Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56 and Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between pages

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''.
[[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Local and Special Laws"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 6, 2001:


==23-0656==
'''(a) The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing [sic]: (1) the creation, extension or impairing of liens; (2) regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts; (3) changing the names of persons or places; (4) changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; (5) authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining of roads, highways, streets or alleys; (6) relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other state; (7) vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; (8) relating to cemeteries, grave-yards or public grounds not of the State; (9) authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; (10) locating or changing county seats; (11) incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; (12) for the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; (13) granting divorces; (14) creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts; (15) changing the law of descent or succession; (16) regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate; (17) regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, magistrates or constables; (18) regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes; (19) fixing the rate of interest; (20) affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability; (21) remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid into the Treasury; (22) exempting property from taxation; (23) regulating labor, trade, mining and manufacturing; (24) declaring any named person of age; (25) extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or his securities from liability; (26) giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds; (27) summoning or empanelling [sic] grand or petit juries; (28) for limitation of civil or criminal actions; (29) for incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements; or (30) relieving or discharging any person or set of persons from the performance of any public duty or service imposed by general law.'''


Section ??? Electin Code removes only one person from his position and will never apply to any other person.
'''(b) In addition to those laws described by Subsection (a) of this section in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the Legislature from passing: (1) special laws for the preservation of the game and fish of this State in certain localities; and (2) fence laws applicable to any subdivision of this State or counties as may be needed to meet the wants of the people.'''


cite: ''Hall v. Bell County'', 138 S.W. 178, 183 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1911), aff'd , 105 Tex. 558, 153 S.W. 121 (1913) ("We have already given reasons for holding that it is a local or special law, and we now add that, as its sole object was to regulate the affairs of Bell County, that fact is conclusive proof that it is a special law. Bell county, as a municipal corporation, is, in the eyes of the law, a person or legal entity, and any statute whose main object is to regulate the rights or interests of a particular and designated person or thing, is, according to all the authorities, a special law.")
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EC 31.031: (a) The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may ''create the position'' of county elections administrator for the county. (b) The order must state the date the creation of the position of administrator is effective. The effective date may not be later than 12 months after the date the order is adopted. (c) To facilitate the orderly transfer of duties on the effective date, the order may authorize the commissioners court to employ the administrator-designate not earlier than the 90th day before the effective date of the creation of the position, at a salary not to exceed that to be paid to the administrator. (d) Not later than the third day after the date the order is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to: (1) the secretary of state; and (2) each member of the county election commission.
This important and often-litigated section generally prohibits the enactment of "local" laws and "special" laws. In addition, Article XII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XII, Section 1|1]] mandates that "[n]o private corporation shall be created except by general laws." Cf. ''Harwood v. Wentworth'', 162 U.S. 547, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9629641612988174310#p563 563-64] (1896) ("We are of the opinion that the territorial act is not a local or special law . . . . The act is general in its operation; it applies to all counties in the Territory; it prescribes a rule for the stated compensation of certain public officers; no officer of the classes named is exempted from its operation; and there is such a relation between the salaries fixed for each class of counties, and the equalized assessed valuation of property in them, respectively, as to show that the act is not local and special in any just sense, but is general in its application to the whole Territory and designed to establish a system for compensating county officers that is not intrinsically unjust, nor capable of being applied for purposes merely local or special.").


EC 31.048. (a) The commissioners court by written order may ''abolish the position'' of county elections administrator at any time. (b) After the effective date of an order abolishing the position of administrator, the county tax assessor-collector is the voter registrar, and the duties and functions of the county clerk that were performed by the administrator revert to the county clerk, unless a transfer of duties and functions occurs under Section 12.031 or 31.071. (c) Not later than the third day after the date an order abolishing the position of administrator is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the secretary of state.
Unfortunately, much of the jurisprudence regarding this type of legislative restriction is indefinite. Cf. ''Henderson v. Koenig'', 168 Mo. 356, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Mo_356.pdf#page=17 372] (1902) (emphasis in original) ("The act in question is ''local'' as to the city of St. Louis, and ''special'' as to the incumbent of the office of judge of probate."); Charles Binney, ''Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation in State Constitutions'' [https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/lXQ1AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA25 25-26] (1894) ("Hence, postponing for the present the inquiry into what constitutes a class for legislative purposes, and premising only that the class to which the general laws are applicable must be real and substantial, it may be said in brief that: (1) A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. (2) A special law is one which relates either to particular persons, places or things, or to persons, places or things which, though not particularized, are separated, by any method of selection, from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable. (3) A local law is one whose operation is confined within territorial limits other than those of the whole State or any properly constituted class of localities therein.").


Only the elections administrator in Harris County is abolished by the enactment. All other counties, whether above or below 3.5 million, with an elections administrator continue to have choice whether or not to abolish the position.
For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but a substantial majority, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, ''Interpretive Commentary'' (West 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").


Classification by population is allowed because logical that larger population counties require different public policy rules than smaller populations counties. The Legislature claims it classifying counties according to population but the law does not treat all counties with a population of 3.3 million the same. One rule for Harris County and another rule for the other 253. That is conclusive proof that the LEgislature is not classifying counties according to population but by some other criteria. Question remains whether that criteria is valid under the applicable caselaw.
The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").


Two approaches have emerged for determining whether a bracketing scheme meets the reasonable basis requirement. The first examines the relationship between the purpose or subject of the law and the criteria used to establish the bracket. The second examines whether the purpose of the law is of statewide, or only local, importance. Under the first method of analysis, the purposes and subject of the law under review are identified and then the criteria used to create the law's bracket are examined. The criteria must have a real relationship to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the law, something germane
The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/237/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 40]) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."
to the purpose of the legislation, and must be related to the subject of the law in such a way to show that the intent of the legislature was to legislate on a subject generally and not to single out one entity or area. The second method of analysis for determining whether a bill's bracketing scheme has a reasonable basis requires an examination of the statewide effects of the proposed law. A bill treating only a particular locality does not violate the local law prohibition if people throughout the state would be affected by the proposed law or if the bill treats substantially a subject that is a matter of interest to people throughout the state. This method of analysis attempts to determine whether the bill deals with a matter of general rather than purely local interest. Normally, a bill's proposed law would not be considered to have a sufficient statewide impact unless the law would affect a substantial class of persons over a broad region of the state. Furthermore, even if the proposed law would affect a matter of statewide importance, a reasonable connection must exist between the bracketing scheme used and the statewide interest.


Question Presented: Is SB --- a general law or local-special law. State argues it is general law. Harris County argues it is local and/or special law.
This section, as adopted in 1876, did not expand or otherwise modify the January 1874 provision. Instead, it closely tracked the laundry list provision (Article IV, Section [https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=mo_constitutions_race&#page=33 53]) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read in part: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: [1] Authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens; [2] Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards or school districts; [3] Changing the names of persons or places; [4] Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; [5] Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining [sic] roads, highways, streets or alleys; [6] Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other State; [7] Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; [8] Relating to cemeteries, grave yards or public grounds not of the State; [9] Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; [10] Locating or changing county seats; [11] Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; [12] For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; . . . In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case, is hereby declared a judicial question, and as such shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject."


There was a general law. SB is an exception to that law.
At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/48/hb167m.pdf#page=2 167] (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1973/jh0008.pdf#page=5 H-8] (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").


Article I Section 3 (equality mandated for all government action): Is there a reasonable ground for the legislative classification (i.e., some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment) of Harris County with respect to having choice or non-choice of elections administrator.
This section has been amended once. The 2001 modification was part of a "constitutional cleanup amendment." It made stylistic changes and transferred the substance of Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 22|22]] and [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 43|43]] of Article XVI to this section. The local and special laws authorized by other sections, either expressly or by implication, include laws: (1) relating to the court system (Article V, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 1|1]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 7|7]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 8|8]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 21|21]]); (2) creating or affecting a conservation and reclamation district (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 59|59]]); (3) creating or affecting a road or water district (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 52|52]]); (4) providing for road maintenance (Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 9|9]]); (5) creating or affecting a hospital district (Article IX, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 4|4]]-[[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 11|11]]); (6) creating or affecting an airport authority (Article IX, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 12|12]]); (7) relating to the regulation of stock or stock raisers (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 23|23]]); (8) granting aid or tax relief in cases of public calamity (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51|51]], Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 10|10]]); and (9) providing for consolidation of political subdivision offices or functions (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 64|64]]).


Article I Section 3-a (equality mandated for sex, etc.): The test is not whether legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
As reflected by the numerous decisions referenced below, the Texas jurisprudence in this area is within the national mainstream. The governing rules can be summarized as follows: (1) A general law is a law which relates to persons, places or things as a class, both in the present and in the future, which class is based upon a real and substantial difference which bears a reasonable relation to the statute's purpose. (2) A special law is a law which relates to particular persons, places or things of a class; to a class as it is constituted at a given time without allowance for changes in the future; or to a "pretended" class which bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the relevant statute. (3) A local law is a special law in which the places to which it applies are territorial subdivisions of the state. Note that the substance of the foregoing rules are routinely stated in different terms. More importantly, recognize that the rules are sometimes ignored by courts when considered necessary to reach an equitable result.


Article III Section 56 (equality mandated for enumerated items): Is there reasonable ground for the legislative classification of 254 Texas counties with respect to total population above and below 3.3 million.
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In this case, the classification criteria is not reasonably related to the purpose of the law.


The classification adopted is not germane to the purpose of the law. The difference in the population size of Harris County and the other 253 Texas counties has no connection with the need or propriety of the relevant legislative regulation.
* ''City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp.'', 571 S.W.3d 336, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11581812043885385661#p337 337] (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no writ) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")


"judges are no fools; they know that just before or after the next census all such laws can be amended to new open-ended classifications that would preserve the limitations to particular counties or cities"
* ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18021988528183648949#p451 451] (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")


problem is not "genuine state concern"
* ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p465 465] (Tex. 1997) ("Moreover, the growers contend that, because of the statute's classifications, it is a local or special law . . . . A local law is limited to a specific geographic region of the State, while a special law is limited to a particular class of persons distinguished by some characteristic other than geography. ''See'' ''Maple Run at Austin Munic. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan'', 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1996). Legislation does not violate Article III, Section 56, however, as long as there is a reasonable basis for its classifications. ''Id''. As explained above, the Act satisfies this test.")


classification is not "related reasonably to the differences in treatment that necessitate the classification"  
* ''Maple Run at Austin Munic. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan'', 931 S.W.2d 941, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9968420057480702546#p948 948-49] (Tex. 1996) ("It is well settled that Section 59(b) authorizes the Legislature to pass local legislation creating specific conservation and reclamation districts without violating Article III, Section 56. . . . Under these circumstances, Section 59 cannot reasonably be read as authorizing local legislation that arbitrarily singles out a community for financial regulation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 43.082 is not authorized under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, and therefore is a prohibited local law under Article III, Section 56.")


no reasonable relationship between size of large counties and stated problems
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The Legislature in this instance may well have concluded that bail bondsmen in the more populous counties should be regulated and required to secure their obligations because of the high incidence of crime and the difficulties involved in enforcing bond forfeitures and determining the net worth of persons engaged in the business of writing bonds, but that the same safeguards and procedures were not necessary and would be unduly burdensome in more sparsely populated areas.
* ''City of Irving v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd.'', 894 S.W.2d 456, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10636583677412860942#p467 467] (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1995, denied) ("There is no doubt about the significance . . . . If ever a statute could be found not local or special 'even though its enforcement or operation is confined to a restricted area,' because 'persons or things throughout the State are affected thereby or if it operates upon a subject in which people at large are interested,' ''see id''. (citing ''Lower Colorado River Authority'', 83 S.W.2d at 629), Senate Bill 348 is such a measure. The Board is also correct in pointing out that Senate Bill 348 may in the future apply to other jointly-operated airports.")


Under the challenged law, Texas counties are classified by population. 253 fine. 1 has problem with incompetence and/or indifference of local officers regarding election administration. That problem has no correlation with population. Any size county, the largest and the smallest, can have such incompetent and/or indifferent local officers.
* ''Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.'', 826 S.W.2d 489, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7182840218285289047#p510 510] (Tex. 1992) (citation omitted) ("Article III, section 56 provides in pertinent part that '[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law . . . [r]egulating the affairs of . . . school districts. . . .' Appellants argue that Senate Bill 351 is such a special law. However, a special or local law is one that applies to a limited class of persons as distinguished by geography or some other special characteristic. By this definition, Senate Bill 351 is clearly not a special or local law: it applies generally to the entire State.")


If the classification is not based on a reasonable and substantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance bearing a proper relation to the purpose of the statute, it is a special law
* ''Kelly v. State'', 724 S.W.2d 42, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16914505811224644099#p47 47] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("In a sense, Art. 1918c, supra, is a 'special or local' law as it is expressly limited to Dallas County. The intent of Art. III, Section 56 . . . was 'to combat corruption, personal privileges, and meddling in local affairs–or, conversely, to prevent a group from dashing to the Capitol to get something their local government would not give them.' Vol. 1, ''The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis'', at page 273. However, as the commentary to the section makes clear, that section of our Constitution has been rendered virtually meaningless by court decisions.")


There must be a reasonable relationship between the classification and the objects sought to be accomplished by the statute
* ''Robinson v. Hill'', 507 S.W.2d 521, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3687881963707768479#p526 526] (Tex. 1974) ("Any classification on the basis of population is subject to this complaint, and that circumstance alone is not a sufficient basis for holding the statutory classification unconstitutional. The Legislature has rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes, and there is nothing here to suggest that the line drawn is arbitrary or capricious or a mere device used for the purpose of giving a local law the appearance of a general law. See Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000. In our opinion the statute is a general law and does not violate Art. III, Sec. 56, of the Texas Constitution.")


Premise, in largest county but not other 353 one elected person will manage election  better than one person appointed by cc plus chair
* ''Board of Managers of the Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Pension Bd. of the Pension Sys. for the City of Houston'', 449 S.W.2d 33, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=754209635729513848#p38 38] (Tex. 1969) ("The fact that Section 23a applied, when passed, only to the City of Houston does not make it a local or special law. As a matter of fact, Article 6243g applied only to the City of Houston when it was passed in 1965, but all of its provisions, including those added by Section 23a, are applicable . . . . We have no reason to say that the classification, embracing, as it does, cities in a broad population bracket, only one of which will be presently affected, bears no reasonable relation to the object to be accomplished.")


Bad countyauditr, fire lower salary move to treasure of Tarrant coutr.
* ''Devon v. City of San Antonio'', 443 S.W.2d 598, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16168023269216229417#p601 601] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1969, ref'd) ("There are no restrictions that limit its operation to any city. It is general and uniform in its application to all cities which may now or hereafter fall within its reasonably broad class. Appellant does not suggest any basis for holding that the classification in the Act is unreasonable or arbitrary, or that it was put in general form by the legislature merely to evade the Constitution, and we find none. To the contrary, considering the subject matter of the Act, we perceive, without discussing, substantial grounds for the classification made by the legislature. The Act is a general law.")


statewide interest in bail bonds: crime in houston; applicable to all: anyone visiting Houston
* ''Smith v. Davis'', 426 S.W.2d 827, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9077696797543097267#p832 832] (Tex. 1968) ("Further, the classification limiting the applicability of Section 2b to counties with 650,000 or more inhabitants is not unreasonable, because this classification includes all counties to which the section would otherwise be applicable. . . . We do not have to consider the effect of the population bracket as if it discriminated against smaller counties with teaching hospital facilities, because it does not do so; and we may assume that the legislature would recognize the possibility of an unreasonable classification in the event a state-supported medical school were created in a smaller county at some time in the future.")


Replacing bad officer ee local matter. .
* ''Cameron County v. Wilson'', 326 S.W.2d 162, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893258599009863966#p167 167] (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.")


Miller: "Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification. It must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a local law the appearance of a general law."
* ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.")


"The fundamental rule is that all classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another." 2. " Another rule is that the characteristics which form the basis of the classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; in other words, legislation for a class, to be general, must be confined to matters peculiar to the class. There must be an evident
* ''Rodriguez v. Gonzales'', 227 S.W.2d 791, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18224133104924555465#p793 793] (Tex. 1950) ("The primary purpose back of the adoption of this section was to secure that uniformity in the application of law which is essential to an ordered society. The section is not of doubtful construction, but is a plain mandate . . . . The prohibition is against any 'local or special law.' We are not concerned with any distinctions which may be drawn between a local law and a special law, for in our opinion the Act under review is both a local and a special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision. This is so clear to our minds that we shall not discuss the question at length.")
connection between the distinctive features to be regulated and the regulation adopted.


reasonable ''basis'' for classification; i.e. "unconstitutional by reason of the fact that such classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished"
* ''State v. McDonald'', 220 S.W.2d 732, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/220_SW2_732.pdf#page=2 733] (Tex.Civ.App.–Texarkana 1949, ref'd) (citations omitted) ("If above House Concurrent Resolution be susceptible of the construction that it was the intent to waive immunity from liability as urged by plaintiffs, such would lend no validity to this judgment, for such resolution is unconstitutional. . . . Appellees assert that the legislature in sessions after sessions has passed bills and resolutions, at times a field day, granting permission to people to sue the State for alleged negligent acts of agents and employees of the various departments of the State, and later has authorized payments of judgments recovered.")


There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and object to be attained. There must be something * * which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes.
* ''State Highway Department v. Gorham'', 162 S.W.2d 934, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/162_SW2_934.pdf#page=4 937] (Tex. 1942) ("If the Act be construed as a special law, depriving the State of a defense in a particular case, it is unconstitutional, as being violative of Section 3 of the Texas Bill of Rights, which provides that all men shall have equal rights. It is also violative of Article III, Section 56, of our State Constitution, which provides that no local or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be made applicable. . . . It certainly was not the intention of the framers of our Constitution that the State should have certain defenses against some individuals, but not against others similarly situated.")


Miller: "Resort to population brackets for the purpose of classifying subjects for legislation is permissible where the spread of population is broad enough to include or segregate a substantial class, and where the population bears some real relation to the subject of legislation and affords a fair basis for the classification."
* ''Ex parte Carson'', 159 S.W.2d 126, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/159_SW2_126.pdf#page=4 129] (Tex.Crim.App. 1942) ("History of legislation reveals to us a very early practice, having a persistent accelerated tendency, against which the framers of the Constitution were, undoubtedly, endeavoring to provide an insurmountable barrier in Section 56, Article 3 of our Constitution. The trading and trafficking in the passing of local and special laws resulting in special privileges and immunities may be viewed as one of the danger elements in all legislative bodies which consists of representatives from varied districts not affected always in all matters by the things which the other may do or not do.")


If there is a legitimate relationship between the size of a city and the privilege of detaching a portion of its territory and that Art. 1266, based upon such relationship, is a valid statufe. Whether it is wise or unwise is exclusively a legislative matter.
* ''Anderson v. Wood'', 152 S.W.2d 1084, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/152_SW2_1084.pdf#page=4 1087] (Tex. 1941) ("We can conceive of no reason why the Commissioners' Courts of counties with a population of less than 195,000 and those with populations in excess of 205,000 should have a right to employ county traffic officers, while the Commissioners' Court of Tarrant County, such county . . . . The necessity for the employment of traffic officers in Tarrant County appears to be as urgent as in counties of lesser population. The classification appears to be an arbitrary one bearing no relation to the subject of legislation, and as a consequence this particular section of the act is void as a local or special law.")
There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.


Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void."
* ''Miller v. El Paso County'', 150 S.W.2d 1000, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/150_SW2_1000.pdf#page=2 1001] (Tex. 1941) ("It is intended to prevent the granting of special privileges and to secure uniformity of law throughout the State as far as possible. It is said that at an early period in many of the states the practice of enacting special and local laws became 'an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests, and encouraged the reprehensible practice of trading and 'logrolling.<nowiki>''</nowiki> It was for the suppression of such practices that such a provision was adopted in this and many of the other states of the Union. 25 R.C.L., p. 820, § 68.")


"The Act contains two provisions relevant here. First, it provides that '[t]he Commissioners Court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less, by written order may create the position of a county elections administrator for the county.' 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 952 (S.B. 1750) § 2(a) (emphasis added to reflect the amendment). Second, it provides that 'on September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax-assessor collector and county clerk.” ''Id''. § 3."
* ''Bexar County v. Tynan'', 97 S.W.2d 467, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/097_SW2_467.pdf#page=4 470-71] (Tex. 1936) ("Notwithstanding it is true that the Legislature may classify counties upon a basis of population for the purpose of fixing compensation of county and precinct officers, yet in doing so the classification must be based upon a real distinction, and must not be arbitrary or a device to give what is in substance a local or special law the form of a general law. . . . There are many things connected with the history of this bill in the Legislature which convincingly indicate that the House and Senate regarded it as purely a local bill, but we do not deem it necessary to enumerate them here.")


Not closed, it does not limit the transfer solely to Harris County even if other counties reach the same size threshold.
* ''Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw'', 83 S.W.2d 629, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_SW2_629.pdf#page=8 636] (Tex. 1935) ("In the first place, it is settled that a statute is not local or special, within the meaning of this constitutional provision, even though its enforcement is confined to a restricted area, if persons or things throughout the state are affected thereby, or if it operates upon a subject that the people at large are interested in. Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246. An examination of this act convinces us that it operates upon a subject that the state at large is interested in. In fact, the business and operation of this district is not restricted to a particular area.")


Old: Under have choice. Execute with vote and order. New: Under have choice but over do not. Transition by operation of law rather than order. Normally prospective so leg made clear retroactive by transition provision re those over 3.5. If administrator exists over 3.5 in violation subject to suit to force compliance with law. Problem is ambiguity re pro/retro re non Harris by second permanent provision. not clear so consult legislative history re application to others than Harris. Before every county had auth to switch which necessarily included auth to have. Now over 3.5 cannot switch. Ambiguous whether they retain authority to have.
* ''Fritter v. West'', 65 S.W.2d 414, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/065_SW_414.pdf#page=? 415-16] (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1933, ref'd) ("  .")


EC 1.003(a): The Code Construction Act (Chapter 311, Government Code) applies to the construction of each provision in this code, except as otherwise ''expressly'' provided by this code.
* ''Smith v. State'', 49 S.W.2d 739, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/049_SW2_739.pdf#page=5 743-44] (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant statute], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")


GC 311.005: The following definitions apply unless the statute or context in which the word or phrase is used requires a different definition: ... (3) "Population" means the population shown by the
* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")
''most recent federal decennial census''.


GC 311.022: A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless ''expressly'' made retrospective.
* ''Stephensen v. Wood'', 34 S.W.2d 246, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/034_SW2_246.pdf#page=4 249] (Tex. 1931) ("The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. . . . A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons stated we hold this to be a general law.")


GC 311.023: In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the: (1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) ''legislative history''; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; 6) administrative construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.
* ''Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins'', 263 S.W. 905, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_905.pdf#page=2 906] (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")


GC 311.031(a): [T]he reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect: (1) the prior operation of the statute or ''any prior action taken under it'' ....
* ''Duclos v. Harris County'', 263 S.W. 562, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_562.pdf#page=2 563] (Tex. 1924) ("If the Legislature had, by enactment other than in the bill creating the court, attempted to increase the salary of the clerk of Harris County alone, such enactment would clearly be a special and local law, and violative of Sec. 56, Art. 3. Can the fact that it is included in the provisions of a general law creating a new court in a county in which a clerk for all district courts was already provided and his compensation fixed under a general law, the same as for all other clerks in like counties, change its nature . . . . We think not. To so hold would he to look to the form and not the spirit and purpose of the law.")


GC 311.032(c): In a statute that does not contain a provision for severability or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute are severable.
* ''O'Brien v. Amerman'', 247 S.W. 270, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_270.pdf#page=2 271] (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions . . . . It seems obvious that the number of pilots and the need of careful and strict supervision of pilotage would increase with the size of the port and the extension of its terminal water transportation facilities. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")


The change in law made by this Act applies only to the creation of the position of county elections administrator on or after the effective date of this Act. The creation of a county elections administrator before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect when the position was created, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.
* ''Bell County v. Hall'', 153 S.W. 121, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/153_SW_121.pdf#page=2 122] (Tex. 1913) ("The honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district held on this appeal that the act . . . . Upon a careful consideration of the question, we concur in this conclusion, and do not regard it necessary to supplement the able opinion written in the case by Chief Justice Key. In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management.")


At least two reasonable bases exist for treating Harris County differently from the state's other 253 counties for election administration purposes. (1) Its sheer size warrants special consideration, as does its outsized impact on statewide elections. (2) Its Commissioners Court changed the election administration system for the 2022 election cycle, created new problems that made national news, created local controversy and led to numerous election contests. Solving its specific issues is a reasonable basis. In other words, it is reasonable for the legislature to make a change to the elections administrator in the one county that was experiencing difficulties while leaving the other counties' elections administrators alone.
* ''Smith v. State'', 113 S.W. 289, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/113_SW_289.pdf#page=12 300] (Tex.Crim.App. 1908) (P.J. Davidson, dissenting) ("I am persuaded that no case can be found in the reports which holds a law to be general which failed to provide for and anticipate the wants of the future. On the contrary, whenever the question has arisen, every court has held a law special which created a classification which was arbitrary or illusive, and which operated upon unchangeable conditions and failed to provide for future localities or objects to come within the class, no matter how ingenious the evasion employed to make a special law assume the guise of a general law may have been.")


The Act has at least three reasonable bases. First, Harris County's sheer size creates a statewide interest in the proper administration of its elections, which is unlikely to dissipate even if, due to statewide population growth, other large counties eventually reach populations of over 3.5 million. Second, legislators may have believed reports that Harris County's elections administrators poorly managed the County’s 2022 elections. Third, regardless of the veracity of those reports, the Legislature may have been concerned that widespread reporting about poorly managed elections in Harris County caused voters to lose confidence in the integrity of those elections.
* ''Reed v. Rogan'', 59 S.W. 255, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/059_SW_255.pdf#page=3 257-58] (Tex. 1900) ("It has been well said that 'a law is not local that operates upon a subject in which the people at large are interested.' Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115. The sales of the school lands of the State may be a matter of especial [sic] importance to the people who reside in the localities where they are situate. They are none the less a matter of interest to the people in general and to the State itself. Not only is the school fund . . . . The simple solution of the question is that the people of the State–its public–are interested in the property of the State, and that a law which provides for its sale is a general and public law.")


Harris County’s size makes it different from all other counties. Okay but how with regard to whether its elections should be administered by elections administrator or county clerk?
* ''Clark v. Finley'', 54 S.W. 343, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/054_SW_343.pdf#page=3 345] (Tex. 1899) ("Indeed, it is perhaps the exception when a statute is found which applies to every person or thing alike. . . . The tendency of the recent decisions upon the subject, as it seems to us, is to drift into refinements that are rather more specious than profitable. It is said in some of the cases that the classification must be reasonable; in others, that it must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, etc. If it is meant by this that the legislature cannot evade the prohibition of the constitution as to special laws by making a law applicable to a pretended class, which is, in fact, no class, we concur in the proposition.")


Because elections in Harris County have a statewide impact, particularly when statewide officials and measures are on the ballot, the Act is not local within the meaning of the Constitution. License to change all election related laws.
* ''City of Dallas v. Western Electric Co.'', 18 S.W. 552, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/018_SW_552.pdf#page=2 553] (Tex. 1892) ("The prohibitions, limitations, and requirements contained in section 56 of article 3 . . . . If provisions found in the charters of cities containing over 10,000 inhabitants are subject to no other objection than that they are local or special, and such as could be provided for by a general law, they must stand because they are permitted by section 5 of article 11, and therefore expressly excepted from the operation of section 56 of article 3. If the privileges and powers contained in such charters are such as can be given to cities by either general or special legislation, they must be respected.")


Given the disparate outcome between different-sized counties and Harris County's own disparate outcome between methods of administration, it was reasonable for the Legislature to change who administered the County's elections. If Bell County faltered, bracket out their elections administrator?
* ''Dillingham v. Putnam'', 14 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/014_SW_303.pdf#page=2 304] (Tex. 1890) (citation omitted) ("The section of the Constitution forbidding the passage of special or local laws on numerated subjects forbids the passage of such laws 'for limitation of civil or criminal actions' but we do not understand the Act in question within the meaning of the Constitution to be such a limitation. We understand that section of the Constitution to forbid the passage of a law which would extend or restrict the time within which an action should be brought against or in favor of one person, when upon a like cause of action a longer or shorter period of limitation is provided for persons generally of like status.")


If outside impact then classify as largest
* ''Lytle v. Halff'', 12 S.W. 610, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/012_SW_610.pdf#page=5 614] (Tex. 1889) ("Every law fixing the territory which shall constitute a judicial district is necessarily local in its character, but the power of the legislature to do this is expressly recognized. The creation of two judicial districts in a county operates no further towards the regulation of the affairs of the county than does the establishment of one, and it seems to us that the act in question is not within the meaning of the constitution on regulating the affairs of a county; for that paragraph of the section referred to has application to such affairs as are common to all the subdivisions of the state referred to in it.")


If personnel problems, then classify by personnel problem
* ''Johnson v. Martin'', 12 S.W. 321, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/012_SW_321.pdf#page=4 324] (Tex. 1889) ("The appellees also contend that the Acts of 1883 and 1879 are in conflict with section 56, article 3, of the Constitution. The section declares that the Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided, pass any local or special law 'regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts,' etc. . . . [T]he portion of the Act of 1883 under which plaintiff was elected is not in violation of the section of the Constitution quoted above. It is a general law, as we think is the entire section; and it does not attempt to regulate any of the affairs of any particular county, town, or city.")


there is no substantial difference in the situation or circumstance of border counties relating to suits for delinquent taxes upon which to base the classification. No valid reason can be perceived for limiting the operation of' the Act to border counties
* ''Beyman v. Black'', 47 Tex. 558, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/047_Tex_558.pdf#page=9 566] (1877) (citation omitted) ("Indeed, it has not been argued that the act violates any of the [specific] provisions of the constitutional amendments of January, 1874, forbidding . . . and that 'the Legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws.' Even if the law could be regarded as a local or special act, its passage would be taken as the judgment of the Legislature, that the case was not one which could be provided for by a general law, and their decision is conclusive of that question.")


Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification.
* ''Treasurer of State v. Wygall'', 46 Tex. 447, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/046_Tex_447.pdf#page=13 459] (1877) ("The constitutional limitations that were invoked in the numerous exceptions taken to this special law of the Legislature . . . . With the policy or motive of passing such a special law in this case, we have nothing to do. As it presents itself to the court it is a question of power in the Legislature. The amendments to the Constitution, January 18,1874, prohibiting the Legislature from passing such a special law, may he regarded as some evidence, though not conclusive, that the Legislature did not regard its power to do it restrained by any other provision of the Constitution. (Acts of 1874, p. 235.).")


In other words, is EC 31.050 void on the ground it is a designation rather than a classification.
* ''Orr v. Rhine'', 45 Tex. 345, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/045_Tex_345.pdf#page=8 352-53] (1876) ("[W]hen this statute was passed, May 26, 1873, there was no constitutional restriction upon the power of the Legislature to enact local laws. There was, at least, no explicit and direct restriction of this kind until the ratification of the amendments to the Constitution, January 26, 1874. It is, we think, a rule of construction, to be generally adhered to in the construction of constitutions as well as statutes, that they operate prospectively, unless the words employed, or when the object in view and the nature and character of the provision, clearly show that it was intended to have a retrospective operation.")


EC 31.017(a): In a county with a population of more than 4 million (Harris County?), the secretary of state's office may order administrative oversight of a county office administering elections ....
|seo_title=Featured Article: Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution ("Local and Special Laws")
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 56, local laws, special laws
|seo_description=This important section generally prohibits the enactment of "local" laws and "special" laws.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


EC 31.031(a): The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may create the position of county elections administrator for the county.
}}


EC 31.048(a): The commissioners court by written order may abolish the position of county elections administrator at any time.
[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
 
EC 31.050: On September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. ...
 
Having once become operative, the office continues to exist in a county, regardless of the population as shown by any future census, unless the office is abolished as provided in Subdivision 9 of this section.
 
?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ??
 
Here, where the subjective motivation is not an element of the Plaintiffs' claims—and only the reasonableness of the Legislature's classification matters—legislative history plays no role in the analysis.
 
Because the Legislature’s classification was reasonable, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits.
 
Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment.
 
The Legislature knew that it would apply to Harris County on September 1, 2023, and then never again, even if some other county with an elections administrator passes the 3.5 million threshold.
 
Law being made theoretically, not for a day, but for all time, a statute applicable to cities of certain population is a general law when it establishes a rule for the prospective government or regulation of all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the prescribed population; but where the statute obviously acts only on a present state of facts in such cities and cannot by possibility apply to other cities that may attain, in future, such population, it is local, special and void.
 
A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.
 
2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145 [in legislation, 3.3 million]; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779
 
This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County.
 
Matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place. All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?
 
Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
 
It is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.
 
So that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented.
 
The classification adopted must rest on real or substantial distinctions which renders one class, in truth, distinct or different from another class. There must exist reasonable justification for the class, that is, the basis of the classification invoked must be a direct relation to the purpose of the law.
 
Regarding population brackets: real or substantial distinctions which render one class distinct or different from another class and the basis of the classification must have a direct relation to the purpose of the law.
 
It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842
 
The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law.
 
Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has Art. 6243g been amended ?)
 
EC 85.066: (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (b), any voter who is entitled to vote an early voting ballot by personal appearance may do so at any branch polling place in the territory served by the early voting clerk. (b) For a countywide election in a county with a population of more than 3.3 million and a primary election in a county with a population of more than 1 million in which temporary branch polling places are established under Section 85.062(d)(1), the commissioners court may limit voting at a temporary branch polling place to the voters of particular state representative districts.  To the extent practicable, the state representative districts shall be grouped so that the temporary branch polling places in each group serve substantially equal numbers of voters.  A maximum of four groups of state representative districts may be established under this subsection.
 
To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle.
 
wrong: every law is general which operates equally upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all; such uniformity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing
 
what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded
 
LCRA is a Texas governmental agency that has many duties coextensive with the limits of the state. Harris County is not. The governance of LCRA is a state public policy matter. The governance of Harris County is not.
 
Stephenson: "Under the above authorities we hold that the act in question is a general, and not a local or special law within the meaning of Sections 56 and 57 of Art. 3 of our State Constitution. The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. To say that the Legislature cannot enact laws to protect the fish along a certain part of the coast line of the State because such a law would be local or special, would be to say that
all such regulations must apply to every part of the State. A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of
our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons
stated we hold this to be a general law."
 
Anderson: "The rule applicable in such cases is thus stated in Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), vol. 1, sec. 306, as follows: 'If, by striking out a void exception, proviso or other restrictive clause, the remainder, by reason of its generality, will have a broader scope as to subject or territory, its operation is not in accord with the legislative intent, and the whole would be affected and made void by the validity of such part.'"
 
Smith: "However, if we were to hold that without the population restriction, the statute is now applicable to all counties in Texas alike, we would be, in effect, invading the legislative field. This we do not propose to do."
 
When Dallas County attains the population threshold, will it share the characteristics of the classification.
 
Question is not  rational action/purpose/object or even rational classification but rather if different treatment is sufficient to overcome strong preference for equal governmental structure of local government Problem identified by leg: incomplete indifference.... to overcome const preference for equal county government structure established classification on 1.3 million and or largest state in texas. But no correlation byw size and info. General law address in is poss . Eg school board takeover staute.Current problem rather than temporary solution permanent change
 
The postulate being established that the constitutional language, no 'law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be made,' means to-day what it meant in 1875-1876, when the Constitution was formulated by the Convention and adopted by the people, the problem before us will be solved when we ascertain the meaning of that language as generally understood when the Constitution was adopted.
 
act does not classify; rather its identifies. 1909 AG: local if according to last preceding census census
 
Davis 1871: "Of a total of 242 public and private acts and resolutions which became laws, 148 (near two-thirds) were of private nature, and of 57 acts which passed both Houses, but failed for different reasons to become laws, 49 were private. Thus it appears that more than two-thirds of the legislation and I may say, of your valuable time, was at that session taken up (at great cost to the people of the State) in matters of purely personal or private character."
 
https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/govdocs/Edmund%20J%20Davis/1871/SOS_Davis_1871.pdf
 
Davis 1873: "Much valuable time is occupied at each session with the matter of private or special legislation. The most of this can be put out of the way by general incorporation laws, of which one was passed at the last session, but which did not include railroad companies, and also made other exceptions. In permitting those exceptions the act is defective. There is no good reason why railroad companies may not, as well as others be remitted altogether to a general incorporation act."
 
https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/govdocs/Edmund%20J%20Davis/1873/SOS_Davis_1873.pdf
 
Water Closets veto: https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/12/CS1/HB167.pdf
 
Cf. Felton v. Johnson, 247 S.W. 837, 840 (Tex. 1923) ("In view of the history of this bill, we think we would do violence to the plain intent of the Legislature if we recommended a construction of this statute which would include professional services of a real estate broker within its terms. Before we could make such a recommendation, we think it would be necessary for us to insert in this statute the very provisions which the Legislature not only refused to include therein but expressly eliminated therefrom. The courts should not do that. To do so would clearly invade the prerogatives of the legislative branch of the state government.").
 
Cf. Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184, 208 (1851) ("The 34th section of article 7 of the Constitution declares, that 'every law enacted by the Legislature shall have but one object, and that shall he expressed in the title.' The object of this act is single, and is expressed in the title; and its provisions cannot be construed to regulate proceedings in any other in the District Courts. Such is the inevitable result of the constitutional provision, and such its force and effect, if it be mandatory, and not directory, in its character. The consequences of such a restriction on legislative discretion and power, of the application of such a test of the validity of special provisions, years, nay ages, after their passage, and after rights under them have accrued, maybe very inconvenient and destructive. But such results were for the consideration of the convention; and, in their wisdom, such restriction was deemed salutary and proper. It would he irrational to suppose that this provision of the Constitution is merely a directory one, which may be obeyed or disregarded at the will and caprice of the Legislature. Under such construction, it would be shorn of its strength and efficacy—would become a dead letter—a mere excrescence in the Constitution.").
 
post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600
 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1974/jh0196.pdf ("As the questioned statute specifically names Bexar County as the only county to which it applies, we believe that it is a local law prohibited by Article 3, Section 56 of the Constitution. The doctrine that legislation on subjects in which the people at large are interested will not be considered a local or
special law, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968) is inapplicable here.")
 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article III, Section 56, of the State Constitution. The last mentioned section of the Constitution, is designed, in part, to insure that the system of county government shall be as uniform as is possible. It is intended to prevent the passage of laws which discriminate between the counties of this state without adequate and substantial difference in the characteristics of the individual counties indicative, rationally, of the necessity for the discrimination.")
 
Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. 266, 281-82 (1889) ("Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for special or local legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all' the cases is that classification, with the view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, — a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws enacted in pursuance of such classification and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. . . . The purpose of the provision under consideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the doing, by local or special laws, that which can be accomplished by general láws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general, instead of local or special laws, whenever the former are at all practicable.")
 
State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.")
 
==houston==
 
1930 Census: 1 Houston 292,352 2 Dallas 260,475 ... ; Acts 1933, 43rd R.S., ch. 94: "Article 6229. In all incorporated cities and towns having a population of two hundred eighty thousand or more according to the preceding Federal census ... constitute a Board of Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Pension Fund ...."
 
1940 Census: 1 Houston 384,514 2 Dallas 294,734 ... ; Acts 1943, 48th R.S., ch. 358: "Section 1. There is hereby created a Municipal Pension System in all cities in this State having a population of three hundred and eighty four thousand (384,000) or more according to any preceding or future Federal Census."
 
1950 Census: 1 Houston 596,163 2 Dallas 434,462 ... ; Acts 1957, 55th R.S., ch. 398: "Section 1. There is hereby created a Municipal Pension System in all cities in this State having a population of five hundred thousand (500,000) or more according to the last preceding or any future Federal Census."
 
1960 Census: 1 Houston 938,219 2 Dallas 679,684 ... ; Acts 1965, 59th R.S., ch. 107 "Section 1. There is hereby created a Municipal Pension System in all cities in this state having a population of nine hundred thousand (900,000) or more according to the last preceding or any future Federal Census."
 
1970 Census: 1 Houston 1,232,802 2 Dallas 844,401 ... ; Acts 1975, 64th R.S., ch. 41: "Section 1. There is hereby created a Municipal Pension System in all cities in this state having a population of one million two hundred thousand (1,200,000) or more according to the last preceding or any future Federal Census."
 
==review==
 
x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 SW3d 271 (TCA 2004)
 
x Williams v. Houston FR&RF, 121 SW3d 415 (TCA 2003)
 
x Diaz v. State, 68 SW3d 680 (TCA 2000 denied)
 
x Sw Travis v. Austin, 64 SW3d 25 (TCA 2000 dism) (xstatewide)
 
x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 SW3d 868 (Tx 2000) (dissent)
 
x Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 SW2d 560 (Tx 1999)
 
x Austin v. Cedar Park, 953 SW2d 424 (TCA 1997)
 
x Scurlock P v. Brazos Co, 869 SW2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)
 
x PUC v. Sw Water Services, 636 SW2d 262 (TCA 1982 nre)
 
X Ex parte Spring, 586 SW2d 482 (TxCrimApp 1978)
 
x Morris v. San Antonio, 572 SW2d 831 (TCA 1978)
 
x Suburban Ut Co v. State, 553 SW2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre)
 
x Culberson Co v. Holmes, 513 SW2d 126 (TCA 1974) (named county)
 
_ San Marcos v. LCRA, 508 SW2d 403 (TCA 1974)
 
x Inman v. RR Comm, 478 SW2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)
 
x Creps v. Firemens Fund, 456 SW2d 434 (TCA 1970 nre)
 
x Gould v. El Paso, 440 SW2d 696 (TCA 1969 nre)
 
x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 344 SW2d 435 (Tx 1961) (insurance receiver)
 
x Wood v. Wood, 320 SW2d 807 (Tx 1959) (military divorce)
 
x Rios v. State, 288 SW2d 77 (TxCrimApp 1955) (jury wheel)
 
x Atwood v. Willacy Co, 284 SW2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre) (cited TSC)
 
x San Antonio v. State, 270 SW2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd) (not closed)
 
x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 SW2d 86 (TCA 1948)
 
x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 SW2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)
 
x Jones v. Anderson, 189 SW2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd) (court related)
 
x Oakley v. Kent, 181 SW2d 919 (TCA 1944)
 
x Jameson v. Smith, 161 SW2d 520 (TCA 1942)
 
x King v. Sheppard, 157 SW2d 682 (TCA 1941 wm) (cited TSC)
 
x Wood v. Marfa ISD, 123 SW2d 429 (TCA 1939 revog)
 
x Watson v. Sabine, 120 SW2d 938 (TCA 1938 refd) (oil field)
 
x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 SW2d 352 (TCA 1937)
 
x Ex Parte Heiling, 82 SW2d 644 (TxCrimApp 1935) (closed)
 
x State v. Hall, 76 SW2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)
 
x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 SW2d 251 (Tx 1934) (general law)
 
x Austin N Bank v. Sheppard, 71 SW2d 242 (Tx 1934) (appropriation)
 
x Womack v. Carson, 65 SW2d 485 (Tx 1933) (closed severability)
 
x Fritter v. West, 65 SW2d 414 (TCA 1933 refd) (Kinney County)
 
x Jones v. Alexander, 59 SW2d 1080 (Tx 1933) (not 56 case)
 
x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 SW2d 228 (TxCommApp 1931)
 
x County of Henderson v. Allred, 40 SW2d 17 (Tx 1931) (road law)
 
x Randolph v State, 36 SW2d 484 (TxCrimApp 1931) (dicta)
 
x NT Traction v. Bryan, 294 SW 527 (Tx 1927) (population xjury)
 
x King v. State, 289 SW 69 (TxCrimApp 1926) (charter special)
 
x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 SW 182 (TxCommApp 1926)
 
x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tx 450 (1923) (court officer)
 
x Limestone Co v. Garrett, 236 SW 970 (TxCommApp 1922)
 
x Vincent v. State, 235 SW 1084 (TxCommApp 1921)
 
x Ward v. Harris County, 209 SW 792 (TCA 1919 refd)
 
x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tx 123 (1918) (same: Duclos)
 
x Logan v. State, 111 SW 1028 (TxCrimApp 1908) (Smith 1908)
 
x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tx 150 (1907) (local option)
 
x Green v. State, 92 SW 847 (TxCrimApp 1906)
 
x Clarke vs. Reeves County, 61 SW 981, 25 TCA 463 (TCA 1901 refd) (state interest)
 
x State v. Brownson, 61 SW 114 (Tx 1901) (schools)
 
x Reed v. Rogan, 59 SW 255 (Tx 1900) (state land)
 
x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 TCA 463 (1901 refd)
 
x C Wharf v. Corpus Christi, 57 SW 982 (TCA 1900 refd)
 
x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 SW 921 (TCA 1897 refd)
 
x McGhee Irr. Ditch v. Hudson, 85 Tx 587 (1893) (state land)
 
x San Antonio & APR v. Wilson, 19 SW 910 (TCA 1892)
 
x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tx 317 (1892) (local matter)
 
x Gulf C&SF v. Ellis, 18 S.W. 723 (Tex. 1892) (due process)
 
x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tx 1 (1890) (limitations)
 
x Holley v. State, 14 TexCtApp 505 (1883)
 
x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (TxCommAp 1881)

Revision as of 17:00, September 26, 2023

As amended November 6, 2001:

(a) The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing [sic]: (1) the creation, extension or impairing of liens; (2) regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts; (3) changing the names of persons or places; (4) changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; (5) authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining of roads, highways, streets or alleys; (6) relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other state; (7) vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; (8) relating to cemeteries, grave-yards or public grounds not of the State; (9) authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; (10) locating or changing county seats; (11) incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; (12) for the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; (13) granting divorces; (14) creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts; (15) changing the law of descent or succession; (16) regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate; (17) regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, magistrates or constables; (18) regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes; (19) fixing the rate of interest; (20) affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability; (21) remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid into the Treasury; (22) exempting property from taxation; (23) regulating labor, trade, mining and manufacturing; (24) declaring any named person of age; (25) extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or his securities from liability; (26) giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds; (27) summoning or empanelling [sic] grand or petit juries; (28) for limitation of civil or criminal actions; (29) for incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements; or (30) relieving or discharging any person or set of persons from the performance of any public duty or service imposed by general law.

(b) In addition to those laws described by Subsection (a) of this section in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the Legislature from passing: (1) special laws for the preservation of the game and fish of this State in certain localities; and (2) fence laws applicable to any subdivision of this State or counties as may be needed to meet the wants of the people.

Editor Comments

This important and often-litigated section generally prohibits the enactment of "local" laws and "special" laws. In addition, Article XII, Section 1 mandates that "[n]o private corporation shall be created except by general laws." Cf. Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1896) ("We are of the opinion that the territorial act is not a local or special law . . . . The act is general in its operation; it applies to all counties in the Territory; it prescribes a rule for the stated compensation of certain public officers; no officer of the classes named is exempted from its operation; and there is such a relation between the salaries fixed for each class of counties, and the equalized assessed valuation of property in them, respectively, as to show that the act is not local and special in any just sense, but is general in its application to the whole Territory and designed to establish a system for compensating county officers that is not intrinsically unjust, nor capable of being applied for purposes merely local or special.").

Unfortunately, much of the jurisprudence regarding this type of legislative restriction is indefinite. Cf. Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356, 372 (1902) (emphasis in original) ("The act in question is local as to the city of St. Louis, and special as to the incumbent of the office of judge of probate."); Charles Binney, Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation in State Constitutions 25-26 (1894) ("Hence, postponing for the present the inquiry into what constitutes a class for legislative purposes, and premising only that the class to which the general laws are applicable must be real and substantial, it may be said in brief that: (1) A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. (2) A special law is one which relates either to particular persons, places or things, or to persons, places or things which, though not particularized, are separated, by any method of selection, from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable. (3) A local law is one whose operation is confined within territorial limits other than those of the whole State or any properly constituted class of localities therein.").

For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but a substantial majority, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, Interpretive Commentary (West 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").

The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 774 (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County, 228 So.3d 76, 80 (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); Gallardo v. State, 336 P.3d 717, 721 (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").

The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section 40) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."

This section, as adopted in 1876, did not expand or otherwise modify the January 1874 provision. Instead, it closely tracked the laundry list provision (Article IV, Section 53) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read in part: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: [1] Authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens; [2] Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards or school districts; [3] Changing the names of persons or places; [4] Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; [5] Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining [sic] roads, highways, streets or alleys; [6] Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other State; [7] Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; [8] Relating to cemeteries, grave yards or public grounds not of the State; [9] Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; [10] Locating or changing county seats; [11] Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; [12] For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; . . . In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case, is hereby declared a judicial question, and as such shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject."

At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. 167 (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. H-8 (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").

This section has been amended once. The 2001 modification was part of a "constitutional cleanup amendment." It made stylistic changes and transferred the substance of Sections 22 and 43 of Article XVI to this section. The local and special laws authorized by other sections, either expressly or by implication, include laws: (1) relating to the court system (Article V, Sections 1, 7, 8, 21); (2) creating or affecting a conservation and reclamation district (Article XVI, Section 59); (3) creating or affecting a road or water district (Article III, Section 52); (4) providing for road maintenance (Article VIII, Section 9); (5) creating or affecting a hospital district (Article IX, Sections 4-11); (6) creating or affecting an airport authority (Article IX, Section 12); (7) relating to the regulation of stock or stock raisers (Article XVI, Section 23); (8) granting aid or tax relief in cases of public calamity (Article III, Section 51, Article VIII, Section 10); and (9) providing for consolidation of political subdivision offices or functions (Article III, Section 64).

As reflected by the numerous decisions referenced below, the Texas jurisprudence in this area is within the national mainstream. The governing rules can be summarized as follows: (1) A general law is a law which relates to persons, places or things as a class, both in the present and in the future, which class is based upon a real and substantial difference which bears a reasonable relation to the statute's purpose. (2) A special law is a law which relates to particular persons, places or things of a class; to a class as it is constituted at a given time without allowance for changes in the future; or to a "pretended" class which bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the relevant statute. (3) A local law is a special law in which the places to which it applies are territorial subdivisions of the state. Note that the substance of the foregoing rules are routinely stated in different terms. More importantly, recognize that the rules are sometimes ignored by courts when considered necessary to reach an equitable result.

—Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp., 571 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no writ) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")
  • Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")
  • Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex. 1997) ("Moreover, the growers contend that, because of the statute's classifications, it is a local or special law . . . . A local law is limited to a specific geographic region of the State, while a special law is limited to a particular class of persons distinguished by some characteristic other than geography. See Maple Run at Austin Munic. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1996). Legislation does not violate Article III, Section 56, however, as long as there is a reasonable basis for its classifications. Id. As explained above, the Act satisfies this test.")
  • Maple Run at Austin Munic. Utility Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 948-49 (Tex. 1996) ("It is well settled that Section 59(b) authorizes the Legislature to pass local legislation creating specific conservation and reclamation districts without violating Article III, Section 56. . . . Under these circumstances, Section 59 cannot reasonably be read as authorizing local legislation that arbitrarily singles out a community for financial regulation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 43.082 is not authorized under Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution, and therefore is a prohibited local law under Article III, Section 56.")

Historic Decisions

  • City of Irving v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 894 S.W.2d 456, 467 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 1995, denied) ("There is no doubt about the significance . . . . If ever a statute could be found not local or special 'even though its enforcement or operation is confined to a restricted area,' because 'persons or things throughout the State are affected thereby or if it operates upon a subject in which people at large are interested,' see id. (citing Lower Colorado River Authority, 83 S.W.2d at 629), Senate Bill 348 is such a measure. The Board is also correct in pointing out that Senate Bill 348 may in the future apply to other jointly-operated airports.")
  • Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 510 (Tex. 1992) (citation omitted) ("Article III, section 56 provides in pertinent part that '[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law . . . [r]egulating the affairs of . . . school districts. . . .' Appellants argue that Senate Bill 351 is such a special law. However, a special or local law is one that applies to a limited class of persons as distinguished by geography or some other special characteristic. By this definition, Senate Bill 351 is clearly not a special or local law: it applies generally to the entire State.")
  • Kelly v. State, 724 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("In a sense, Art. 1918c, supra, is a 'special or local' law as it is expressly limited to Dallas County. The intent of Art. III, Section 56 . . . was 'to combat corruption, personal privileges, and meddling in local affairs–or, conversely, to prevent a group from dashing to the Capitol to get something their local government would not give them.' Vol. 1, The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis, at page 273. However, as the commentary to the section makes clear, that section of our Constitution has been rendered virtually meaningless by court decisions.")
  • Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. 1974) ("Any classification on the basis of population is subject to this complaint, and that circumstance alone is not a sufficient basis for holding the statutory classification unconstitutional. The Legislature has rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes, and there is nothing here to suggest that the line drawn is arbitrary or capricious or a mere device used for the purpose of giving a local law the appearance of a general law. See Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000. In our opinion the statute is a general law and does not violate Art. III, Sec. 56, of the Texas Constitution.")
  • Board of Managers of the Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Pension Bd. of the Pension Sys. for the City of Houston, 449 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. 1969) ("The fact that Section 23a applied, when passed, only to the City of Houston does not make it a local or special law. As a matter of fact, Article 6243g applied only to the City of Houston when it was passed in 1965, but all of its provisions, including those added by Section 23a, are applicable . . . . We have no reason to say that the classification, embracing, as it does, cities in a broad population bracket, only one of which will be presently affected, bears no reasonable relation to the object to be accomplished.")
  • Devon v. City of San Antonio, 443 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1969, ref'd) ("There are no restrictions that limit its operation to any city. It is general and uniform in its application to all cities which may now or hereafter fall within its reasonably broad class. Appellant does not suggest any basis for holding that the classification in the Act is unreasonable or arbitrary, or that it was put in general form by the legislature merely to evade the Constitution, and we find none. To the contrary, considering the subject matter of the Act, we perceive, without discussing, substantial grounds for the classification made by the legislature. The Act is a general law.")
  • Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 832 (Tex. 1968) ("Further, the classification limiting the applicability of Section 2b to counties with 650,000 or more inhabitants is not unreasonable, because this classification includes all counties to which the section would otherwise be applicable. . . . We do not have to consider the effect of the population bracket as if it discriminated against smaller counties with teaching hospital facilities, because it does not do so; and we may assume that the legislature would recognize the possibility of an unreasonable classification in the event a state-supported medical school were created in a smaller county at some time in the future.")
  • Cameron County v. Wilson, 326 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.")
  • Smith v. Decker, 312 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.")
  • Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 227 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1950) ("The primary purpose back of the adoption of this section was to secure that uniformity in the application of law which is essential to an ordered society. The section is not of doubtful construction, but is a plain mandate . . . . The prohibition is against any 'local or special law.' We are not concerned with any distinctions which may be drawn between a local law and a special law, for in our opinion the Act under review is both a local and a special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision. This is so clear to our minds that we shall not discuss the question at length.")
  • State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex.Civ.App.–Texarkana 1949, ref'd) (citations omitted) ("If above House Concurrent Resolution be susceptible of the construction that it was the intent to waive immunity from liability as urged by plaintiffs, such would lend no validity to this judgment, for such resolution is unconstitutional. . . . Appellees assert that the legislature in sessions after sessions has passed bills and resolutions, at times a field day, granting permission to people to sue the State for alleged negligent acts of agents and employees of the various departments of the State, and later has authorized payments of judgments recovered.")
  • State Highway Department v. Gorham, 162 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1942) ("If the Act be construed as a special law, depriving the State of a defense in a particular case, it is unconstitutional, as being violative of Section 3 of the Texas Bill of Rights, which provides that all men shall have equal rights. It is also violative of Article III, Section 56, of our State Constitution, which provides that no local or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be made applicable. . . . It certainly was not the intention of the framers of our Constitution that the State should have certain defenses against some individuals, but not against others similarly situated.")
  • Ex parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 1942) ("History of legislation reveals to us a very early practice, having a persistent accelerated tendency, against which the framers of the Constitution were, undoubtedly, endeavoring to provide an insurmountable barrier in Section 56, Article 3 of our Constitution. The trading and trafficking in the passing of local and special laws resulting in special privileges and immunities may be viewed as one of the danger elements in all legislative bodies which consists of representatives from varied districts not affected always in all matters by the things which the other may do or not do.")
  • Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1087 (Tex. 1941) ("We can conceive of no reason why the Commissioners' Courts of counties with a population of less than 195,000 and those with populations in excess of 205,000 should have a right to employ county traffic officers, while the Commissioners' Court of Tarrant County, such county . . . . The necessity for the employment of traffic officers in Tarrant County appears to be as urgent as in counties of lesser population. The classification appears to be an arbitrary one bearing no relation to the subject of legislation, and as a consequence this particular section of the act is void as a local or special law.")
  • Miller v. El Paso County, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (Tex. 1941) ("It is intended to prevent the granting of special privileges and to secure uniformity of law throughout the State as far as possible. It is said that at an early period in many of the states the practice of enacting special and local laws became 'an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests, and encouraged the reprehensible practice of trading and 'logrolling.'' It was for the suppression of such practices that such a provision was adopted in this and many of the other states of the Union. 25 R.C.L., p. 820, § 68.")
  • Bexar County v. Tynan, 97 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Tex. 1936) ("Notwithstanding it is true that the Legislature may classify counties upon a basis of population for the purpose of fixing compensation of county and precinct officers, yet in doing so the classification must be based upon a real distinction, and must not be arbitrary or a device to give what is in substance a local or special law the form of a general law. . . . There are many things connected with the history of this bill in the Legislature which convincingly indicate that the House and Senate regarded it as purely a local bill, but we do not deem it necessary to enumerate them here.")
  • Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw, 83 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1935) ("In the first place, it is settled that a statute is not local or special, within the meaning of this constitutional provision, even though its enforcement is confined to a restricted area, if persons or things throughout the state are affected thereby, or if it operates upon a subject that the people at large are interested in. Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246. An examination of this act convinces us that it operates upon a subject that the state at large is interested in. In fact, the business and operation of this district is not restricted to a particular area.")
  • Fritter v. West, 65 S.W.2d 414, 415-16 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1933, ref'd) (" .")
  • Smith v. State, 49 S.W.2d 739, 743-44 (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant statute], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")
  • City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 36 S.W.2d 470, 472-73 (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")
  • Stephensen v. Wood, 34 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. 1931) ("The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. . . . A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons stated we hold this to be a general law.")
  • Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins, 263 S.W. 905, 906 (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")
  • Duclos v. Harris County, 263 S.W. 562, 563 (Tex. 1924) ("If the Legislature had, by enactment other than in the bill creating the court, attempted to increase the salary of the clerk of Harris County alone, such enactment would clearly be a special and local law, and violative of Sec. 56, Art. 3. Can the fact that it is included in the provisions of a general law creating a new court in a county in which a clerk for all district courts was already provided and his compensation fixed under a general law, the same as for all other clerks in like counties, change its nature . . . . We think not. To so hold would he to look to the form and not the spirit and purpose of the law.")
  • O'Brien v. Amerman, 247 S.W. 270, 271 (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions . . . . It seems obvious that the number of pilots and the need of careful and strict supervision of pilotage would increase with the size of the port and the extension of its terminal water transportation facilities. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")
  • Bell County v. Hall, 153 S.W. 121, 122 (Tex. 1913) ("The honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district held on this appeal that the act . . . . Upon a careful consideration of the question, we concur in this conclusion, and do not regard it necessary to supplement the able opinion written in the case by Chief Justice Key. In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management.")
  • Smith v. State, 113 S.W. 289, 300 (Tex.Crim.App. 1908) (P.J. Davidson, dissenting) ("I am persuaded that no case can be found in the reports which holds a law to be general which failed to provide for and anticipate the wants of the future. On the contrary, whenever the question has arisen, every court has held a law special which created a classification which was arbitrary or illusive, and which operated upon unchangeable conditions and failed to provide for future localities or objects to come within the class, no matter how ingenious the evasion employed to make a special law assume the guise of a general law may have been.")
  • Reed v. Rogan, 59 S.W. 255, 257-58 (Tex. 1900) ("It has been well said that 'a law is not local that operates upon a subject in which the people at large are interested.' Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115. The sales of the school lands of the State may be a matter of especial [sic] importance to the people who reside in the localities where they are situate. They are none the less a matter of interest to the people in general and to the State itself. Not only is the school fund . . . . The simple solution of the question is that the people of the State–its public–are interested in the property of the State, and that a law which provides for its sale is a general and public law.")
  • Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. 1899) ("Indeed, it is perhaps the exception when a statute is found which applies to every person or thing alike. . . . The tendency of the recent decisions upon the subject, as it seems to us, is to drift into refinements that are rather more specious than profitable. It is said in some of the cases that the classification must be reasonable; in others, that it must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, etc. If it is meant by this that the legislature cannot evade the prohibition of the constitution as to special laws by making a law applicable to a pretended class, which is, in fact, no class, we concur in the proposition.")
  • City of Dallas v. Western Electric Co., 18 S.W. 552, 553 (Tex. 1892) ("The prohibitions, limitations, and requirements contained in section 56 of article 3 . . . . If provisions found in the charters of cities containing over 10,000 inhabitants are subject to no other objection than that they are local or special, and such as could be provided for by a general law, they must stand because they are permitted by section 5 of article 11, and therefore expressly excepted from the operation of section 56 of article 3. If the privileges and powers contained in such charters are such as can be given to cities by either general or special legislation, they must be respected.")
  • Dillingham v. Putnam, 14 S.W. 303, 304 (Tex. 1890) (citation omitted) ("The section of the Constitution forbidding the passage of special or local laws on numerated subjects forbids the passage of such laws 'for limitation of civil or criminal actions' but we do not understand the Act in question within the meaning of the Constitution to be such a limitation. We understand that section of the Constitution to forbid the passage of a law which would extend or restrict the time within which an action should be brought against or in favor of one person, when upon a like cause of action a longer or shorter period of limitation is provided for persons generally of like status.")
  • Lytle v. Halff, 12 S.W. 610, 614 (Tex. 1889) ("Every law fixing the territory which shall constitute a judicial district is necessarily local in its character, but the power of the legislature to do this is expressly recognized. The creation of two judicial districts in a county operates no further towards the regulation of the affairs of the county than does the establishment of one, and it seems to us that the act in question is not within the meaning of the constitution on regulating the affairs of a county; for that paragraph of the section referred to has application to such affairs as are common to all the subdivisions of the state referred to in it.")
  • Johnson v. Martin, 12 S.W. 321, 324 (Tex. 1889) ("The appellees also contend that the Acts of 1883 and 1879 are in conflict with section 56, article 3, of the Constitution. The section declares that the Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided, pass any local or special law 'regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts,' etc. . . . [T]he portion of the Act of 1883 under which plaintiff was elected is not in violation of the section of the Constitution quoted above. It is a general law, as we think is the entire section; and it does not attempt to regulate any of the affairs of any particular county, town, or city.")
  • Beyman v. Black, 47 Tex. 558, 566 (1877) (citation omitted) ("Indeed, it has not been argued that the act violates any of the [specific] provisions of the constitutional amendments of January, 1874, forbidding . . . and that 'the Legislature shall pass general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws.' Even if the law could be regarded as a local or special act, its passage would be taken as the judgment of the Legislature, that the case was not one which could be provided for by a general law, and their decision is conclusive of that question.")
  • Treasurer of State v. Wygall, 46 Tex. 447, 459 (1877) ("The constitutional limitations that were invoked in the numerous exceptions taken to this special law of the Legislature . . . . With the policy or motive of passing such a special law in this case, we have nothing to do. As it presents itself to the court it is a question of power in the Legislature. The amendments to the Constitution, January 18,1874, prohibiting the Legislature from passing such a special law, may he regarded as some evidence, though not conclusive, that the Legislature did not regard its power to do it restrained by any other provision of the Constitution. (Acts of 1874, p. 235.).")
  • Orr v. Rhine, 45 Tex. 345, 352-53 (1876) ("[W]hen this statute was passed, May 26, 1873, there was no constitutional restriction upon the power of the Legislature to enact local laws. There was, at least, no explicit and direct restriction of this kind until the ratification of the amendments to the Constitution, January 26, 1874. It is, we think, a rule of construction, to be generally adhered to in the construction of constitutions as well as statutes, that they operate prospectively, unless the words employed, or when the object in view and the nature and character of the provision, clearly show that it was intended to have a retrospective operation.")

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