Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 49-k and Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between pages

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 49-k of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Texas Mobility Fund"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Added November 6, 2001:
{{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''.


'''(a) In this section: (1) "Commission" means the Texas Transportation Commission or its successor. (2) "Comptroller" means the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas. (3) "Department" means the Texas Department of Transportation or its successor. (4) "Fund" means the Texas Mobility Fund. (5) "Obligations" means bonds, notes, and other public securities.'''
==review==


'''(b) The Texas Mobility Fund is created in the State Treasury and shall be administered by the Commission as a revolving fund to provide a method of financing the construction, reconstruction, acquisition, and expansion of state highways, including costs of any necessary design and costs of acquisition of rights-of-way, as determined by the Commission in accordance with standards and procedures established by law.'''
x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TCA 2004)


'''(c) Money in the Fund may also be used to provide participation by the State in the payment of a portion of the costs of constructing and providing publicly owned toll roads and other public transportation projects in accordance with the procedures, standards, and limitations established by law.'''
_ Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680 (TCA 2000)


'''(d) The Commission may issue and sell obligations of the State and enter into related credit agreements that are payable from and secured by a pledge of and a lien on all or part of the money on deposit in the Fund in an aggregate principal amount that can be repaid when due from money on deposit in the Fund, as that aggregate amount is projected by the Comptroller in accordance with procedures established by law. The proceeds of the obligations must be deposited in the Fund and used for one or more specific purposes authorized by law, including: (1) refunding obligations and related credit agreements authorized by this section; (2) creating reserves for payment of the obligations and related credit agreements; (3) paying the costs of issuance; and (4) paying interest on the obligations and related credit agreements for a period not longer than the maximum period established by law.'''
_ Sw. Travis Co. WD v. Austin, 64 S.W.3d 25 (TCA 2000)


'''(e) The Legislature by law may dedicate to the Fund one or more specific sources or portions, or a specific amount, of the revenue, including taxes, and other money of the
x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (2000) (!dissent!)
State that are not otherwise dedicated by this constitution. The Legislature may not dedicate money from the collection of motor vehicle registration fees and taxes on motor fuels and lubricants dedicated by Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 7-a|7-a]], Article VIII, of this constitution, but it may dedicate money received from other sources that are allocated to the same costs as those dedicated taxes and fees.'''


'''(f) Money dedicated as provided by this section is appropriated when received by the State, shall be deposited in the Fund, and may be used as provided by this section and law enacted under this section without further appropriation. While money in the Fund is pledged to the payment of any outstanding obligations or related credit agreements, the dedication of a specific source or portion of revenue, taxes, or other money made as provided by this section may not be reduced, rescinded, or repealed unless: (1) the Legislature by law dedicates a substitute or different source that is projected by the Comptroller to be of a value equal to or greater than the source or amount being reduced, rescinded, or repealed and authorizes the Commission to implement the authority granted by Subsection (g) of this section; and (2) the Commission implements the authority granted by the Legislature pursuant to Subsection (g) of this section.'''
_ Austin v. Cedar Park, 953 S.W.2d 424 (TCA 1997)


'''(g) In addition to the dedication of specified sources or amounts of revenue, taxes, or money as provided by Subsection (e) of this section, the Legislature may by law authorize the Commission to guarantee the payment of any obligations and credit agreements issued and executed by the Commission under the authority of this section by pledging the full faith and credit of the State to that payment if dedicated revenue is insufficient for that purpose. If that authority is granted and is implemented by the Commission, while any of the bonds, notes, other obligations, or credit agreements are outstanding and unpaid, and for any fiscal year during which the dedicated revenue, taxes, and money are insufficient to make all payments when due, there is appropriated, and there shall be deposited in the Fund, out of the first money coming into the State Treasury in each fiscal year that is not otherwise appropriated by this constitution, an amount that is sufficient to pay the principal of the obligations and agreements and the interest on the obligations and agreements that become due during that fiscal year, minus any amount in the Fund that is available for that payment in accordance with applicable law.'''
x Scurlock P. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)


'''(h) Proceedings authorizing obligations and related credit agreements to be issued and executed under the authority of this section shall be submitted to the Attorney General for approval as to their legality. If the Attorney General finds that they will be issued in accordance with this section and applicable law, the Attorney General shall approve them, and, after payment by the purchasers of the obligations in accordance with the terms of sale and after execution and delivery of the related credit agreements, the obligations and related credit agreements are incontestable for any cause.'''
_ Morris v. San Antonio, 572 S.W.2d 831 (TCA 1978)


'''(i) Obligations and credit agreements issued or executed under the authority of this section may not be included in the computation required by Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 49-j|49-j]], Article III, of this constitution, except that if money has been dedicated to the Fund without specification of its source or the authority granted by Subsection (g) of this section has been implemented, the obligations and credit agreements shall be included to the extent the Comptroller projects that general funds of the state, if any, will be required to pay amounts due on or on account of the obligations and credit agreements.'''
x Suburban Ut. Co. v. State, 553 S.W.2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre)


'''(j) The collection and deposit of the amounts required by this section, applicable law, and contract to be applied to the payment of obligations and credit agreements issued, executed, and secured under the authority of this section may be enforced by mandamus against the Commission, the Department, and the Comptroller in a district court of Travis County, and the sovereign immunity of the state is waived for that purpose.'''
_ Culberson County v. Holmes, 513 S.W.2d 126 (TCA 1974)


|editor=
x Inman v. Rr Comm., 478 S.W.2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)


Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2015/kp0017.pdf#page=4 KP-17] (2015), opined that: "A court would likely conclude that the language used to describe Proposition 15 on the 2001 November ballot, adding article III, section 49-k to the Texas Constitution, sufficiently expressed the scope and character of the proposed amendment and set its subject matter apart from the other amendments to satisfy constitutional standards."
_ Creps v. Firemen's Fund, 456 S.W.2d 434 (TCA nre)


|recent=
x Gould v. El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696 (TCA 1969 nre)


None.
x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)


|historic=
x Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959)


None.
x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)


|seo_title=Article III, Section 49-k of the Texas Constitution ("Texas Mobility Fund")
x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 49-k, road bonds, debt authorization
|seo_description=The Texas Mobility Fund is created in the State Treasury and administered by the Commission as a revolving fund.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


}}
x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)


[[Category:Transportation Law]]
x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (TCA 1948)
[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
 
x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)
 
x Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd)
 
x Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.2d 919 (TCA 1944)
 
x Jameson v. Smith, 161 S.W.2d 520 (TCA 1942)
 
x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 wm)
 
x Wood v. Marfa I.S.D, 123 S.W.2d 429 (TCA 1939 revog)
 
x Watson v. Sabine Royalty Co., 120 S.W.2d 938 (TCA 1938 refd)
 
x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)
 
x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)
 
x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)
 
x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934)
 
x Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)
 
x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)
 
x Fritter v. Wesh, 65 S.W.2d 414 (TCA 1933 refd)
 
x Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. 1933)
 
x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 S.W.2d 228 (Tx.Comm.App. 1931)
 
x County of Henderson v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 17 (1931)
 
x Randolph v State, 36 S.W.2d 484 (Tx.Cr.A. 1931)
 
x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931) (interested)
 
x NT Traction v. Bryan, 116 Tex. 479, 294 S.W. 527 (1927)
 
x King v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 289 S.W. 69, 71 (1926) (city)
 
x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926)
 
x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923)
 
x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922)
 
x Vincent v. State ex rel. Wayland, 235 S.W. 1084 (Tx.Comm.App 1921)
 
x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd)
 
x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)
 
x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908)
 
x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tex. 150 (1907)
 
x Green v. State, 49 Tx.C.R. 380, 92 S. W. 847 (1906)
 
x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools)
 
x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)
 
x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 463 (1901 refd)
 
