Editing Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56

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==reviewed==

x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TCA 2004)

x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (2000) (dissent)

x Scurlock P. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)

x Suburban Ut. Co. v. State, 553 S.W.2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre)

x Inman v. Rr Comm., 478 S.W.2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)

x Gould v. El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696 (TCA 1969 nre)

x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)

x Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959)

x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)

x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)

x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)

x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (TCA 1948)

x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)

x Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd)

x Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.2d 919 (TCA 1944)

x Jameson v. Smith, 161 S.W.2d 520 (TCA 1942)

x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 wm)

x Wood v. Marfa I.S.D, 123 S.W.2d 429 (TCA 1939 revog)

x Watson v. Sabine Royalty Co., 120 S.W.2d 938 (TCA 1938 refd)

x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)

x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)

x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)

x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934)

x Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)

x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)

x Fritter v. Wesh, 65 S.W.2d 414 (TCA 1933 refd)

x Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. 1933)

x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 S.W.2d 228 (Tx.Comm.App. 1931)

x County of Henderson v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 17 (1931)

x Randolph v State, 36 S.W.2d 484 (Tx.Cr.A. 1931)

x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931) (interested)

x NT Traction v. Bryan, 116 Tex. 479, 294 S.W. 527 (1927)

x King v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 289 S.W. 69, 71 (1926) (city)

x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926)

x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923)

x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922)

x Vincent v. State ex rel. Wayland, 235 S.W. 1084 (Tx.Comm.App 1921)

x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd)

x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)

x Smith v. State, 54 TCA 298, 113 S.W. 289 (1908) (!!closed!!)

x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908)

x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools)

x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)

x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd)

x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893)

x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892)

x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317, 18 S.W. 577 (1892) (!!brief!!)

x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations)

x Holley v. State, 14 Tex.Ct.App. 505 (1883)

x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881)

x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879)

x Lastro v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 363 (1878)

x Tx AG Opinion H-196 (1974) (one county)

x Tx AG Opinion C-544 (1965)

x Tx AG Opinion V‑0386 (1947)

x Tx AG Opinion O-5326 (1943)

x Tx AG Opinion O‑5115 (1943)

x Tx AG Opinion O‑2329 (1940) (purpose)

x Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503 (1935)

x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose)

x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) (!!one city!!)

x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics)

x Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554 (1893) (one city)

x Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277/281 (1889) (purpose/rule)

x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs)

x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875)

x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt)

x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose)

==brief==

Sec. 311.022.  PROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES.  A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.

First, construe entire statute. change to administrator one way? in other words, no authority to move back to county clerk. only prospective? Then argue effect of 2023 amendment.

Law being made theoretically, not for a day, but for all time, a statute applicable to cities of certain population is a general law when it establishes a rule for the prospective government or regulation of all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the prescribed population; but where the statute obviously acts only on a present state of facts in such cities and cannot by possibility apply to other cities that may attain, in future, such population, it is local, special and void.

A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.

2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend	822,779

This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County.

Matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place. All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?

Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.

It is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.

So that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented.

The classification adopted must rest on real or substantial distinctions which renders one class, in truth, distinct or different from another class. There must exist reasonable justification for the class, that is, the basis of the classification invoked must be a direct relation to the purpose of the law.

Regarding population brackets: real or substantial distinctions which render one class distinct or different from another class and the basis of the classification must have a direct relation to the purpose of the law.

It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842

The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law.

H.B. 4559 relating to the application of statutes that classify political subdivisions according to population; note other population brackets in Election Code (has 449 S.W.2d 33, 38 been amended)

To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle.

wrong: every law is general which operates equally upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all; such uniformity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing