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| [[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Equal Rights Provision"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876: | | [[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876: |
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| '''All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.''' | | '''No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.''' |
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| This has been called the natural-rights section of the Texas Bill of Rights. However, the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have always treated it as simply an equal rights provision. | | This section is similar to the due-process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Cf. ''Zucht v. King'', 260 U.S. 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17474784919803032884#p176 176] (1922) ("Long before this suit was instituted, ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'', 197 U.S. 11, had settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory vaccination. . . . And still others had settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law."). |
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| In addition, for at least the last thirty-five years, all published appellate court decisions have assumed that the substance of this section and the substance of the federal equal protection clause are identical. | | The fundamental precept declared by this section has its origin in chapter twenty-nine of ''Magna Carta''. See Cooley, ''A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Cooley_Constitutional_Limitations_1874_due_course.pdf#page=17 351-53] (1874) (citations omitted) ("In some form of words, it is to be found in each of the State constitutions . . . . Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly identical, except that the phrase 'due process (or course) of law' is sometimes used, sometimes 'the law of the land,' and in some cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case."). |
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| It seems improbable that the foregoing interpretation will be departed from by the Texas judiciary in the future. Nonetheless, for completeness, the apparent origin of this section's unique text is outlined below.
| | Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2020/kp-0308.pdf#page=2 KP-308] (2020), opined that: "While the Texas and federal Constitutions differ in that Texas refers to 'due course' rather than 'due process,' Texas courts regard these terms as without substantive distinction unless and until a party demonstrates otherwise." The foregoing assertion by the Texas Attorney General is correct concerning "procedural" due process. However, as reflected by several of the decisions referenced below, the state's "substantive" due process jurisprudence has sometimes differed from its federal counterpart. |
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| The influential Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted in June 1776. The first section read: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." And the fourth read: "[N]o man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."
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| The first North Carolina Declaration of Rights was adopted in December 1776. The third section read: "[N]o man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-second read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State." Note that no section directly addressed equality or equal rights.
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| The first Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1780. The first section read: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." And the sixth read: "No man nor corporation or association of men have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges distinct from those of the community, than what rises from the consideration of services rendered to the public, and this title being in nature neither hereditary nor transmissible to children or descendants or relations by blood; the idea of a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge is absurd and unnatural."
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| The first Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1792. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."
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| The second Kentucky Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1799. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal, and [] no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "[T]he Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction."
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| The first Mississippi Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1817. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights, and [] no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive, separate, public emoluments or privileges, from the community, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read: "[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."
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| The first Connecticut Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1818. The first section read: "[A]ll men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and [] no man, or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." And the twentieth read: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors, shall ever be granted, or conferred in this State."
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| The first Alabama Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1819. The first section read: "[A]ll freemen, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and [] no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." And the twenty-sixth read in part: "No title of nobility, or hereditary distinction, privilege, honor, or emolument, shall ever be granted or conferred in this State."
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| The Declaration of Rights of the Republic of Texas was adopted in 1836. The first section read: "All men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public privileges or emoluments from the community." And the eighth read in part: "No title of nobility, hereditary privileges or honors, shall ever be granted or conferred in this Republic."
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| In ''Jackson v. Bulloch'', 12 Conn. 38, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Conn_38.pdf#page=5 42-43] (1837), the Connecticut Supreme Court opined: "The bill of rights, in its 1st section, declares, that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and that no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the bill of rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it."
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| The State of Texas's first Bill of Rights was adopted in 1845. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights; and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive, separate, public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." Note that no section directly addressed titles of nobility or hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors.
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| In ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Miss_209.pdf#page=10 218] (1854), the Mississippi Supreme Court opined: "The principle here announced is that of equality in political rights, and a denial of all title to individual privileges, honors, and distinctions from the community but for public services. It was directed against superiority of personal and political rights . . . . But it has no reference to the private relations of the citizens, nor to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them. Such matters are left, with but few limitations, to the discretion of the legislature."
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| In the State of Texas's second Bill of Rights adopted in 1861 due to it joining the Confederacy and its third Bill of Rights adopted in 1866 due to it leaving the Confederacy, the relevant constitutional language remained exactly the same.