_ Central Wharf v. Corpus Christi, 57 S.W. 982 (TCA refd)
 
x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd)
 
x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893)
 
x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892)
 
x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317, 18 S.W. 577 (1892) (!!brief!!)
 
x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations)
 
x Holley v. State, 14 Tex.Ct.App. 505 (1883)
 
x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881)
 
x Cox v. State, 8 Tex.Ct.App. 254 (1880)
 
x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879)
 
x Lastro v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 363 (1878)
 
x Tx AG Opinion H-196 (1974) (one county)
 
x Tx AG Opinion C-544 (1965)
 
x Tx AG Opinion V‑0386 (1947)
 
x Tx AG Opinion O-5326 (1943)
 
x Tx AG Opinion O‑5115 (1943)
 
x Tx AG Opinion O‑2329 (1940) (purpose)
 
x Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503 (1935)
 
x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose)
 
x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) (!!one city!!)
 
x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics)
 
x Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554 (1893) (one city)
 
x Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277/281 (1889) (purpose/rule)
 
x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs)
 
x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875)
 
x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt)
 
x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose)
 
x Gray v. Taylor, 227 U.S. 51 (1913)
 
==23-0656==
 
reasonable ''basis'' for classification
 
Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void."
 
"The Act contains two provisions relevant here. First, it provides that '[t]he Commissioners Court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less, by written order may create the position of a county elections administrator for the county.' 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 952 (S.B. 1750) § 2(a) (emphasis added to reflect the amendment). Second, it provides that 'on September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax-assessor collector and county clerk.” ''Id''. § 3."
 
Not closed, it does not limit the transfer solely to Harris County even if other counties reach the same size threshold.
 
Old: Under have choice. Execute with vote and order. New: Under have choice but over do not. Transition by operation of law rather than order. Normally prospective so leg made clear retroactive by transition provision re those over 3.5. If administrator exists over 3.5 in violation subject to suit to force compliance with law. Problem is ambiguity re pro/retro re non Harris by second permanent provision. not clear so consult legislative history re application to others than Harris. Before every county had auth to switch which necessarily included auth to have. Now over 3.5 cannot switch. Ambiguous whether they retain authority to have.
 
EC 1.003(a): The Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision in this code, except as otherwise ''expressly'' provided by this code.
 
GC 311.005: The following definitions apply unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition: ... (3) "Population" means the population shown by the
''most recent federal decennial census''.
 
GC 311.022: A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless ''expressly'' made retrospective.
 
GC 311.023: In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) ''legislative history''; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; 6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.
 
GC 311.031(a): [T]he reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect: (1) the prior operation of the statute or ''any prior action taken under it'' ....
 
GC 311.032(c): In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute are severable.
 
The change in law made by this Act applies only to the creation of the position of county elections administrator on or after the effective date of this Act. The creation of a county elections administrator before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect when the position was created, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.
 
At least two reasonable bases exist for treating Harris County differently from the state's other 253 counties for election administration purposes. (1) Its sheer size warrants special consideration, as does its outsized impact on statewide elections. (2) Its Commissioners Court changed the election administration system for the 2022 election cycle, created new problems that made national news, created local controversy and led to numerous election contests. Solving its specific issues is a reasonable basis. In other words, it is reasonable for the legislature to make a change to the elections administrator in the one county that was experiencing difficulties while leaving the other counties' elections administrators alone.
 
The Act has at least three reasonable bases. First, Harris County's sheer size creates a statewide interest in the proper administration of its elections, which is unlikely to dissipate even if, due to statewide population growth, other large counties eventually reach populations of over 3.5 million. Second, legislators may have believed reports that Harris County's elections administrators poorly managed the County’s 2022 elections. Third, regardless of the veracity of those reports, the Legislature may have been concerned that widespread reporting about poorly managed elections in Harris County caused voters to lose confidence in the integrity of those elections.
 
Harris County’s size makes it different from all other counties. Okay but how with regard to whether its elections should be administered by elections administrator or county clerk?
 
Because elections in Harris County have a statewide impact, particularly when statewide officials and measures are on the ballot, the Act is not local within the meaning of the Constitution. License to change all election related laws.
 
Given the disparate outcome between different-sized counties and Harris County's own disparate outcome between methods of administration, it was reasonable for the Legislature to change who administered the County's elections. If Bell County faltered, bracket out their elections administrator?
 
If outside impact then classify as largest
 
If personnel problems, then classify by personnel problem
 
Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification.
 
In other words, is EC 31.050 void on the ground it is a designation rather than a classification.
 
EC 31.017(a): In a county with a population of more than 4 million (Harris County?), the secretary of state's office may order administrative oversight of a county office administering elections ....
 
EC 31.031(a): The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may create the position of county elections administrator for the county.
 
EC 31.048(a): The commissioners court by written order may abolish the position of county elections administrator at any time.
 
EC 31.050: On September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. ...
 
Having once become operative, the office continues to exist in a county, regardless of the population as shown by any future census, unless the office is abolished as provided in Subdivision 9 of this section.
 
?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ??
 
Here, where the subjective motivation is not an element of the Plaintiffs' claims—and only the reasonableness of the Legislature's classification matters—legislative history plays no role in the analysis.
 
Because the Legislature’s classification was reasonable, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits.
 
Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment.
 
The Legislature knew that it would apply to Harris County on September 1, 2023, and then never again, even if some other county with an elections administrator passes the 3.5 million threshold.
 
Law being made theoretically, not for a day, but for all time, a statute applicable to cities of certain population is a general law when it establishes a rule for the prospective government or regulation of all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the prescribed population; but where the statute obviously acts only on a present state of facts in such cities and cannot by possibility apply to other cities that may attain, in future, such population, it is local, special and void.
 
A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.
 
2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145 [in legislation, 3.3 million]; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779
 
This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County.
 
Matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place. All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?
 
Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
 
It is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.
 
So that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented.
 
The classification adopted must rest on real or substantial distinctions which renders one class, in truth, distinct or different from another class. There must exist reasonable justification for the class, that is, the basis of the classification invoked must be a direct relation to the purpose of the law.
 
Regarding population brackets: real or substantial distinctions which render one class distinct or different from another class and the basis of the classification must have a direct relation to the purpose of the law.
 
It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842
 
The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law.
 
Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has Art. 6243g been amended ?)
 
EC 85.066: (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (b), any voter who is entitled to vote an early voting ballot by personal appearance may do so at any branch polling place in the territory served by the early voting clerk. (b) For a countywide election in a county with a population of more than 3.3 million and a primary election in a county with a population of more than 1 million in which temporary branch polling places are established under Section 85.062(d)(1), the commissioners court may limit voting at a temporary branch polling place to the voters of particular state representative districts.  To the extent practicable, the state representative districts shall be grouped so that the temporary branch polling places in each group serve substantially equal numbers of voters.  A maximum of four groups of state representative districts may be established under this subsection.
 
To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle.
 
wrong: every law is general which operates equally upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all; such uniformity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing
 
what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded

Revision as of 11:06, September 8, 2023

This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution.

review

x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TCA 2004)

_ Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680 (TCA 2000)

_ Sw. Travis Co. WD v. Austin, 64 S.W.3d 25 (TCA 2000)

x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (2000) (!dissent!)

_ Austin v. Cedar Park, 953 S.W.2d 424 (TCA 1997)

x Scurlock P. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)

_ Morris v. San Antonio, 572 S.W.2d 831 (TCA 1978)

x Suburban Ut. Co. v. State, 553 S.W.2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre)

_ Culberson County v. Holmes, 513 S.W.2d 126 (TCA 1974)

x Inman v. Rr Comm., 478 S.W.2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)

_ Creps v. Firemen's Fund, 456 S.W.2d 434 (TCA nre)

x Gould v. El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696 (TCA 1969 nre)

x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)

x Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959)

x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)

x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)

x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)

x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (TCA 1948)

x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)

x Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd)

x Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.2d 919 (TCA 1944)

x Jameson v. Smith, 161 S.W.2d 520 (TCA 1942)

x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 wm)

x Wood v. Marfa I.S.D, 123 S.W.2d 429 (TCA 1939 revog)

x Watson v. Sabine Royalty Co., 120 S.W.2d 938 (TCA 1938 refd)

x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)

x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)

x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)

x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934)

x Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)

x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)

x Fritter v. Wesh, 65 S.W.2d 414 (TCA 1933 refd)

x Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. 1933)

x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 S.W.2d 228 (Tx.Comm.App. 1931)

x County of Henderson v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 17 (1931)

x Randolph v State, 36 S.W.2d 484 (Tx.Cr.A. 1931)

x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931) (interested)

x NT Traction v. Bryan, 116 Tex. 479, 294 S.W. 527 (1927)

x King v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 289 S.W. 69, 71 (1926) (city)

x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926)

x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923)

x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922)

x Vincent v. State ex rel. Wayland, 235 S.W. 1084 (Tx.Comm.App 1921)

x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd)

x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)

x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908)

x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tex. 150 (1907)

x Green v. State, 49 Tx.C.R. 380, 92 S. W. 847 (1906)

x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools)

x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)

x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 463 (1901 refd)

_ Central Wharf v. Corpus Christi, 57 S.W. 982 (TCA refd)

x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd)

x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893)

x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892)

x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317, 18 S.W. 577 (1892) (!!brief!!)

x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations)

x Holley v. State, 14 Tex.Ct.App. 505 (1883)

x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881)

x Cox v. State, 8 Tex.Ct.App. 254 (1880)

x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879)

x Lastro v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 363 (1878)

x Tx AG Opinion H-196 (1974) (one county)

x Tx AG Opinion C-544 (1965)

x Tx AG Opinion V‑0386 (1947)

x Tx AG Opinion O-5326 (1943)

x Tx AG Opinion O‑5115 (1943)

x Tx AG Opinion O‑2329 (1940) (purpose)

x Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503 (1935)

x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose)

x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) (!!one city!!)

x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics)

x Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554 (1893) (one city)

x Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277/281 (1889) (purpose/rule)

x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs)

x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875)

x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt)

x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose)

x Gray v. Taylor, 227 U.S. 51 (1913)

23-0656

reasonable basis for classification

Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void."

"The Act contains two provisions relevant here. First, it provides that '[t]he Commissioners Court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less, by written order may create the position of a county elections administrator for the county.' 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 952 (S.B. 1750) § 2(a) (emphasis added to reflect the amendment). Second, it provides that 'on September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax-assessor collector and county clerk.” Id. § 3."

Not closed, it does not limit the transfer solely to Harris County even if other counties reach the same size threshold.

Old: Under have choice. Execute with vote and order. New: Under have choice but over do not. Transition by operation of law rather than order. Normally prospective so leg made clear retroactive by transition provision re those over 3.5. If administrator exists over 3.5 in violation subject to suit to force compliance with law. Problem is ambiguity re pro/retro re non Harris by second permanent provision. not clear so consult legislative history re application to others than Harris. Before every county had auth to switch which necessarily included auth to have. Now over 3.5 cannot switch. Ambiguous whether they retain authority to have.

EC 1.003(a): The Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision in this code, except as otherwise expressly provided by this code.

GC 311.005: The following definitions apply unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition: ... (3) "Population" means the population shown by the most recent federal decennial census.

GC 311.022: A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.

GC 311.023: In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; 6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.

GC 311.031(a): [T]he reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect: (1) the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken under it ....

GC 311.032(c): In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute are severable.

The change in law made by this Act applies only to the creation of the position of county elections administrator on or after the effective date of this Act. The creation of a county elections administrator before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect when the position was created, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.

At least two reasonable bases exist for treating Harris County differently from the state's other 253 counties for election administration purposes. (1) Its sheer size warrants special consideration, as does its outsized impact on statewide elections. (2) Its Commissioners Court changed the election administration system for the 2022 election cycle, created new problems that made national news, created local controversy and led to numerous election contests. Solving its specific issues is a reasonable basis. In other words, it is reasonable for the legislature to make a change to the elections administrator in the one county that was experiencing difficulties while leaving the other counties' elections administrators alone.

The Act has at least three reasonable bases. First, Harris County's sheer size creates a statewide interest in the proper administration of its elections, which is unlikely to dissipate even if, due to statewide population growth, other large counties eventually reach populations of over 3.5 million. Second, legislators may have believed reports that Harris County's elections administrators poorly managed the County’s 2022 elections. Third, regardless of the veracity of those reports, the Legislature may have been concerned that widespread reporting about poorly managed elections in Harris County caused voters to lose confidence in the integrity of those elections.

Harris County’s size makes it different from all other counties. Okay but how with regard to whether its elections should be administered by elections administrator or county clerk?

Because elections in Harris County have a statewide impact, particularly when statewide officials and measures are on the ballot, the Act is not local within the meaning of the Constitution. License to change all election related laws.

Given the disparate outcome between different-sized counties and Harris County's own disparate outcome between methods of administration, it was reasonable for the Legislature to change who administered the County's elections. If Bell County faltered, bracket out their elections administrator?

If outside impact then classify as largest

If personnel problems, then classify by personnel problem

Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification.

In other words, is EC 31.050 void on the ground it is a designation rather than a classification.

EC 31.017(a): In a county with a population of more than 4 million (Harris County?), the secretary of state's office may order administrative oversight of a county office administering elections ....

EC 31.031(a): The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may create the position of county elections administrator for the county.

EC 31.048(a): The commissioners court by written order may abolish the position of county elections administrator at any time.

EC 31.050: On September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. ...

Having once become operative, the office continues to exist in a county, regardless of the population as shown by any future census, unless the office is abolished as provided in Subdivision 9 of this section.

?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ??

Here, where the subjective motivation is not an element of the Plaintiffs' claims—and only the reasonableness of the Legislature's classification matters—legislative history plays no role in the analysis.

Because the Legislature’s classification was reasonable, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits.

Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment.

The Legislature knew that it would apply to Harris County on September 1, 2023, and then never again, even if some other county with an elections administrator passes the 3.5 million threshold.

Law being made theoretically, not for a day, but for all time, a statute applicable to cities of certain population is a general law when it establishes a rule for the prospective government or regulation of all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the prescribed population; but where the statute obviously acts only on a present state of facts in such cities and cannot by possibility apply to other cities that may attain, in future, such population, it is local, special and void.

A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.

2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145 [in legislation, 3.3 million]; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779

This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County.

Matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place. All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?

Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.

It is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.

So that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented.

The classification adopted must rest on real or substantial distinctions which renders one class, in truth, distinct or different from another class. There must exist reasonable justification for the class, that is, the basis of the classification invoked must be a direct relation to the purpose of the law.

Regarding population brackets: real or substantial distinctions which render one class distinct or different from another class and the basis of the classification must have a direct relation to the purpose of the law.

It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842

The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law.

Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has Art. 6243g been amended ?)

EC 85.066: (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), any voter who is entitled to vote an early voting ballot by personal appearance may do so at any branch polling place in the territory served by the early voting clerk. (b) For a countywide election in a county with a population of more than 3.3 million and a primary election in a county with a population of more than 1 million in which temporary branch polling places are established under Section 85.062(d)(1), the commissioners court may limit voting at a temporary branch polling place to the voters of particular state representative districts. To the extent practicable, the state representative districts shall be grouped so that the temporary branch polling places in each group serve substantially equal numbers of voters. A maximum of four groups of state representative districts may be established under this subsection.

To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle.

wrong: every law is general which operates equally upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all; such uniformity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing

what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded