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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-23T18:06:33Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

It has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "men" was changed to "free men" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. Unfortunately, no journal exists of the proceedings of either constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6

2026-09-23T17:58:03Z

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution (''"Freedom of Worship"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.'''

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Sections 4 through 7 of Article I, including the recently adopted Section [[Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6-a|6-a]], concern religion. This section is the most expansive of those sections. Among other things, it guarantees individual religious freedom and prohibits discrimination between religious denominations. Despite its breadth, the section has been the subject of relatively few court decisions. Moreover, since roughly the 1950s, Texas state courts have routinely relied on the federal constitution rather than the state constitution when resolving suits involving the interaction of state government and religion. However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law has been heavily criticized.

Due either to the plain language of the provision or to state court decisions interpreting the provision, the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the state constitution sometimes differs from the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the federal constitution. For example, "opening exercises" in public school classrooms that include the reading of a Bible passage and the recital of the Lord's Prayer do not violate this section. However, such practices violate the federal constitution. See ''Abington School District v. Schempp'', 374 U.S. 203, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2708202356121821143#p225 225] (1963) ("They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment . . . .").

This section is derived from the 1845 Texas Constitution, which provided: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion; and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or mode of worship; but it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of their own mode of public worship."

And also note that it is textually similar to the provisions concerning religion contained in the early state constitutions of Delaware (1776 1792 & 1831), Pennsylvania (1776 1790 & 1838), Kentucky (1792 & 1799), and Tennessee (1796 & 1835). For example, the 1799 Kentucky Declaration of Rights provided: "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or modes of worship."

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* ''SMU v. S. Cent. Juris. Conf. of United Methodist Church'', 716 S.W.3d 475, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14056762347756447748#p508 508] (Tex. 2025) (Young, concurring) ("I turn to the question that in the end may prove most consequential: Given the Texas Constitution's distinct language and history, is its church-autonomy doctrine meaningfully different from its federal counterpart? As with other important constitutional guarantees, the answer is: 'We still do not really know, even as we approach the sesquicentennial of our current Constitution.' ''Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, 664 (Tex. 2022) (Young, J., concurring).")

* ''Perez v. City of San Antonio'', 715 S.W.3d 709, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3463690842371194617#p717 717] n.9 (Tex. 2025) ("We have also applied strict scrutiny to the Texas Constitution's Freedom of Worship Clause, which is original to the 1876 Texas Constitution and provides in part: 'All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,' and '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. For want of arguments to the contrary, we have assumed that the Freedom of Worship Clause provides protection that is 'coextensive' with the federal Free Exercise Clause and thus requires a strict-scrutiny analysis.")

* ''Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert'', 264 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5305447475925079813#p2 2] (Tex. 2008) ("This appeal concerns the tension between a church's right to protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and a church member's right to judicial redress under a claim for intentional tort. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. . . . We further conclude the case, as tried, presents an ecclesiastical dispute over religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church doctrine and, accordingly, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the case.")

* ''HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd.'', 235 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=517806966840097315#p642 642] (Tex. 2007) (footnotes omitted) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits . . . . Correspondingly, article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution states that 'no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society'. We have referred to this provision and article I, section 7 as 'Texas' equivalent of the Establishment Clause.' The parties do not argue that there is any difference in the application of these federal and state constitutional provisions to this case, and we will assume for present purposes that they are coextensive.")

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* ''State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church'', 683 S.W.2d 692, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9335125298661201719#p696 696-97] (Tex. 1984) ("[T]he State has a compelling interest of the highest order in protecting the children in child-care facilities from physical and mental harm. . . . We have considered all of People's Baptist's remaining arguments: that state licensing and regulation of these homes would violate the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. 1983; article I, sections 3a, 6 and 19; article II, section 1; and article III, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. We conclude that the State's regulatory scheme does not violate these provisions.")

* ''Ex parte Luehr'', 266 S.W.2d 375, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10688224872471884201#p376 376] (Tex.Crim.App. 1954) ("The [City of Cuero] ordinance in question reads as follows: '. . . .' Appellant is a missionary evangelist preaching from house to house by soliciting and taking orders for subscriptions to the magazine The Watchtower, under the directions of the Victoria Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, as his way of worship. Under many authorities the above ordinance when properly construed and applied does not cover such preaching activities, and if it does so the ordinance is in conflict with the Constitutions of the United States and of This [sic] State.")

* ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=3 305] (Tex. 1918) ("The ordinance [requiring students attending school to be vaccinated against the smallpox virus] does not in any way undertake to control or interfere with any rights of conscience in matters of religion. As pointed out in Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United States . . . . No more does section 6 of the Bill of Rights in our state Constitution relieve one from obedience to reasonable health regulations, enacted under the police power of the state, because such regulations happen not to conform to one's religious belief.")

* ''Church v. Bullock'', 109 S.W. 115, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/109_SW_115.pdf#page=3 117-18] (Tex. 1908) ("Did the exercises which the evidence shows the teachers engaged in convert the schoolroom into a 'place of worship,' within the intent and meaning of [this section]? . . . An annual appropriation is made for a chaplain for the penitentiary; in fact, Christianity is so interwoven with the web and woof of the state government that to sustain the contention that the Constitution prohibits reading the Bible, offering prayers, or singing songs of a religious character in any public building of the government would produce a condition bordering upon moral anarchy.")

* ''Gabel v. City of Houston'', 29 Tex. 335, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/029_Tex_335.pdf#page=13 347] (1867) ("It does not enjoin upon any person the duty of conforming his conduct to the rites of his church; but it does prevent him from following a tippling occupation in the city on Sunday, by which crowds of persons may be congregated at a public house, and, under the influence of intoxication, may commit riots and breaches of the peace, to the great annoyance . . . . That there is nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this state to prevent the legislature from forbidding the pursuit of worldly business upon Sunday, has been decided in a number of states.")

* ''Blair v. Odin'', 3 Tex. 288, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_Tex_288.pdf#page=13 300] (1848) ("But the revolution, and the constitution formed by the people as the fundamental system of the new government, materially affected these pretensions of the church, and with justice and humanity resolved, that, as man is an accountable being, he should be permitted to worship his maker according to the dictates of his own conscience. The third article of the Declaration of Rights is, that '. . . .' This declaration reduced the Roman Catholic church from the high privilege of being the only national church, to a level and an equality with every other denomination of religion.")

|seo_title=Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Worship")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 6, religious liberty, school prayer
|seo_description=All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Religion Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T20:41:33Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

It has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "men" was changed to "free men" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. Unfortunately, no report exists of the proceedings of either constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T20:36:24Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

It has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "men" was changed to "free men" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. Unfortunately, no report exists of the proceedings of either constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T20:32:47Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "men" was changed to "free men" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. Unfortunately, no report exists of the proceedings of either constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6

2026-09-22T20:07:16Z

Admin:

{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution (''"Freedom of Worship"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.'''

|editor=

Sections 4 through 7 of Article I, including the recently adopted Section [[Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6-a|6-a]], concern religion. This section is the most expansive of those sections. Among other things, it guarantees individual religious freedom and prohibits discrimination between religious denominations. Despite its breadth, the section has been the subject of relatively few court decisions. Moreover, since roughly the 1950s, Texas state courts have routinely relied on the federal constitution rather than the state constitution when resolving suits involving the interaction of state government and religion. However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law has been heavily criticized.

Due either to the plain language of the provision or to state court decisions interpreting the provision, the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the state constitution sometimes differs from the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the federal constitution. For example, "opening exercises" in public school classrooms that include the reading of a Bible passage and the recital of the Lord's Prayer do not violate this section. However, such practices violate the federal constitution. See ''Abington School District v. Schempp'', 374 U.S. 203, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2708202356121821143#p225 225] (1963) ("They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment . . . .").

This section is derived from the 1845 Texas Constitution, which provided: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion; and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or mode of worship; but it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of their own mode of public worship."

And also note that it is textually similar to the provisions concerning religion contained in the early state constitutions of Delaware (1776 1792 & 1831), Pennsylvania (1776 1790 & 1838), Kentucky (1792 & 1799), and Tennessee (1796). For example, the 1799 Kentucky Declaration of Rights provided: "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or modes of worship."

|recent=

* ''SMU v. S. Cent. Juris. Conf. of United Methodist Church'', 716 S.W.3d 475, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14056762347756447748#p508 508] (Tex. 2025) (Young, concurring) ("I turn to the question that in the end may prove most consequential: Given the Texas Constitution's distinct language and history, is its church-autonomy doctrine meaningfully different from its federal counterpart? As with other important constitutional guarantees, the answer is: 'We still do not really know, even as we approach the sesquicentennial of our current Constitution.' ''Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, 664 (Tex. 2022) (Young, J., concurring).")