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| The State of Texas's fourth Bill of Rights was adopted in 1869 due to the demands of Congressional Reconstruction. The second section read: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights; and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges." And the twenty-first read: "The equality of all persons before the law is herein recognized, and shall ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden, or duty, on account of race, color, or previous condition."
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| Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").
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| The courts and commentators routinely insert the term "free men" rather than "freemen" when quoting the text of this section. Because it appears in the enrolled version of the Texas Constitution, "freemen" is used here. Cf. Joshua Morrow, ''There Is Only One Texas Constitution'', 52 St. Mary's L.J. 765, [https://commons.stmarytx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=thestmaryslawjournal&#page=72 835-36] (2021) ("One constitution governs Texas: the manuscript constitution that the delegates to the Convention of 1875 signed and enrolled. . . . No longer should any court cite a pre-ratification copy as law, although courts can use those copies to help dispel any ambiguities that appear in the ratified text."). | |
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| Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").
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| * ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).") | | * ''Texas Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distributing LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17653902673364512620#p664 664-65] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("The Court today 'conclude[s] that the due-course clause does not protect the interest that the plaintiffs assert,' ''ante'' at 2, 125 S.Ct. 2195, and I agree. But what ''does'' that clause protect—and how does it do so? We still do not really know, even as we approach . . . . To that end, in Part II, I explain why I believe that our precedents do not go much beyond what has permeated most of our jurisprudence: the unadorned assertion that the Texas due-course clause is essentially the twin (the junior twin, to be sure) of the federal due-process clause.") |
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| * ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")
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| * ''Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese'', 148 S.W.3d 94, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11799262158355772649#p97 97-98] (Tex. 2004) ("The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Texas Constitution contains a similar provision: '. . . .' TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3. The parties do not argue any distinction between these two clauses, and we have said that both guarantees 'require a similar multi-tiered analysis.' ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2000); ''see also'' ''Rose v. Doctors Hosp.'', 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990) ('Texas cases echo federal standards when determining whether a statute violates equal protection.').") | | * ''Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Comm'n'', 593 S.W.3d 250, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15370415983701477665#p265 265] (Tex. 2019) ("We measure what process is due under a 'flexible standard' that depends on 'the practical requirements of the circumstances.' ''Id''. This standard includes three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. ''Id''.") |
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| * ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.") | | * ''Patel v. Texas Dep't of Licensing & Reg.'', 469 S.W.3d 69, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7017811002225614343#p91 91] (Tex. 2015) (citation omitted) ("[T]he Chief Justice refers to rediscovering and unleashing 'the ''Lochner'' monster' if legislative enactments are measured against a standard other than the rational relationship standard. But as discussed above, Texas courts, including this Court, have expressed and applied various standards for considering as-applied substantive due process claims for over a century. And it is those decisions on which the standards we set out today are based. Surely if those cases represented a 'monster' running amuck in Texas, this Court would have long ago decisively dealt with it.") |
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| * ''Cannady v. State'', 11 S.W.3d 205, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13607837580022769587#p215 215] (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (footnotes omitted) ("Cannady recognizes that this Court in the past has held that the Texas equal rights provision and the federal equal protection provision are coterminous. But he urges us to reconsider these holdings. This we will not do. . . . Therefore, a claim that a provision of the capital murder statute violates equal protection is reviewed using the rational basis test and the challenged classification need only be 'rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.' We have recognized that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in maintaining the safe, orderly, and effective functioning of prisons.") | | * ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p15 15] (Tex. 2015) (citations omitted) ("Before any substantive or procedural due-process rights attach, however, the Petitioners must have a liberty or property interest that is entitled to constitutional protection. A constitutionally protected right must be a vested right, which is <nowiki>'</nowiki>'something more than a mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of an existing law.'<nowiki>'</nowiki> The court of appeals held, and we agree, that the Petitioners' due-course claims are facially invalid because the Petitioners have no vested property right to the pension-plan contributions and future retirement benefits at issue.") |
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| * ''Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen'', 952 S.W.2d 454, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14712011369692053572#p464 464-65] (Tex. 1997) (citations omitted) ("The Legislature has broad discretion in enacting social or economic legislation that does not classify on suspect categories, such as race, or impinge on fundamental rights. Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, such legislation is valid as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . The equal protection clause is not, without more, violated merely because a law treats different geographic regions or political subdivisions differently, or because it allows political subdivisions the discretion to adopt or reject a statutory scheme.") | | * ''Perry v. Del Rio'', 67 S.W.3d 85, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7715699698971836172#p92 92] (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted) ("The Texas Constitution . . . . We have recognized that our due course of law provision at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. And, under certain circumstances, the right to be heard assures a full hearing before a court having jurisdiction over the matter, the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and the right to judicial findings based upon that evidence. This right also includes an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to produce witnesses, and to be heard on questions of law.") |
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| * ''Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz'', 940 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12738540633429222592#p89 89-91] (Tex. 1997) ("The first clause of section 29 establishes that the purpose of the Texas Bill of Rights is to 'guard against transgressions of the high powers' delegated to the state government by the Texas Constitution. . . . Accordingly, based on the text of the Texas Bill of Rights, its history and purpose, our prior judicial decisions, the law in other jurisdictions, constitutional theory, and the concern for the liberty of all Texas citizens, we conclude that state action is required before a litigant can maintain a claim for deprivation of a right secured by the free speech, equal rights, and due course of law guarantees of the Texas Bill of Rights.") | | * ''Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz'', 940 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12738540633429222592#p89 89-91] (Tex. 1997) ("The first clause of section 29 establishes that the purpose of the Texas Bill of Rights is to 'guard against transgressions of the high powers' delegated to the state government by the Texas Constitution. . . . Accordingly, based on the text of the Texas Bill of Rights, its history and purpose, our prior judicial decisions, the law in other jurisdictions, constitutional theory, and the concern for the liberty of all Texas citizens, we conclude that state action is required before a litigant can maintain a claim for deprivation of a right secured by the free speech, equal rights, and due course of law guarantees of the Texas Bill of Rights.") |
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| * ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.") | | * ''University of Texas Medical School at Houston v. Than'', 901 S.W.2d 926, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15343094571363495286#p929 929] (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted) ("While the Texas Constitution is textually different in that it refers to 'due course' rather than 'due process,' we regard these terms as without meaningful distinction. As a result, in matters of procedural due process, we have traditionally followed contemporary federal due process interpretations of procedural due process issues. Although not bound by federal due process jurisprudence in this case, we consider federal interpretations of procedural due process to be persuasive authority in applying our due course of law guarantee.") |
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| * ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")
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| * ''Whitworth v. Bynum'', 699 S.W.2d 194, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5170238358851926343#p196 196-97] (Tex. 1985) (citations omitted) ("Subject to adhering to minimal federal standards, we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. . . . This is particularly true when a state court is acting within a subject area uniquely appropriate for a state's judiciary, such as the common law. An examination of Texas cases reveals the standards we have previously set in respect to equal protection. A court begins by presuming a statute's constitutionality, whether the basis of the constitutional attack is grounded in due process or equal protection.") | | * ''In re J.W.T.'', 872 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16303537001961127537#p221 221] (Tex. 1994) (J. Cornyn, dissenting) ("An appellate court's identification in its opinion of an established . . . . In this case, however, under the guise of an independent state constitutional interpretation, the court 1) disregards contrary precedent by the United States Supreme Court; 2) eschews our traditional constitutional analysis and creates a new constitutional right nowhere found in the text of the Texas Constitution or its history; 3) revives substantive due process in a particularly arbitrary new form; and 4) fails to identify and consider any of the substantial countervailing state interests reflected in these statutes.") |
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| * ''Hill v. Texas Water Quality Bd.'', 568 S.W.2d 738, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5367327063712323854#p739 739] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1978, n.r.e.) ("Although the Attorney General [] refers to the 'unconstitutional' action of the Board, the only way that the Board's action could be remotely suspect under the Constitution of either the State or the Federal government would be a violation of equal protection due, as alleged by the Attorney General, to its arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable action. This contention must fail as equal protection is a constitutional guaranty afforded only to 'persons' and the State does not have standing to raise the claim. ''South Carolina v. Katzenbach'', 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966).") | | * ''Itz v. Penick'', 493 S.W.2d 506, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=653538298795690003#p509 509] (Tex. 1973) ("A much more enlightened view of the necessity for immunization of students attending elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education in order to lessen the spread of communicable diseases has been adopted by the legislatures and approved by the courts of Texas and a majority of the other states during the past half century. All of appellants' points of error have been heretofore assigned in challenging the constitutionality of compulsory immunization statutes, city ordinances or school district regulations and overruled in one or more of the following Texas cases: . . . .") |
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| * ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).") | | * ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p527 527] (Tex. 1968) (C.J. Calvert, dissenting) ("Pervading the majority opinion dealing with these sections is a basic philosophy that when a municipality puts in a public utility of its own, with a private utility franchise then outstanding or thereafter granted, the two enterprises must be permitted to enter into a dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest competition for customers, with the prize of survival going to the one with the greater resources and ability to absorb losses for a longer period of time. In my opinion, the philosophy is unsound. It was condemned long ago by the United States Court of Appeals, [].") |
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| * ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.") | | * ''Board of Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund Trustees of Texarkana v. Hamilton'', 386 S.W.2d 754, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10592628077712497873#p755 755] (Tex. 1965) ("[S]he contends that since her claim for compensation as provided by statute involves a property right and that even though the statute made no provision for an appeal, that under the due process clauses of both the State and United States Constitutions she is entitled to an inherent right of appeal. . . . What the Constitution guarantees her is a judicial review of an order of an administrative agency affecting her property rights. Such a review must be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction, not to some other administrative agency.") |
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| * ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.") | | * ''State v. Richards'', 301 S.W.2d 597, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1473384419797643914#p602 602] (Tex. 1957) ("The line where the police power of the state encounters the barrier of substantive due process is not susceptible of exact definition. As a general rule the power is commensurate with, but does not exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience as consistently as may be with private property rights. The guarantee of due process does not deprive . . . . A large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.") |
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| * ''Ex parte George'', 215 S.W.2d 170, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/215_SW2_170.pdf#page=3 172] (Tex.Crim.App. 1948) ("The question arises as to whether the exemptions mentioned invalidate the Act. In approaching a determination of such question it is well to keep in mind that there is nothing in our State or Federal Constitutions which prohibits the legislature of this State from resorting to classification for the purpose of legislation. The only limitation upon the passage of such legislation is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification not arbitrary or capricious, and it must rest upon grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.") | | * ''Ex parte Sizemore'', 8 S.W.2d 134, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/008_SW2_134.pdf#page=2 135-36] (Tex.Crim.App. 1928) ("Section 19 of our Bill of Rights . . . . Provisions similar to those quoted in our state Constitution have been a part of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence since there was wrung from the unwilling hands of King John at Runnymede in 1215 the Magna Charta, which itself provides that a freeman shall not be passed upon or condemned but 'by the lawful judgment of his peers and the law of the land.' 'Law of the land' has the same legal meaning as 'due process of law,' and one of its accepted meanings is that quoted above. In re Jilz, 3 Mo. App. 243; 3 Words and Phrases, First Series, pp. 2227-2232.") |
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| * ''Watts v. Mann'', 187 S.W.2d 917, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/187_SW2_917.pdf#page=8 924] (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1945, ref'd) ("The principles here involved are of long standing and general acceptation. Substantially they are: The Legislature may classify law violators and impose different penalties, inhibitions and restrictions upon the several classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the classification. In determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification there is a general presumption that the Legislature has done its duty, not violated the Constitution; and therefore the classification will be upheld unless it appears, clearly and without doubt, that it has no reasonable basis of support.") | | * ''Stockwell v. State'', 221 S.W. 932, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/221_SW_932.pdf#page=4 935] (Tex. 1920) ("Viewing the powers given the Commissioner by this statute and his attempted exercise of them here, the inquiry naturally arises as to what are the rights of the defendant if the Commissioner was mistaken in his judgment that citrus canker was . . . . Under the contest made by his pleading, before the property of the defendant could be summarily destroyed, he was entitled to a judicial hearing and decision as to whether it ought to be destroyed. As applied to such a case, nothing less would amount to due process of law, without which the Bill of Rights declares no citizen shall be deprived of his property.") |
