Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17 (view source)

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As adopted in 1876, this section read: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person, and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by deposit of money; and no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by the Legislature or created under its authority shall be subject to the control thereof."
As adopted in 1876, this section read: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person; and, when taken, except for the use of the State, such compensation shall be first made, or secured by deposit of money; and no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by the Legislature, or created under its authority shall be subject to the control thereof."


It has been amended once. The 2009 amendment established specific limitations on the taking of private property for public use, excluded certain purposes from the definition of public use, and increased the legislative vote needed to delegate eminent domain authority to non-governmental entities.
It has been amended once. The 2009 amendment established specific limitations on the taking of private property for public use, excluded certain purposes from the definition of public use, and increased the legislative vote needed to delegate eminent domain authority to non-governmental entities.
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* ''TxDOT v. Self'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11329341778052650525#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) (citations & footnotes omitted) ("The Texas Constitution helps ensure that government fulfills this purpose by providing a robust right to adequate compensation . . . . Our Takings Clause protects against more types of government action than its federal counterpart, as it contains the additional verbs 'damaged,' 'destroyed,' and 'applied'—each of which creates a claim with its own distinct scope. 'When the government takes private property without first paying for it, the owner may recover damages for inverse condemnation.'")
* ''Commons of Lake Hous., Ltd. v. City of Houston'', 711 S.W.3d 666, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9212496728385225048#p676 676] (Tex. 2025) (citation & footnotes omitted) ("At this stage in this case, the parties dispute only the third element [of the inverse-condemnation claim]: whether the City's amendment to its floodplain ordinance caused a taking, damaging, destroying, or applying of The Commons's property. We have recognized two broad types of takings: (1) a ''physical'' occupation, appropriation, or invasion of property and (2) a ''regulatory'' action that is so restrictive or intrusive 'that it effectively 'takes' the property.'")


* ''Rodriguez v. City of Robinson'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11365408367965305922#p--- ___] (Tex. 2023) (" ... ")
* ''Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Self'', 690 S.W.3d 12, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9034220576448734346#p26 26] (Tex. 2024) (citations & footnote omitted) ("The elements of an inverse condemnation or 'takings' claim are that (1) an entity with eminent domain power intentionally performed certain acts (2) that resulted in taking, damaging, or destroying the property for, or applying it to, (3) public use. Although the Constitution does not expressly require an intentional act, we have explained that such a requirement helps ensure that the taking is for 'public use.' . . . We explore these two ''Jennings'' standards for proving intent in more detail below.")


* ''City of Baytown v. Schrock'', 645 S.W.3d 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5501203577523966836#p184 184] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("Had the Texas Constitution been presented as an alternative rather than duplicative source of law, today's case may have turned out differently. Or maybe not. We cannot know for sure until we have a case like this one that includes arguments tailored to our ''state'' constitutional law. It is clearly true that the Texas Takings Clause is broader than the federal . . . . We cannot meaningfully answer those questions unless litigants undertake substantial additional work beyond invoking federal takings doctrines.")
* ''City of Baytown v. Schrock'', 645 S.W.3d 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5501203577523966836#p184 184] (Tex. 2022) (Young, concurring) ("Had the Texas Constitution been presented as an alternative rather than duplicative source of law, today's case may have turned out differently. Or maybe not. We cannot know for sure until we have a case like this one that includes arguments tailored to our ''state'' constitutional law. It is clearly true that the Texas Takings Clause is broader than the federal . . . . We cannot meaningfully answer those questions unless litigants undertake substantial additional work beyond invoking federal takings doctrines.")
 
* ''Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys.'', 624 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13869168342441310828#p782 782] (Tex. 2021) ("The final verb in the Texas Takings Clause, 'applied,' has not previously been addressed by this Court. Unlike 'damaged' and 'destroyed,' 'applied' has been included . . . . Given the plain language of the 'applied to public use' prong and our cases interpreting the 'damaged for public use' prong, it is possible that a government entity's violation of a private author's rights in a copyrighted work could in some circumstances require compensation under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.")


