Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51: Difference between revisions

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As adopted, it read: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant, or authorize the making of any grant, of public money to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."
As adopted, it read: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant, or authorize the making of any grant, of public money to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."


It has been amended nine times. The first eight amendments concerned grants to certain Confederate participants and their spouses. The last amendment in 1999 removed the remaining language concerning such assistance.
It was based on a unique provision (Article IV, Section [https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=mo_constitutions_race&#page=32 46]) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read: "The General Assembly shall have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."


It was based on a new section (Art. IV, Sec. 46) of the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read: "The General Assembly shall have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."
This section has been amended nine times. The first eight amendments concerned grants to certain Confederate participants and their spouses. The last amendment in 1999 removed the remaining language concerning such assistance.
 
Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1939/gm0941.pdf#page=2 O-941] (1939), opined that: "To give meaning to such exception, therefore, we are constrained to hold that a grant of public money may be made in a case of public calamity although such calamity may not be of such proportions as to have a direct effect upon the State as a whole."


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* ''Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth'', 22 S.W.3d 831, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4029717219227699877#p841 841-42] (Tex. 2000) ("The City's most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution . . . and section 52 of the same article, which similarly provides . . . . To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City's 'public money'.")
* ''Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth'', 22 S.W.3d 831, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4029717219227699877#p841 841-42] (Tex. 2000) ("The City's most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '[t]he Legislature shall have no power . . . . To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City's 'public money'.")


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* ''Board of Managers of the Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Pension Bd. of the Pension Sys. for the City of Houston'', 449 S.W.2d 33, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=754209635729513848#p37 37] (Tex. 1969) ("The question is controlled by our decision in Bexar County Hospital District v. Crosby, 160 Tex. 116, 327 S.W.2d 445 (1959). In that case, in an analogous situation, we held that a statutory requirement for transfer of delinquent city taxes to a hospital district did not offend the proscription of Section 51, Article III of the Constitution, inasmuch as such tax funds could only be used by the district for the purpose for which the taxes were levied. The same is true with respect to the transferred contributions in this case.")


* ''State v. City of Austin'', 331 S.W.2d 737, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3606363952092627207#p742 742-43] (Tex. 1960) ("The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds to private purposes . . . . The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.")
* ''State v. City of Austin'', 331 S.W.2d 737, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3606363952092627207#p742 742-43] (Tex. 1960) ("The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds to private purposes . . . . The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.")


* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=9 578] (Tex. 1941) ("Section 51 of Article III of our Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations, whatsoever. It is then provided that the Legislature may grant aid to indigent or disabled Confederate soldiers and their widows. Aid in case of public calamity is also preserved. Under the plain provisions of this constitutional provision, the Legislature is without power to grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual as a gratuity.")
* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=9 578] (Tex. 1941) ("Section 51 of Article III of our Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations, whatsoever. It is then provided that the Legislature may grant aid to indigent or disabled Confederate soldiers and their widows. Aid in case of public calamity is also preserved. Under the plain provisions of this constitutional provision, the Legislature is without power to grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual as a gratuity.")
* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann'', 140 S.W.2d 1098, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/140_SW2_1098.pdf#page=5 1102] (Tex. 1940) ("One of these exceptions is that such constitutional prohibition shall not be construed so as 'to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.' In the Brazos River, etc., case, supra, it was expressly held that a donation of general fund State taxes could be made for more than two years,–in fact, for 20 years,–to a district such as this . . . . It follows that this grant cannot be condemned as unauthorized under Section 51 of Article III, supra, unless it can be said, as a matter of law, that the legislative finding of 'public calamity' contained in this Act is without any substantial basis on which to rest.")
* ''Road Dist. No. 4 v. Allred'', 68 S.W.2d 164, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/068_SW2_164.pdf#page=8 171] (Tex. 1934) ("There is certainly a vast difference between a case where public money is granted to municipal or political corporation on condition that it assume the unqualified burden and duty of . . . . The Attorney General contends that this is class legislation in contravention of section 3 of article 1 of our State Constitution. The mere statement of such contention demonstrates that it presents a very serious constitutional question; but, in view of the fact that we have already determined section 12 of the special act in violation of section 51 of article 3 of our Constitution, we do not consider it necessary to determine it.")


