Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 8 - Revision history

Admin at 21:27, October 25, 2025

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	* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")		* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")

	* ''AEP Tex. ~~Commercial~~ & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply ''because''.'")		* ''AEP Tex. Com. & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply ''because''.'")

	* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")		* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

Admin at 21:10, October 25, 2025

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	* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")		* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")

	* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.'")		* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply ''because''.'")

	* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")		* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

Admin at 21:08, October 25, 2025

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	* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")		* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")

	* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.~~) (footnotes omitted~~) ("In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well. More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be 'broader' in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is 'broader' in all others, and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart. Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.' Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, 'we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8.'")		* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.'")

	* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")		* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

Admin at 21:04, October 25, 2025

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	* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")		* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")

	* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923]		* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) ("In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well. More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be 'broader' in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is 'broader' in all others, and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart. Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.' Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, 'we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8.'")
	(Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) ("In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well. More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be 'broader' in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is 'broader' in all others, and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart. Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.' Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, 'we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8.'")

	* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")		* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

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 * ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")
+* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923]
+(Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) ("In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well. More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be 'broader' in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is 'broader' in all others, and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart. Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.' Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, 'we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8.'")
 * ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

Admin at 20:54, October 25, 2025

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	* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")		* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.")




			== add ==

			AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 436 S.W.3d 890,

			https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205 ]

			(Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.)

			We 923*923 see no reason to depart from these precedents here. In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is "broader" or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well.[131] More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be "broader" in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is "broader" in all others,[132] and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart.[133] Consequently, whether "Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech ... than the First Amendment" in a particular application or context "must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because."[134] Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, "we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8."[135]





	* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")		* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.")

Admin: Undo revision 8995 by Admin (talk)

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Undo revision 8995 by Admin (talk)

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	{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Freedom of Speech"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution\|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:		{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Freedom of Speech"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution\|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

	Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.		'''Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.'''

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	{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Freedom of Speech"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution\|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:		{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Freedom of Speech"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution\|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:

	~~'''~~Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.~~'''~~		Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.

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	\|seo_title=Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Speech")		\|seo_title=Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Speech")
	\|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 8, free speech, free press		\|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 8, free speech, free press
	\|seo_description=Every person shall be at liberty to speak or publish ~~his~~ opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.		\|seo_description=Every person shall be at liberty to speak or publish their opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
	\|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights		\|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights

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	\|seo_title=Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Speech")		\|seo_title=Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ("Freedom of Speech")
	\|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 8, free speech, free press		\|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 8, free speech, free press
	\|seo_description=Every person shall be at liberty to speak~~, write~~ or publish his opinions ~~on any subject~~, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.		\|seo_description=Every person shall be at liberty to speak or publish his opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
	\|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights		\|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights