Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 18 and Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 59: Difference between pages

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article V, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Commissioners Courts; Commissioners; Justices of the Peace; Constables"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 5, 2002:
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution}}{{Template:Texas Constitution|text=As amended September 13, 2003:


'''(a) Each county in the State with a population of 50,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than four and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of 18,000 or more but less than 50,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of less than 18,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be designated as a single precinct or, if the Commissioners Court determines that the county needs more than one precinct, shall be divided into not more than four precincts. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, Chambers County and Randall County, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than six precincts. A division or designation under this subsection shall be made by the Commissioners Court provided for by this Constitution. Except as provided by this section, in each such precinct there shall be elected one Justice of the Peace and one Constable, each of whom shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified; provided that in a county with a population of less than 150,000, according to the most recent federal census, in any precinct in which there may be a city of 18,000 or more inhabitants, there shall be elected two Justices of the Peace, and in a county with a population of 150,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, each precinct may contain more than one Justice of the Peace Court. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, any county that is divided into four or more precincts on November 2, 1999, shall continue to be divided into not less than four precincts.'''
'''(a) The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters, the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.'''


'''(b) Each county shall, in the manner provided for justice of the peace and constable precincts, be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.'''
'''(b) There may be created within the State of Texas, or the State may be divided into, such number of conservation and reclamation districts as may be determined to be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of this amendment to the constitution, which districts shall be governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate with such powers of government and with the authority to exercise such rights, privileges and functions concerning the subject matter of this amendment as may be conferred by law.'''


'''(c) When the boundaries of justice of the peace and constable precincts are changed, each Justice and Constable in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct in which the person resides for the term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, abolishes the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, or temporarily results in extra Justices or Constables serving in a precinct. When, as a result of a change of precinct boundaries, a vacancy occurs in the office of Justice of the Peace or Constable, the Commissioners Court shall fill the vacancy by appointment until the next general election.'''
'''(c) The Legislature shall authorize all such indebtedness as may be necessary to provide all improvements and the maintenance thereof requisite to the achievement of the purposes of this amendment. All such indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of such conservation and reclamation districts, to be issued under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The Legislature shall also authorize the levy and collection within such districts of all such taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of such bonds and for the maintenance of such districts and improvements. Such indebtedness shall be a lien upon the property assessed for the payment thereof. The Legislature shall not authorize the issuance of any bonds or provide for any indebtedness against any reclamation district unless such proposition shall first be submitted to the qualified voters of such district and the proposition adopted.'''


'''(d) When the boundaries of commissioners precincts are changed, each commissioner in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct to which each was elected or appointed for the entire term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed.'''
'''(c-1) In addition and only as provided by this subsection, the Legislature may authorize conservation and reclamation districts to develop and finance with taxes those types and categories of parks and recreational facilities that were not authorized by this section to be developed and financed with taxes before September 13, 2003. For development of such parks and recreational facilities, the Legislature may authorize indebtedness payable from taxes as may be necessary to provide for improvements and maintenance only for a conservation and reclamation district all or part of which is located in Bexar County, Bastrop County, Waller County, Travis County, Williamson County, Harris County, Galveston County, Brazoria County, Fort Bend County, or Montgomery County, or for the Tarrant Regional Water District, a water control and improvement district located in whole or in part in Tarrant County. All the indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of the conservation and reclamation district, to be issued under regulations as may be prescribed by law. The Legislature may also authorize the levy and collection within such district of all taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of the bonds and for maintenance of and improvements to such parks and recreational facilities. The indebtedness shall be a lien on the property assessed for the payment of the bonds. The Legislature may not authorize the issuance of bonds or provide for indebtedness under this subsection against a conservation and reclamation district unless a proposition is first submitted to the qualified voters of the district and the proposition is adopted. This subsection expands the authority of the Legislature with respect to certain conservation and reclamation districts and is not a limitation on the authority of the Legislature with respect to conservation and reclamation districts and parks and recreational facilities pursuant to this section as that authority existed before September 13, 2003.'''


'''(e) The office of Constable is abolished in Mills County, Reagan County, and Roberts County. The powers, duties, and records of the office are transferred to the County Sheriff.'''
'''(d) No law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall be passed unless notice of the intention to introduce such a bill setting forth the general substance of the contemplated law shall have been published at least thirty (30) days and not more than ninety (90) days prior to the introduction thereof in a newspaper or newspapers having general circulation in the county or counties in which said district or any part thereof is or will be located and by delivering a copy of such notice and such bill to the Governor who shall submit such notice and bill to the Texas Water Commission, or its successor, which shall file its recommendation as to such bill with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House of Representatives within thirty (30) days from date notice was received by the Texas Water Commission. Such notice and copy of bill shall also be given of the introduction of any bill amending a law creating or governing a particular conservation and reclamation district if such bill (1) adds additional land to the district, (2) alters the taxing authority of the district, (3) alters the authority of the district with respect to the issuance of bonds, or (4) alters the qualifications or terms of office of the members of the governing body of the district.'''


'''(f) The Legislature by general law may prescribe the qualifications of constables.'''
'''(e) No law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall be passed unless, at the time notice of the intention to introduce a bill is published as provided in Subsection (d) of this section, a copy of the proposed bill is delivered to the commissioners court of each county in which said district or any part thereof is or will be located and to the governing body of each incorporated city or town in whose jurisdiction said district or any part thereof is or will be located. Each such commissioners court and governing body may file its written consent or opposition to the creation of the proposed district with the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house of representatives. Each special law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall comply with the provisions of the general laws then in effect relating to consent by political subdivisions to the creation of conservation and reclamation districts and to the inclusion of land within the district.'''


'''(g) [''this subsection contains no text'']'''
'''(f) A conservation and reclamation district created under this section to perform any or all of the purposes of this section may engage in fire-fighting activities and may issue bonds or other indebtedness for fire-fighting purposes as provided by law and this constitution.'''
 
'''(h) The commissioners court of a county may declare the office of constable in a precinct dormant if at least seven consecutive years have passed since the end of the term of the person who was last elected or appointed to the office and during that period of time no person was elected to fill that office, or during that period a person was elected to that office, but the person failed to meet the qualifications of that office or failed to assume the duties of that office. If an office of constable is declared dormant, the office may not be filled by election or appointment and the previous officeholder does not continue to hold the office under Subsection (a) of this section or Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 17|17]], Article XVI, of this constitution. The records of an office of constable declared dormant are transferred to the county clerk of the county. The commissioners court may reinstate an office of constable declared dormant by vote of the commissioners court or by calling an election in the precinct to reinstate the office. The commissioners court shall call an election to reinstate the office if the commissioners court receives a petition signed by at least 10 percent of the qualified voters of the precinct. If an election is called under this subsection, the commissioners court shall order the ballot for the election to be printed to permit voting for or against the proposition: "Reinstating the office of Constable of Precinct No. ___ that was previously declared dormant." The office of constable is reinstated if a majority of the voters of the precinct voting on the question at the election approve the reinstatement.'''


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This section creates a commissioners court in each county, addresses the division of counties into precincts, and provides for the election of commissioners, justices of the peace and constables.
This section and Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 52#mw-content-text|52(b)(1)]] and [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 52#mw-content-text|(2)]] were adopted to provide for the conservation and development of the state's natural resources.


Neither commissioners courts nor individual commissioners have inherent powers. They may exercise only the powers granted to them by other parts of the state constitution or by the legislature.
Under those constitutional provisions, the Legislature is authorized to create special "conservation and reclamation" districts to carry out that purpose.


Moreover, the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1999/jc0036.pdf#page=6 JC-36] (1999), opined that the legislature may not grant "commissioners courts authority over matters other than county business."
Notably, this section, added in 1917, does not limit the amount of debt incurred by or the level of tax levied by a conservation and reclamation district.


Note that in ''Avery v. Midland County'', 390 U.S. 474, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=407941042095042600#p476 476] (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that the federal constitution's one-person one-vote principle applies to county government.
It has been amended five times. The most recent amendment concerned provision of recreational facilities by a conservation and reclamation district.


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* ''City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne'', 111 S.W.3d 22, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17226599747779013973#p27 27-28] (Tex. 2003) (citations omitted) ("A commissioners court's primary function is to administer its county's business affairs. Though they are creatures of the Texas Constitution . . . . The powers the Legislature confers on counties and commissioners courts are duties rather than privileges. Thus, a commissioners court may exercise only those powers expressly given by either the Texas Constitution or the Legislature. When the Constitution or Legislature imposes an obligation on a commissioners court, that commissioners court also has the implied authority to exercise the power necessary to accomplish its assigned duty.")
* ''Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. State'', 575 S.W.3d 339, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14070258080807006449#p350 350] (Tex. 2019) ("The District’s authority derives from Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. Section 59(a) provides that, among . . . . ''Id''. art. XVI, § 59(b). Thus, the 'rights, privileges and functions' of the District are limited to those 'conferred by law.' The source of such law is enactments of the Legislature. The District does not contend that any other source of authority exists. In this regard, the District is not like a home-rule city such as Galveston, which derives some power directly from the Texas Constitution and has 'all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city’s charter.'")
 
* ''Maple Run at Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan'', 931 S.W.2d 941, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9968420057480702546#p949 949] (Tex. 1996) ("While Section 59(c) allows the Legislature to authorize districts to incur bonded indebtedness and to levy . . . . Thus, while Section 59 grants the Legislature a broad mandate to protect our natural resources, it recognizes local control of financial obligations. Under these circumstances, Section 59 cannot reasonably be read as authorizing local legislation that arbitrarily singles out a community for financial regulation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 43.082 is not authorized under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, and therefore is a prohibited local law under Article III, Section 56.")


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* ''Guynes v. Galveston County'', 861 S.W.2d 861, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2993230007216722159#p863 863] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("Article 5, section 18 of the Texas Constitution provides that a commissioners court 'shall exercise such . . . .' This provision has been interpreted to mean that although a commissioners court may exercise broad discretion in conducting county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded ultimately in the constitution or statutes. As the administrative head of county government, a commissioners court also possesses broad implied powers to accomplish its legitimate directives. These powers include the authority to contract with experts when necessary, including attorneys.")
* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mihelich'', 525 S.W.2d 506, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9071434481120798989#p510 510] (Tex. 1975) ("These were not the circumstances of the present case. On the contrary, the Harris County Flood Control District was engaged in day-to-day maintenance and operations which involved paid employees . . . . Therefore, the question here is whether judgments obtained in accordance with the Texas Tort Claims Act are payable from maintenance taxes levied by the District in accordance with Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. We hold that they are. In this holding, we find support in the briefs of both parties that judgments under the Tort Claims Act are incidental to and properly payable out of maintenance funds.")
 
* ''Tarrant County v. Ashmore'', 635 S.W.2d 417, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10316916452154427891#p423 423] (Tex. 1982) ("In applying these [due process] principles to the instant case, we note that commissioners courts in various counties of Texas are given authority to divide the counties into precincts and to revise those precincts 'from time to time, for the convenience of the people.' Tex. Const. art. V, § 18. . . . As such, the redistricting may be seen as the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative power leading to the resolution of essentially political issues. We cannot conclude that the officers involved in this suit were wrongfully deprived of a trial-type adjudication of relevant facts, since there were no adjudicative facts to be determined.")


* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p428 428] (Tex. 1966) ("[E]qual rights and equal protection of laws require equality in political rights and there may be circumstances under which equality in population of political subdivisions electing representatives to an overall governing body is essential to equality in voting rights. On the other hand, the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may require—and constitutionally justify—a rational variance from equality in population in commissioners precincts upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values.")
* ''City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton'', 276 S.W.2d 798, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4137429929018883780#p803 803] (Tex. 1955) ("In August of the same year the people adopted the Conservation Amendment, Article XVI, § 59, to the Constitution declaring the conservation of the state's natural resources, including water, to be a public right and duty. But the Amendment was not self-enacting. By the very terms of the Amendment the duty was enjoined upon the Legislature to implement the public policy found therein. It was said . . . . The power certainly does not lie with the courts to usurp the legislative function and say what types of conduits and reservoirs may be used for the transportation and storage of water, lawfully obtained and lawfully used.")


* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann'', 140 S.W.2d 1098, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/140_SW2_1098.pdf#page=8 1105] (Tex. 1940) ("[I]t is already settled that the implied prohibition contained in Section 18 of Article V [], against requiring Commissioners' Courts to perform duties not classed as 'county business,' cannot be confined in such a narrow groove as to prohibit the Legislature from committing to commissioners' courts the governing affairs of conservation and reclamation districts, such as this, created by the Legislature under the express authority of Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution,–where the district is located within the county of the commissioners' court authorized and required to govern it.")
* ''Deason v. Orange County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1'', 244 S.W.2d 981, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12034765268321583372#p984 984] (Tex. 1952) ("Section 52, Article 3, specifies that water control and improvement districts may issue bonds for certain purposes. The purposes enumerated do not include the right to purchase, own and operate fire engines, fire-fighting equipment and appliances. Section 59(a), Article 16, the other constitutional amendment involved here, contains no language . . . . Both constitutional amendments specify the circumstances and purposes for which water control and improvement districts may be organized and the Legislature is without power to add to or withdraw from the circumstances and purposes specified.")


* ''Stovall v. Shivers'', 103 S.W.2d 363, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10255038/Stovall%20v.%20Shivers,%20103%20S.W.2d%20363%20(1937).pdf#page=3 365-66] (Tex. 1937) (citations omitted) (If the order of the commissioners court of April, 1931, be invalid, then there can be no question of the right of the district court under section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution and under article . . . to review same and prevent its enforcement. It is also true that if in the passage of the order of April, 1931, the commissioners court acted arbitrarily without the exercise of any discretion, or clearly abused its discretion, the district court in the exercise of its equitable powers can review and abrogate such action; and especially if the action of the court involves a failure to perform a duty affecting the public welfare.")
* ''Kaufman County Levee Improvement Dist. v. National Life Ins. Co.'', 171 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.Civ.App.–Dallas 1943, ref'd) ("The provision has the same meaning today that it had when first adopted as a part of . . . . Improvement districts, such as the District involved here, were unknown in 1845 when § 14 of Art. 16 became a part of the constitutional law of the state; nor did such districts come into existence until after the constitutional amendment known as § 52 of Art. 3 was adopted in November, 1904, and more extensively after the amendment known as § 59 of Art. 16 was adopted in August, 1917, hence we do not think § 14 of Art. 16 has any application whatever to the District involved here.")


* ''Anderson v. Parsley'', 37 S.W.2d 358, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10259684/Anderson%20v.%20Parsley,%2037%20S.W.2d%20358%20(1931).pdf#page=8 365] (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1931, ref'd) ("Article 17, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, act of 1921, provides that the newly elected officers shall take their official oath and enter upon and assume the duties of their respective offices on the 1st day of January following the last general election, or as soon thereafter as possible. This provision is well within the power of the Legislature, and we can see no reason to sustain the contention that the newly elected commissioners, elected in the general election of 1930, ought to have been permitted to take the oath and qualify and enter upon their duties as commissioners prior to January 1, 1931.")
* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann'', 140 S.W.2d 1098, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/140_SW2_1098.pdf#page=7 1104] (Tex. 1940) ("We are of the opinion that we have disposed of the contention that the 1937 Act violates that part of Section 56 of Article III of our State Constitution above indicated in our holding that this Act creates this District as a State governmental agency . . . . Simply stated, the Act of 1937 is fully authorized by Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution, and the Act creating this District should not be classed as a local or special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision under discussion. ''Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw'', [] 83 S.W.2d 629; ''Brazos River Con. & Rec. Dist. v. McCraw'', [] 91 S.W.2d 665.")


* ''Williams v. Castleman'', 247 S.W. 263, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10302571/Williams%20v.%20Castleman,%20247%20S.W.%20263%20(1922).pdf#page=5 267] (Tex. 1922) ("It is plain from section 18, art. 5, of the Constitution that its prime purpose in not fixing definitely the number of justice precincts in any county, and the number of justices in any particular precinct was, as it states, 'the convenience of the people'; that is, to give to the commissioners' court some discretion so that the number of precincts may be made to meet the changing needs of the people. The object of the Constitution in providing for two justices of the peace in precincts containing 8,000 or more inhabitants is the same as that declared in the previous paragraph of the same section—that is, for the convenience of the people.")
* ''Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw'', 83 S.W.2d 629, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_S.W.2d_629.pdf#page=5 633] (Tex. 1935) ("In this connection, it is true that the last clause of subsection (c) provides that the Legislature shall not authorize districts organized under section 59 to issue bonds, or provide for any indebtedness against such districts, unless the proposition shall first be authorized by the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district; but it is clear from a reading of the whole subsection . . . . As already said, bonds payable out of revenues are not indebtednesses. It was the evident intention of this constitutional provision to only require a vote in instances where it is proposed to issue bonds or to authorize a debt payable out of tax funds.")


* ''Clark v. Finley'', 54 S.W. 343, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/054_SW_343.pdf#page=5 347] (Tex. 1899) (citation omitted) ("But we do not concur in the proposition that the determination of the number of deputies which may be employed by an officer is a county affair, within the meaning of that provision of the constitution which prescribes that the commissioners' court 'shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business as is conferred by this constitution and the laws of this state, or as may be hereafter prescribed.' Art. 5, sec. 18. The officers to whom the provision applies, though called county officers, are in fact officers of the state and the number of deputies to be allowed to each cannot properly be deemed a county affair.")
* ''Parker v. El Paso Water Improvement Dist. No. 1'', 297 S.W. 737, 742 (Tex. 1927) ("The improvement district cannot take that water and distribute it without his consent, provided he desires to and does use it. . . . If the plaintiff in error does not take his proportionate share of the riparian water and use it, then that proportion to which he is entitled, so long as he does not take it, under the modified rules of the common law applicable to the arid or semiarid states, increases the residue of riparian water in the river available for the use of others, including those whose lands are in the improvement district, and may be taken out of the river by them, or by the district for distribution, if they have authorized it to do so.")


* ''Fears v. Nacogdoches County'', 9 S.W. 265, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/2192712/Fears%20v.%20Nacogdoches%20County,%2071%20Tex.%20337%20(1888).pdf#page=3 266] (Tex. 1888) ("If we are to resort to general principles, we are at a loss to determine upon what ground the county is to be held liable for [the physician's] services. A coroner's inquest is a proceeding by and on behalf of the state, and is the first step in a proper case for the detection and punishment of the offender when an unlawful homicide has been committed. The justice of the peace, who in our state conducts the proceeding, is ''ex officio'' coroner, though sometimes called a precinct or county officer, and is to all intents and purposes an officer of the state, and in exercising his function acts for the state, and not for the county.")
* ''Motl v. Boyd'', 286 S.W. 458, 473 (Tex. 1926) ("We think it plain, too, that the amendments to the Constitution, adopted after the enactment of these statutes, one of them, the conservation amendment plainly making the distinction referred to, adopted the construction of the statutes which we have given, and the conclusion at which we have arrived, that riparian rights attach only to the ordinary and normal flow of the streams of the state, included in which are all waters, regardless of source, which do not rise above the line of highest ordinary and normal flow, and that such rights do not attach to the waters of the streams of the state when these waters rise above the highest line of ordinary normal flow.")


* ''Ex parte Towles'', 48 Tex. 413, [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28525/m1/448/ 440] (1877) ("The transmission of a case from such inferior to such superior court, in the mode prescribed by law for correction of errors therein, is properly an appeal. . . . If the Legislature can make a law to so change the constitutional relation of the courts as to give an appeal in this case, why not also in the levy of county taxes, the laying off of roads, provisions for the indigent, and the like, and thereby transfer in effect the whole jurisdiction of the Commissioner's Court to the District Court of the county? Such a thing could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution in the distribution of the judicial powers of the State.")
* ''Dallas County Levee Dist. No. 2 v. Looney'', 207 S.W. 310, 312-13 (Tex. 1918) ("It is clear that the Conservation Amendment does not undertake to prescribe any given rule for making the apportionment. It provides no express method by which the benefit to the particular . . . be ascertained, and accordingly refrains from the adoption of any express basis for the apportionment of the tax. The effect of the declaration simply is that it shall be justly laid in fair proportion to the benefit. If it is so apportioned, there can be no question but that an 'equal distribution' of the taxes will be accomplished within the full meaning of the term. The basis of apportionment, therefore, is by the amendment left to the Legislature.")


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[[Category:TxCon ArtV Sec]]
[[Category:Natural Resources Law]]
[[Category:Water Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtXVI Sec]]

Latest revision as of 10:52, September 28, 2023

As amended September 13, 2003:

(a) The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters, the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.

(b) There may be created within the State of Texas, or the State may be divided into, such number of conservation and reclamation districts as may be determined to be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of this amendment to the constitution, which districts shall be governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate with such powers of government and with the authority to exercise such rights, privileges and functions concerning the subject matter of this amendment as may be conferred by law.

(c) The Legislature shall authorize all such indebtedness as may be necessary to provide all improvements and the maintenance thereof requisite to the achievement of the purposes of this amendment. All such indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of such conservation and reclamation districts, to be issued under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The Legislature shall also authorize the levy and collection within such districts of all such taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of such bonds and for the maintenance of such districts and improvements. Such indebtedness shall be a lien upon the property assessed for the payment thereof. The Legislature shall not authorize the issuance of any bonds or provide for any indebtedness against any reclamation district unless such proposition shall first be submitted to the qualified voters of such district and the proposition adopted.

(c-1) In addition and only as provided by this subsection, the Legislature may authorize conservation and reclamation districts to develop and finance with taxes those types and categories of parks and recreational facilities that were not authorized by this section to be developed and financed with taxes before September 13, 2003. For development of such parks and recreational facilities, the Legislature may authorize indebtedness payable from taxes as may be necessary to provide for improvements and maintenance only for a conservation and reclamation district all or part of which is located in Bexar County, Bastrop County, Waller County, Travis County, Williamson County, Harris County, Galveston County, Brazoria County, Fort Bend County, or Montgomery County, or for the Tarrant Regional Water District, a water control and improvement district located in whole or in part in Tarrant County. All the indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of the conservation and reclamation district, to be issued under regulations as may be prescribed by law. The Legislature may also authorize the levy and collection within such district of all taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of the bonds and for maintenance of and improvements to such parks and recreational facilities. The indebtedness shall be a lien on the property assessed for the payment of the bonds. The Legislature may not authorize the issuance of bonds or provide for indebtedness under this subsection against a conservation and reclamation district unless a proposition is first submitted to the qualified voters of the district and the proposition is adopted. This subsection expands the authority of the Legislature with respect to certain conservation and reclamation districts and is not a limitation on the authority of the Legislature with respect to conservation and reclamation districts and parks and recreational facilities pursuant to this section as that authority existed before September 13, 2003.

(d) No law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall be passed unless notice of the intention to introduce such a bill setting forth the general substance of the contemplated law shall have been published at least thirty (30) days and not more than ninety (90) days prior to the introduction thereof in a newspaper or newspapers having general circulation in the county or counties in which said district or any part thereof is or will be located and by delivering a copy of such notice and such bill to the Governor who shall submit such notice and bill to the Texas Water Commission, or its successor, which shall file its recommendation as to such bill with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House of Representatives within thirty (30) days from date notice was received by the Texas Water Commission. Such notice and copy of bill shall also be given of the introduction of any bill amending a law creating or governing a particular conservation and reclamation district if such bill (1) adds additional land to the district, (2) alters the taxing authority of the district, (3) alters the authority of the district with respect to the issuance of bonds, or (4) alters the qualifications or terms of office of the members of the governing body of the district.

(e) No law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall be passed unless, at the time notice of the intention to introduce a bill is published as provided in Subsection (d) of this section, a copy of the proposed bill is delivered to the commissioners court of each county in which said district or any part thereof is or will be located and to the governing body of each incorporated city or town in whose jurisdiction said district or any part thereof is or will be located. Each such commissioners court and governing body may file its written consent or opposition to the creation of the proposed district with the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the house of representatives. Each special law creating a conservation and reclamation district shall comply with the provisions of the general laws then in effect relating to consent by political subdivisions to the creation of conservation and reclamation districts and to the inclusion of land within the district.

(f) A conservation and reclamation district created under this section to perform any or all of the purposes of this section may engage in fire-fighting activities and may issue bonds or other indebtedness for fire-fighting purposes as provided by law and this constitution.

Editor Comments

This section and Article III, Section 52(b)(1) and (2) were adopted to provide for the conservation and development of the state's natural resources.

Under those constitutional provisions, the Legislature is authorized to create special "conservation and reclamation" districts to carry out that purpose.

Notably, this section, added in 1917, does not limit the amount of debt incurred by or the level of tax levied by a conservation and reclamation district.

It has been amended five times. The most recent amendment concerned provision of recreational facilities by a conservation and reclamation district.

Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 350 (Tex. 2019) ("The District’s authority derives from Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. Section 59(a) provides that, among . . . . Id. art. XVI, § 59(b). Thus, the 'rights, privileges and functions' of the District are limited to those 'conferred by law.' The source of such law is enactments of the Legislature. The District does not contend that any other source of authority exists. In this regard, the District is not like a home-rule city such as Galveston, which derives some power directly from the Texas Constitution and has 'all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city’s charter.'")
  • Maple Run at Austin Mun. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. 1996) ("While Section 59(c) allows the Legislature to authorize districts to incur bonded indebtedness and to levy . . . . Thus, while Section 59 grants the Legislature a broad mandate to protect our natural resources, it recognizes local control of financial obligations. Under these circumstances, Section 59 cannot reasonably be read as authorizing local legislation that arbitrarily singles out a community for financial regulation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 43.082 is not authorized under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, and therefore is a prohibited local law under Article III, Section 56.")

Historic Decisions

  • Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mihelich, 525 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex. 1975) ("These were not the circumstances of the present case. On the contrary, the Harris County Flood Control District was engaged in day-to-day maintenance and operations which involved paid employees . . . . Therefore, the question here is whether judgments obtained in accordance with the Texas Tort Claims Act are payable from maintenance taxes levied by the District in accordance with Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. We hold that they are. In this holding, we find support in the briefs of both parties that judgments under the Tort Claims Act are incidental to and properly payable out of maintenance funds.")
  • City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1955) ("In August of the same year the people adopted the Conservation Amendment, Article XVI, § 59, to the Constitution declaring the conservation of the state's natural resources, including water, to be a public right and duty. But the Amendment was not self-enacting. By the very terms of the Amendment the duty was enjoined upon the Legislature to implement the public policy found therein. It was said . . . . The power certainly does not lie with the courts to usurp the legislative function and say what types of conduits and reservoirs may be used for the transportation and storage of water, lawfully obtained and lawfully used.")
  • Deason v. Orange County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 244 S.W.2d 981, 984 (Tex. 1952) ("Section 52, Article 3, specifies that water control and improvement districts may issue bonds for certain purposes. The purposes enumerated do not include the right to purchase, own and operate fire engines, fire-fighting equipment and appliances. Section 59(a), Article 16, the other constitutional amendment involved here, contains no language . . . . Both constitutional amendments specify the circumstances and purposes for which water control and improvement districts may be organized and the Legislature is without power to add to or withdraw from the circumstances and purposes specified.")
  • Kaufman County Levee Improvement Dist. v. National Life Ins. Co., 171 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex.Civ.App.–Dallas 1943, ref'd) ("The provision has the same meaning today that it had when first adopted as a part of . . . . Improvement districts, such as the District involved here, were unknown in 1845 when § 14 of Art. 16 became a part of the constitutional law of the state; nor did such districts come into existence until after the constitutional amendment known as § 52 of Art. 3 was adopted in November, 1904, and more extensively after the amendment known as § 59 of Art. 16 was adopted in August, 1917, hence we do not think § 14 of Art. 16 has any application whatever to the District involved here.")
  • Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann, 140 S.W.2d 1098, 1104 (Tex. 1940) ("We are of the opinion that we have disposed of the contention that the 1937 Act violates that part of Section 56 of Article III of our State Constitution above indicated in our holding that this Act creates this District as a State governmental agency . . . . Simply stated, the Act of 1937 is fully authorized by Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution, and the Act creating this District should not be classed as a local or special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision under discussion. Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw, [] 83 S.W.2d 629; Brazos River Con. & Rec. Dist. v. McCraw, [] 91 S.W.2d 665.")
  • Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw, 83 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1935) ("In this connection, it is true that the last clause of subsection (c) provides that the Legislature shall not authorize districts organized under section 59 to issue bonds, or provide for any indebtedness against such districts, unless the proposition shall first be authorized by the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district; but it is clear from a reading of the whole subsection . . . . As already said, bonds payable out of revenues are not indebtednesses. It was the evident intention of this constitutional provision to only require a vote in instances where it is proposed to issue bonds or to authorize a debt payable out of tax funds.")
  • Parker v. El Paso Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 297 S.W. 737, 742 (Tex. 1927) ("The improvement district cannot take that water and distribute it without his consent, provided he desires to and does use it. . . . If the plaintiff in error does not take his proportionate share of the riparian water and use it, then that proportion to which he is entitled, so long as he does not take it, under the modified rules of the common law applicable to the arid or semiarid states, increases the residue of riparian water in the river available for the use of others, including those whose lands are in the improvement district, and may be taken out of the river by them, or by the district for distribution, if they have authorized it to do so.")
  • Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458, 473 (Tex. 1926) ("We think it plain, too, that the amendments to the Constitution, adopted after the enactment of these statutes, one of them, the conservation amendment plainly making the distinction referred to, adopted the construction of the statutes which we have given, and the conclusion at which we have arrived, that riparian rights attach only to the ordinary and normal flow of the streams of the state, included in which are all waters, regardless of source, which do not rise above the line of highest ordinary and normal flow, and that such rights do not attach to the waters of the streams of the state when these waters rise above the highest line of ordinary normal flow.")
  • Dallas County Levee Dist. No. 2 v. Looney, 207 S.W. 310, 312-13 (Tex. 1918) ("It is clear that the Conservation Amendment does not undertake to prescribe any given rule for making the apportionment. It provides no express method by which the benefit to the particular . . . be ascertained, and accordingly refrains from the adoption of any express basis for the apportionment of the tax. The effect of the declaration simply is that it shall be justly laid in fair proportion to the benefit. If it is so apportioned, there can be no question but that an 'equal distribution' of the taxes will be accomplished within the full meaning of the term. The basis of apportionment, therefore, is by the amendment left to the Legislature.")

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