Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a - Revision history

https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Texas_Constitution%3AArticle_I%2C_Section_3-a Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a - Revision history 2026-04-27T13:04:19Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.39.3 https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8965&oldid=prev Admin at 16:02, October 24, 2025 2025-10-24T16:02:56Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 11:02, October 24, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l25">Line 25:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 25:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">J. </del>Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law or regulation . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law or regulation . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8964&oldid=prev Admin: Undo revision 8963 by Admin (talk) 2025-10-24T15:55:52Z

<p>Undo revision 8963 by <a href="/Special:Contributions/Admin" title="Special:Contributions/Admin">Admin</a> (<a href="/User_talk:Admin" title="User talk:Admin">talk</a>)</p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 10:55, October 24, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l1">Line 1:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 1:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3-a of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Equal Rights Amendment"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Added November 7, 1972:</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3-a of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Equal Rights Amendment"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Added November 7, 1972:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">'''</ins>Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">'''</ins></div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>|editor=</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>|editor=</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8963&oldid=prev Admin at 15:55, October 24, 2025 2025-10-24T15:55:25Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 10:55, October 24, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l1">Line 1:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 1:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3-a of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Equal Rights Amendment"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Added November 7, 1972:</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3-a of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Equal Rights Amendment"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Added November 7, 1972:</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div><del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">'''</del>Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">'''</del></div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>|editor=</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>|editor=</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8916&oldid=prev Admin at 23:50, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T23:50:44Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 18:50, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l23">Line 23:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 23:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[Texas] </ins>Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8915&oldid=prev Admin at 23:44, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T23:44:20Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 18:44, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l23">Line 23:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 23:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[Texas] </ins>Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8914&oldid=prev Admin at 23:43, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T23:43:24Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 18:43, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l27">Line 27:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 27:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">or regulation </ins>. . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Heaton v. Bristol'', 317 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18222848089783696141#p98 98] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1958, ref'd) ("Neither counsel for appellants nor appellees have pointed out any case wherein an appellate court of any jurisdiction has at any time held, or even intimated, that a state cannot, as a part of its over-all educational system, maintain one all-male or one all-female university as the Legislature has done in Texas for our higher educational system. There is certainly not even the remotest suggestion by inference or otherwise in any of the reported cases that the system now maintained by Texas constitutes a violation of any constitutional provisions, State or Federal.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Heaton v. Bristol'', 317 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18222848089783696141#p98 98] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1958, ref'd) ("Neither counsel for appellants nor appellees have pointed out any case wherein an appellate court of any jurisdiction has at any time held, or even intimated, that a state cannot, as a part of its over-all educational system, maintain one all-male or one all-female university as the Legislature has done in Texas for our higher educational system. There is certainly not even the remotest suggestion by inference or otherwise in any of the reported cases that the system now maintained by Texas constitutes a violation of any constitutional provisions, State or Federal.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8913&oldid=prev Admin at 22:08, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T22:08:29Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 17:08, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l25">Line 25:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 25:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">The sex equality provision of the Texas ERA is not . . . . </del>Adoption of the Texas <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">ERA</del>, considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[Equal Rights Amendment]</ins>, considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8912&oldid=prev Admin at 22:06, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T22:06:31Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 17:06, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l25">Line 25:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 25:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("The sex equality provision of the Texas ERA is not <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">simply window dressing added to the state constitution as a sop for a few overwrought but vocal citizens</del>. Adoption of the Texas ERA, considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("The sex equality provision of the Texas ERA is not <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">. . . </ins>. Adoption of the Texas ERA, considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8911&oldid=prev Admin at 22:04, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T22:04:46Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 17:04, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l25">Line 25:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 25:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#<del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">p797 797</del>] n.3 (Tex.1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) (" <del style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;"> </del>")</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">p802 802</ins>] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("<ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">The sex equality provision of the Texas ERA is not simply window dressing added to the state constitution as a sop for a few overwrought but vocal citizens. Adoption of the Texas ERA, considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.</ins>")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> </table>

Admin https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_I,_Section_3-a&diff=8910&oldid=prev Admin at 21:58, June 25, 2025 2025-06-25T21:58:40Z

<p></p> <table style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122;" data-mw="interface"> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <col class="diff-marker" /> <col class="diff-content" /> <tr class="diff-title" lang="en"> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">← Older revision</td> <td colspan="2" style="background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;">Revision as of 16:58, June 25, 2025</td> </tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno" id="mw-diff-left-l25">Line 25:</td> <td colspan="2" class="diff-lineno">Line 25:</td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793,</div></td><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="+"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">[https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p797 </ins>797] n.3 (Tex.1980) (J. <ins style="font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;">Steakley</ins>, dissenting) (" ")</div></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div> </div></td><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-added"></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div> </div></td><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-added"></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker" data-marker="−"></td><td style="color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>797] n.3 (Tex.1980) (J. , dissenting) (" ")</div></td><td colspan="2" class="diff-side-added"></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br/></td></tr> <tr><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td><td class="diff-marker"></td><td style="background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;"><div>* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.")</div></td></tr> </table>

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