* ''KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett'', 593 S.W.3d 175, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3010365581179623555#p186 186-87] (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted) ("A city may take private property when it determines the property is necessary for a public use so long as it provides just compensation to the property owner. To establish a valid exercise of eminent domain, a municipality must show it intends to put the property to public use and that the condemnation is necessary to advance or achieve that public use. . . . Similarly, the mere fact that a particular individual, group, or enterprise may benefit will not deprive the use of its public character.")
* ''KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett'', 593 S.W.3d 175, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3010365581179623555#p186 186-87] (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted) ("A city may take private property when it determines the property is necessary for a public use so long as it provides just compensation to the property owner. To establish a valid exercise of eminent domain, a municipality must show it intends to put the property to public use and that the condemnation is necessary to advance or achieve that public use. . . . Similarly, the mere fact that a particular individual, group, or enterprise may benefit will not deprive the use of its public character.")


* ''Porretto v. Texas Gen. Land Office'', 448 S.W.3d 393, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16625049805220548647#p401 401] (Tex. 2014) ("We are mindful that Article I, Section 17 [] requires compensation for private property 'damaged' as well as 'taken'. And we find troubling the defendants' continued assertion of claims it later abandoned, having been made aware of the Porrettos' contention that those claims were impeding the sale of the Porrettos' property. But as we have said, mere claims do not rise to the level of action requiring compensation under the Constitution. We conclude that the Porrettos are not entitled to prevail on their taking claim.")
* ''Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office'', 448 S.W.3d 393, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16625049805220548647#p401 401] (Tex. 2014) ("We are mindful that Article I, Section 17 [] requires compensation for private property 'damaged' as well as 'taken'. And we find troubling the defendants' continued assertion of claims it later abandoned, having been made aware of the Porrettos' contention that those claims were impeding the sale of the Porrettos' property. But as we have said, mere claims do not rise to the level of action requiring compensation under the Constitution. We conclude that the Porrettos are not entitled to prevail on their taking claim.")


* ''Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State'', 381 S.W.3d 468, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4694948600542306391#p476 476] (Tex. 2012) ("Hearts Bluff brought an inverse condemnation claim against the State. Inverse condemnation is 'a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . . This dispute raises the question of when the State's actions affecting the regulation of property become a taking, compelling us once again to venture into the 'sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog.'")
* ''Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State'', 381 S.W.3d 468, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4694948600542306391#p476 476] (Tex. 2012) ("Hearts Bluff brought an inverse condemnation claim against the State. Inverse condemnation is 'a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . . This dispute raises the question of when the State's actions affecting the regulation of property become a taking, compelling us once again to venture into the 'sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog.'")
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* ''City of Austin v. Nalle'', 120 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/120_SW_996.pdf#page=1 996] (Tex. 1909) ("Eminent domain is defined to be: 'The sovereign power vested in the state to take private property for the public use, providing first a just compensation therefor.' 15 Cyc. 557. 'Taxes are defined to be burthens, or charges, imposed by the legislative power of a state upon persons or property, to raise money for public purposes.' Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 608. The former takes specific property (not money) upon paying compensation therefor. The other takes money, the only compensation being that it will be appropriated according to law.")
* ''City of Austin v. Nalle'', 120 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/120_SW_996.pdf#page=1 996] (Tex. 1909) ("Eminent domain is defined to be: 'The sovereign power vested in the state to take private property for the public use, providing first a just compensation therefor.' 15 Cyc. 557. 'Taxes are defined to be burthens, or charges, imposed by the legislative power of a state upon persons or property, to raise money for public purposes.' Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 608. The former takes specific property (not money) upon paying compensation therefor. The other takes money, the only compensation being that it will be appropriated according to law.")


* ''Storrie v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 46 S.W. 796, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/046_SW_796.pdf#page=4 799] (Tex. 1898) ("This provision of the constitution was in force at the time the street-railway company acquired its right in the streets of Houston and before the mortgage of the trust company was executed. The rights of both the street-railway company and the mortgage company were acquired subject to the control of the legislature upon this question. The legislature had the right to enact the law of 1891, amending the charter of Houston, by which the liability of the street-car company for the cost of paving the street was enlarged.")
* ''Storrie v. Hous. City St. Ry. Co.'', 46 S.W. 796, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/046_SW_796.pdf#page=4 799] (Tex. 1898) ("This provision of the constitution was in force at the time the street-railway company acquired its right in the streets of Houston and before the mortgage of the trust company was executed. The rights of both the street-railway company and the mortgage company were acquired subject to the control of the legislature upon this question. The legislature had the right to enact the law of 1891, amending the charter of Houston, by which the liability of the street-car company for the cost of paving the street was enlarged.")


* ''Travis County v. Trogden'', 31 S.W. 358, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/031_SW_358.pdf#page=2 359] (Tex. 1895) ("In order to make such guaranty perfect, it was provided in 1876 that 'such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money.' The evil, however, did not exist in that class of cases where the right of eminent domain had been exercised in behalf of the state, whether directly, in its own name, or through one of its counties; for the state has control of its own finances and those of its governmental subdivisions . . . and the presumption must have been indulged that the state would deal justly with its citizens.")
* ''Travis County v. Trogden'', 31 S.W. 358, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/031_SW_358.pdf#page=2 359] (Tex. 1895) ("In order to make such guaranty perfect, it was provided in 1876 that 'such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money.' The evil, however, did not exist in that class of cases where the right of eminent domain had been exercised in behalf of the state, whether directly, in its own name, or through one of its counties; for the state has control of its own finances and those of its governmental subdivisions . . . and the presumption must have been indulged that the state would deal justly with its citizens.")


* ''City of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/019_SW_127.pdf#page=5 131] (Tex. 1892) ("[T]his particular clause of the constitution was intended to prohibit the legislature from granting any 'special privilege or immunity' in such way, or of such character, as that it could not be subsequently annulled or declared forfeited for such causes as might be defined by the law, or condemned in the exercise of eminent domain [] and it was further intended that 'all privileges and franchises' granted by the legislature, or under its authority, should at all times remain subject to legislative control and regulation.")
* ''City of Houston v. Hous. City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/019_SW_127.pdf#page=5 131] (Tex. 1892) ("[T]his particular clause of the constitution was intended to prohibit the legislature from granting any 'special privilege or immunity' in such way, or of such character, as that it could not be subsequently annulled or declared forfeited for such causes as might be defined by the law, or condemned in the exercise of eminent domain [] and it was further intended that 'all privileges and franchises' granted by the legislature, or under its authority, should at all times remain subject to legislative control and regulation.")


* ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/050_Tex_614.pdf#page=14 627-28] (1879) ("This provision as to the deposit of money in advance, was evidently intended more particularly to provide speedy adequate compensation for property taken in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain, rendered more frequent by the rapidly-increasing demand for railroads and . . . . There is, however, a distinction between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that of a police regulation to meet an impending peril, by the destruction of an adjacent building to prevent the spread of fire.")
* ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/050_Tex_614.pdf#page=14 627-28] (1879) ("This provision as to the deposit of money in advance, was evidently intended more particularly to provide speedy adequate compensation for property taken in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain, rendered more frequent by the rapidly-increasing demand for railroads and other works . . . . There is, however, a distinction between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that of a police regulation to meet an impending peril, by the destruction of an adjacent building to prevent the spread of fire.")


* ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C.R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_Tex_588.pdf#page=11 598] (1863) ("It cannot be questioned that a railroad for general travel, or the transportation of produce for the country at large, is a 'public use,' for the construction of which private property may be taken or applied upon adequate compensation for it being made. That the road for the construction of which the property when taken is to be applied is a corporation of private individuals to whose benefit the profits of the road, when complete, will alone accrue, furnishes no valid objection to such appropriation of private property.")
* ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C. R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_Tex_588.pdf#page=11 598] (1863) ("It cannot be questioned that a railroad for general travel, or the transportation of produce for the country at large, is a 'public use,' for the construction of which private property may be taken or applied upon adequate compensation for it being made. That the road for the construction of which the property when taken is to be applied is a corporation of private individuals to whose benefit the profits of the road, when complete, will alone accrue, furnishes no valid objection to such appropriation of private property.")


|seo_title=Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution ("Taking Property for Public Use; Grant of Special Privileges")
|seo_title=Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution ("Taking Property for Public Use; Grant of Special Privileges")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 17, eminent domain<!--term is key search term-->, takings clause
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 17, Texas eminent domain<!--term is key search term-->, Texas takings clause
|seo_description=No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation.
|seo_description=No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for public use without adequate compensation.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights


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