* ''City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling'', 247 S.W. 818, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_818.pdf#page=2 819-20] (Tex. 1923) ("The state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The destruction of ports, through which moves the commerce of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special benefit to particular communities, must be regarded as promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the state. . . . The use of the cities or counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state's duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51 of article 3.")
* ''City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling'', 247 S.W. 818, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_818.pdf#page=2 819-20] (Tex. 1923) ("The state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The destruction of ports, through which moves the commerce of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special benefit to particular communities, must be regarded as promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the state. . . . The use of the cities or counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state's duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51 of article 3.")

Latest revision as of 10:47, September 28, 2023

As amended November 2, 1999:

The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.

Editor Comments

This section first appeared in the Texas Constitution of 1876. Neither the Republic of Texas constitution (1836) nor any of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866, 1869) contained a provision with similar substantive language.

As adopted, it read: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant, or authorize the making of any grant, of public money to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."

It was based on a unique provision (Article IV, Section 46) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read: "The General Assembly shall have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."

This section has been amended nine times. The first eight amendments concerned grants to certain Confederate participants and their spouses. The last amendment in 1999 removed the remaining language concerning such assistance.

Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. O-941 (1939), opined that: "To give meaning to such exception, therefore, we are constrained to hold that a grant of public money may be made in a case of public calamity although such calamity may not be of such proportions as to have a direct effect upon the State as a whole."

Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 841-42 (Tex. 2000) ("The City's most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '[t]he Legislature shall have no power . . . . To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City's 'public money'.")

Historic Decisions

  • Board of Managers of the Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Pension Bd. of the Pension Sys. for the City of Houston, 449 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tex. 1969) ("The question is controlled by our decision in Bexar County Hospital District v. Crosby, 160 Tex. 116, 327 S.W.2d 445 (1959). In that case, in an analogous situation, we held that a statutory requirement for transfer of delinquent city taxes to a hospital district did not offend the proscription of Section 51, Article III of the Constitution, inasmuch as such tax funds could only be used by the district for the purpose for which the taxes were levied. The same is true with respect to the transferred contributions in this case.")
  • State v. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tex. 1960) ("The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds to private purposes . . . . The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.")
  • Friedman v. American Surety Co., 151 S.W.2d 570, 578 (Tex. 1941) ("Section 51 of Article III of our Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations, whatsoever. It is then provided that the Legislature may grant aid to indigent or disabled Confederate soldiers and their widows. Aid in case of public calamity is also preserved. Under the plain provisions of this constitutional provision, the Legislature is without power to grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual as a gratuity.")
  • Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann, 140 S.W.2d 1098, 1102 (Tex. 1940) ("One of these exceptions is that such constitutional prohibition shall not be construed so as 'to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.' In the Brazos River, etc., case, supra, it was expressly held that a donation of general fund State taxes could be made for more than two years,–in fact, for 20 years,–to a district such as this . . . . It follows that this grant cannot be condemned as unauthorized under Section 51 of Article III, supra, unless it can be said, as a matter of law, that the legislative finding of 'public calamity' contained in this Act is without any substantial basis on which to rest.")
  • Road Dist. No. 4 v. Allred, 68 S.W.2d 164, 171 (Tex. 1934) ("There is certainly a vast difference between a case where public money is granted to municipal or political corporation on condition that it assume the unqualified burden and duty of . . . . The Attorney General contends that this is class legislation in contravention of section 3 of article 1 of our State Constitution. The mere statement of such contention demonstrates that it presents a very serious constitutional question; but, in view of the fact that we have already determined section 12 of the special act in violation of section 51 of article 3 of our Constitution, we do not consider it necessary to determine it.")
  • City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 247 S.W. 818, 819-20 (Tex. 1923) ("The state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The destruction of ports, through which moves the commerce of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special benefit to particular communities, must be regarded as promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the state. . . . The use of the cities or counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state's duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51 of article 3.")
  • Bexar County v. Linden, 220 S.W. 761, 762 (Tex. 1920) ("The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against. The prohibition is a positive and absolute one except as to a distinctive class to whom the State is under a sacred obligation. Not only are individuals, associations of individuals and private corporations within its spirit, but all kinds of public or political corporations, as well, whether strictly municipal or not. . . . The similar restraints upon the use of public funds and the public credit applied to counties by these other provisions of the Constitution practically demonstrate this to be true.")

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