* ''Perez v. City of San Antonio'', 715 S.W.3d 709, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3463690842371194617#p717 717] n.9 (Tex. 2025) ("We have also applied strict scrutiny to the Texas Constitution's Freedom of Worship Clause, which is original to the 1876 Texas Constitution and provides in part: 'All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,' and '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. For want of arguments to the contrary, we have assumed that the Freedom of Worship Clause provides protection that is 'coextensive' with the federal Free Exercise Clause and thus requires a strict-scrutiny analysis.")

* ''Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert'', 264 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5305447475925079813#p2 2] (Tex. 2008) ("This appeal concerns the tension between a church's right to protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and a church member's right to judicial redress under a claim for intentional tort. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. . . . We further conclude the case, as tried, presents an ecclesiastical dispute over religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church doctrine and, accordingly, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the case.")

* ''HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd.'', 235 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=517806966840097315#p642 642] (Tex. 2007) (footnotes omitted) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits . . . . Correspondingly, article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution states that 'no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society'. We have referred to this provision and article I, section 7 as 'Texas' equivalent of the Establishment Clause.' The parties do not argue that there is any difference in the application of these federal and state constitutional provisions to this case, and we will assume for present purposes that they are coextensive.")

|historic=

* ''State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church'', 683 S.W.2d 692, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9335125298661201719#p696 696-97] (Tex. 1984) ("[T]he State has a compelling interest of the highest order in protecting the children in child-care facilities from physical and mental harm. . . . We have considered all of People's Baptist's remaining arguments: that state licensing and regulation of these homes would violate the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. 1983; article I, sections 3a, 6 and 19; article II, section 1; and article III, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. We conclude that the State's regulatory scheme does not violate these provisions.")

* ''Ex parte Luehr'', 266 S.W.2d 375, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10688224872471884201#p376 376] (Tex.Crim.App. 1954) ("The [City of Cuero] ordinance in question reads as follows: '. . . .' Appellant is a missionary evangelist preaching from house to house by soliciting and taking orders for subscriptions to the magazine The Watchtower, under the directions of the Victoria Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, as his way of worship. Under many authorities the above ordinance when properly construed and applied does not cover such preaching activities, and if it does so the ordinance is in conflict with the Constitutions of the United States and of This [sic] State.")

* ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=3 305] (Tex. 1918) ("The ordinance [requiring students attending school to be vaccinated against the smallpox virus] does not in any way undertake to control or interfere with any rights of conscience in matters of religion. As pointed out in Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United States . . . . No more does section 6 of the Bill of Rights in our state Constitution relieve one from obedience to reasonable health regulations, enacted under the police power of the state, because such regulations happen not to conform to one's religious belief.")

* ''Church v. Bullock'', 109 S.W. 115, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/109_SW_115.pdf#page=3 117-18] (Tex. 1908) ("Did the exercises which the evidence shows the teachers engaged in convert the schoolroom into a 'place of worship,' within the intent and meaning of [this section]? . . . An annual appropriation is made for a chaplain for the penitentiary; in fact, Christianity is so interwoven with the web and woof of the state government that to sustain the contention that the Constitution prohibits reading the Bible, offering prayers, or singing songs of a religious character in any public building of the government would produce a condition bordering upon moral anarchy.")

* ''Gabel v. City of Houston'', 29 Tex. 335, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/029_Tex_335.pdf#page=13 347] (1867) ("It does not enjoin upon any person the duty of conforming his conduct to the rites of his church; but it does prevent him from following a tippling occupation in the city on Sunday, by which crowds of persons may be congregated at a public house, and, under the influence of intoxication, may commit riots and breaches of the peace, to the great annoyance . . . . That there is nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this state to prevent the legislature from forbidding the pursuit of worldly business upon Sunday, has been decided in a number of states.")

* ''Blair v. Odin'', 3 Tex. 288, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_Tex_288.pdf#page=13 300] (1848) ("But the revolution, and the constitution formed by the people as the fundamental system of the new government, materially affected these pretensions of the church, and with justice and humanity resolved, that, as man is an accountable being, he should be permitted to worship his maker according to the dictates of his own conscience. The third article of the Declaration of Rights is, that '. . . .' This declaration reduced the Roman Catholic church from the high privilege of being the only national church, to a level and an equality with every other denomination of religion.")

|seo_title=Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Worship")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 6, religious liberty, school prayer
|seo_description=All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Religion Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6

2026-09-22T20:05:49Z

Admin:

{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution (''"Freedom of Worship"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.'''

|editor=

Sections 4 through 7 of Article I, including the recently adopted Section [[Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 6-a|6-a]], concern religion. This section is the most expansive of those sections. Among other things, it guarantees individual religious freedom and prohibits discrimination between religious denominations. Despite its breadth, the section has been the subject of relatively few court decisions. Moreover, since roughly the 1950s, Texas state courts have routinely relied on the federal constitution rather than the state constitution when resolving suits involving the interaction of state government and religion. However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law has been heavily criticized.

Due either to the plain language of the provision or to state court decisions interpreting the provision, the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the state constitution sometimes differs from the substance of the provisions concerning religion contained in the federal constitution. For example, "opening exercises" in public school classrooms that include the reading of a Bible passage and the recital of the Lord's Prayer do not violate this section. However, such practices violate the federal constitution. See ''Abington School District v. Schempp'', 374 U.S. 203, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2708202356121821143#p225 225] (1963) ("They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment . . . .").

This section is derived from the 1845 Texas Constitution, which provided: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion; and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or mode of worship; but it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of their own mode of public worship."

And also note that it is textually similar to the provisions concerning religion contained in the early state constitutions of Delaware (1776 1792 & 1831), Pennsylvania (1776 1790 & 1838), Tennessee (1796), and Kentucky (1792 & 1799). For example, the 1799 Kentucky Declaration of Rights provided: "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious societies or modes of worship."

|recent=

* ''SMU v. S. Cent. Juris. Conf. of United Methodist Church'', 716 S.W.3d 475, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14056762347756447748#p508 508] (Tex. 2025) (Young, concurring) ("I turn to the question that in the end may prove most consequential: Given the Texas Constitution's distinct language and history, is its church-autonomy doctrine meaningfully different from its federal counterpart? As with other important constitutional guarantees, the answer is: 'We still do not really know, even as we approach the sesquicentennial of our current Constitution.' ''Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, 664 (Tex. 2022) (Young, J., concurring).")

* ''Perez v. City of San Antonio'', 715 S.W.3d 709, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3463690842371194617#p717 717] n.9 (Tex. 2025) ("We have also applied strict scrutiny to the Texas Constitution's Freedom of Worship Clause, which is original to the 1876 Texas Constitution and provides in part: 'All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences,' and '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. For want of arguments to the contrary, we have assumed that the Freedom of Worship Clause provides protection that is 'coextensive' with the federal Free Exercise Clause and thus requires a strict-scrutiny analysis.")

* ''Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert'', 264 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5305447475925079813#p2 2] (Tex. 2008) ("This appeal concerns the tension between a church's right to protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and a church member's right to judicial redress under a claim for intentional tort. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 6. . . . We further conclude the case, as tried, presents an ecclesiastical dispute over religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church doctrine and, accordingly, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss the case.")

* ''HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd.'', 235 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=517806966840097315#p642 642] (Tex. 2007) (footnotes omitted) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits . . . . Correspondingly, article I, section 6 of the Texas Constitution states that 'no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society'. We have referred to this provision and article I, section 7 as 'Texas' equivalent of the Establishment Clause.' The parties do not argue that there is any difference in the application of these federal and state constitutional provisions to this case, and we will assume for present purposes that they are coextensive.")

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* ''State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church'', 683 S.W.2d 692, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9335125298661201719#p696 696-97] (Tex. 1984) ("[T]he State has a compelling interest of the highest order in protecting the children in child-care facilities from physical and mental harm. . . . We have considered all of People's Baptist's remaining arguments: that state licensing and regulation of these homes would violate the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. 1983; article I, sections 3a, 6 and 19; article II, section 1; and article III, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. We conclude that the State's regulatory scheme does not violate these provisions.")

* ''Ex parte Luehr'', 266 S.W.2d 375, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10688224872471884201#p376 376] (Tex.Crim.App. 1954) ("The [City of Cuero] ordinance in question reads as follows: '. . . .' Appellant is a missionary evangelist preaching from house to house by soliciting and taking orders for subscriptions to the magazine The Watchtower, under the directions of the Victoria Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, as his way of worship. Under many authorities the above ordinance when properly construed and applied does not cover such preaching activities, and if it does so the ordinance is in conflict with the Constitutions of the United States and of This [sic] State.")

* ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=3 305] (Tex. 1918) ("The ordinance [requiring students attending school to be vaccinated against the smallpox virus] does not in any way undertake to control or interfere with any rights of conscience in matters of religion. As pointed out in Chief Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United States . . . . No more does section 6 of the Bill of Rights in our state Constitution relieve one from obedience to reasonable health regulations, enacted under the police power of the state, because such regulations happen not to conform to one's religious belief.")

* ''Church v. Bullock'', 109 S.W. 115, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/109_SW_115.pdf#page=3 117-18] (Tex. 1908) ("Did the exercises which the evidence shows the teachers engaged in convert the schoolroom into a 'place of worship,' within the intent and meaning of [this section]? . . . An annual appropriation is made for a chaplain for the penitentiary; in fact, Christianity is so interwoven with the web and woof of the state government that to sustain the contention that the Constitution prohibits reading the Bible, offering prayers, or singing songs of a religious character in any public building of the government would produce a condition bordering upon moral anarchy.")

* ''Gabel v. City of Houston'', 29 Tex. 335, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/029_Tex_335.pdf#page=13 347] (1867) ("It does not enjoin upon any person the duty of conforming his conduct to the rites of his church; but it does prevent him from following a tippling occupation in the city on Sunday, by which crowds of persons may be congregated at a public house, and, under the influence of intoxication, may commit riots and breaches of the peace, to the great annoyance . . . . That there is nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this state to prevent the legislature from forbidding the pursuit of worldly business upon Sunday, has been decided in a number of states.")

* ''Blair v. Odin'', 3 Tex. 288, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_Tex_288.pdf#page=13 300] (1848) ("But the revolution, and the constitution formed by the people as the fundamental system of the new government, materially affected these pretensions of the church, and with justice and humanity resolved, that, as man is an accountable being, he should be permitted to worship his maker according to the dictates of his own conscience. The third article of the Declaration of Rights is, that '. . . .' This declaration reduced the Roman Catholic church from the high privilege of being the only national church, to a level and an equality with every other denomination of religion.")

|seo_title=Article I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Worship")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 6, religious liberty, school prayer
|seo_description=All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Religion Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T19:52:01Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "men" was changed to "freemen" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. No report exists of the proceedings of either constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T19:48:51Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The term "freemen" was substituted for "men" in the first section. No change was made to the twenty-sixth section. Note that no report exist of the proceedings of either the 1792 or 1799 constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T19:43:58Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The first Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The first Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." The twenty-sixth section was not amended. Note that no report exist of the proceedings of either the 1792 or 1799 constitutional convention.

The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The first Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T19:15:45Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction." The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." The twenty-sixth section was not amended. Note that no report exist of the proceedings of either the 1792 or 1799 constitutional convention.

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T19:00:15Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objections were raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T15:55:15Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T15:54:23Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T15:53:56Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T14:51:27Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=7 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-22T14:50:24Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/braden_tex_const_3_and_3-a.pdf#page=2 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

File:braden tex const 3 and 3-a.pdf

2026-09-22T14:47:36Z

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:33:50Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee's version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:32:42Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three-person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:32:17Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the three=person committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:27:36Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:26:46Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that the substance of this section and the substance of the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:25:06Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have uniformly held that the substance of this section and the substance of the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:24:15Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the substance of the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:22:25Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:20:48Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the [Texas] Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:20:17Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:19:32Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved and forwarded by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new state constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:17:35Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T19:13:43Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. The framers of the Constitution of 1836 placed this section first in the Declaration of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:58:03Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:56:14Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("In the light of judicial equating of Section 3 and the Equal Protection Clause, it would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated
against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:54:08Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:50:07Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:46:37Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:40:28Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden et al., 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi et al., ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Conn. Hist. Rev. 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

The declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T18:22:50Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'', 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:47:18Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:44:43Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014-2015) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:42:15Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision.
Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014-2015) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This fundamental section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:41:54Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision.
Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014-2015) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:40:23Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision.
Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014-2015) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review 101, https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:39:49Z

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[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision.
Cf. Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery, ''On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees'' 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, [https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315] (2014-2015) ("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:34:39Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf.

Steven Calabresi & Sofía Vickery

On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees
2015

[https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Calabresi-93-6.pdf#page=17 1315]

("Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."); Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:25:36Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf.

1315

"Historians agree that these changes were intended to reassure slaveholders that the Guarantee would not be interpreted as abolishing slavery in Virginia in 1776."

Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-21T16:08:04Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-20T19:13:21Z

Admin: Undo revision 9553 by Admin (talk)

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3

2026-09-20T19:12:36Z

Admin:

[[Category:Featured Article]]{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''"Equal Rights Provision"'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

'''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.'''

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This has been called a "natural rights" provision. See George Braden, 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=42 13] (1977) ("Couched in language reminiscent of the United States Declaration of Independence, Section 3 is the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights.").

However, Texas courts have always treated it as simply an "equal rights" provision. Cf. Robert Forbes, ''Grating the Nutmeg: Slavery and Racism in Connecticut from the Colonial Era to the Civil War'', 52.2 Connecticut History Review [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Connecticut_History_52.2.pdf#page=18 118-19] (2013) ("As in Virginia, the Mississippi delegates adopted the Lockean language of 'social compact' explicitly to evade attributing rights to slaves, who by law and custom were considered aliens.").

And, for at least the last thirty-five years, Texas courts have held that the substance of this section and the federal equal protection clause are identical. Cf. 1 ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'' [https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf#page=48 19] ("[I]t would seem sensible to rewrite Sections 3 and 3a along these lines: No person may be denied the equal protection of the laws or discriminated against by law because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").

It's entirely improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the origin of this section's unique text is outlined below. Cf. ''Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp.'', 283 S.W.3d 838, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15690929099727630487#p842 842] (Tex. 2009) ("In construing the Constitution, as in construing statutes, the fundamental guiding rule is to give effect to the intent of the makers and adopters of the provision in question.").

The groundbreaking Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services, which, not being
descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge, to be hereditary."

Note that the declaration of rights approved by the committee assigned to draft Virginia's new constitution did not contain the "when they enter into a state of society" language. That text was added on the convention floor after an objection was raised that the committee version of Section 1 would undermine the state's system of chattel slavery. See ''The Virginia Declaration of Rights'' at [https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/discover/sources/revolutionary-documents/the-virginia-declaration-of-rights/ 1] ("This addition, which the convention accepted, was understood to exclude enslaved people from the document's expansive promises of natural rights.").

The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was adopted in September 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fifth read in part: "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community."

The North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.

The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible to children, or descendents, or relations by blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural."

The Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."

The Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this state."

The Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."

In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."

The Florida Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1838. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal; and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness. And the twenty-fifth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."

The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.

In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."

In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.

The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized and shall ever remain inviolate, nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."

Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

The courts and commentators often insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p236 236-37] (Tex. 2024) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution provides the following guarantee of equal rights: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3. We have typically referred to Section 3 as our Constitution's 'equal protection' clause. ''See'' ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex.'', 95 S.W.3d 253, 257 n.4 (Tex. 2002). In 1972, Texans adopted the Equal Rights Amendment, which states, '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. For convenience, we will refer to these two provisions jointly as the Equal Rights Clauses. We evaluate alleged violations of the Equal Rights Clauses in three steps.")

* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' Tex. Const. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.")

* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.")

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, dissenting) ("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language . . . . While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.")

* ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).")

* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).")

* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.")

* ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.")

* ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.")

* ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.")

* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=4 999-1000] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'")

* ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

* ''Bohl v. State'', 3 Tex.Ct.App. 683, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_TexCtApp_683.pdf#page=2 684-85] (1878) (citations omitted) ("[A]rticle 1, which is in these words: 'All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services.' . . . The principle enunciated in the 3d section of the Bill of Rights is to be found expressed in the same language in each of the Constitutions under which the people of Texas have lived since the organization of the state government. And under those Constitutions the decisions heretofore rendered, holding Sunday laws constitutional, were made by our courts.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, equal rights provision, equal protection clause
|seo_description=This foundational section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."
|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision

}}

[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Civil Rights Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]