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| * ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', 181 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/181_SW2_570.pdf#page=5 574] (Tex. 1944) (citations omitted) ("Article I, Section 3, of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality of rights. This provision of the Constitution was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons, from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation. This principle of equality also applies to political rights. Under the foregoing provision of the Constitution the Legislature has the power to adopt any classification it sees fit, provided there is a reasonable basis for such classification. . . . The discrimination is apparent, and we can perceive no reasonable basis for the classification.") | | * ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=2 304-05] (Tex. 1918) ("The contention that this ordinance is inconsistent with the liberty guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions has been too completely repelled by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 22, 25 Sup.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.Cas. 765, to justify further discussion. . . . However, if defendants in error, or any of them, had a right with respect to the children's school attendance, which could properly be considered a property right, the same was held subject to a valid exercise of the police power of the state.") |
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| * ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.") | | * ''Griner v. Thomas'', 104 S.W. 1058, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/104_SW_1058.pdf#page=3 1060] (Tex. 1907) ("To the contention that suspension without notice is a deprivation of property without due process, the answer is that such property right in an office as the holder has is qualified by all pre-existing valid laws which provide for its suspension or termination, and hence the application of remedies so provided for does not unduly deprive him of any property. Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 669. Whether the suspension of the relator's functions took effect at once upon the making of the order, or, as contended by him, only when he received notice of it, is a question which cannot affect this proceeding to vacate the order.") |
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| * ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.") | | * ''Armstrong v. Traylor'', 30 S.W. 440, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/030_SW_440.pdf#page=2 441] (Tex. 1895) ("Under the provisions of these articles, the interested party is authorized to determine the question of a trespass having been committed by the stock. It is not provided that this question shall be inquired into by any other person or officer. . . . There is no hearing, no inquiry, and no trial before judgment; no officer to sell the property, nor process under which sale is to be made; nothing that bears the faintest resemblance to a judicial proceeding. Such a law affords no security to the owner of the stock. It is not due process of law, and the property is not sold 'by the due course of the law of the land.'") |
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| * ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.") | | * ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, adopts, as the best definition, that given by Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case, of the term 'due course of the law of the land,' which is: 'By the 'law of the land' is most clearly intended the general law; a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.' A law which is enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its constitutional powers, and which affords a hearing before it condemns, and renders judgment after trial, is not in violation of this provision of the constitution.") |
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| * ''Gustafson v. State'', 48 S.W. 518, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/048_SW_518.pdf#page=2 519] (Tex.Crim.App. 1898) ("Our constitution provides (section 3, art. 1): . . . . Mr. Cooley says on this subject (Cooley, Const. Lim. 485): 'Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted or special burdens or restrictions imposed, in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of government. The state, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimination against persons or classes is still more so.'") | | * ''Mellinger v. City of Houston'', 3 S.W. 249, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_SW_249.pdf#page=5 253] (Tex. 1887) ("[I]t must be held that the people intended, by [Article I, Section 19], in so far as it is identical with the fourteenth amendment, to place thereby just such restrictions on the powers of the legislature as the highest court in the nation has declared is the true construction of like language made a part of the constitution of the United States for the purpose of placing a limitation on the power of the legislatures of the several states. As construed, that section of the constitution only forbids the making of laws retroactive in effect, whereby title to property which had vested under former laws would be divested.") |
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| * ''Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning'', 26 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_SW_982.pdf#page=3 984] (Tex. 1894) ("Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the State of Texas, which is in these words: '. . . .' It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person.") | | * ''Manning v. San Antonio Club'', 63 Tex. 166, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/063_Tex_166.pdf#page=6 171] (1884) ("Appellant does not pretend that, in his expulsion, the board of directors violated in any way the by-laws of the club. But he insists that . . . . These guaranties were mainly intended to protect the citizen against oppression by the government; but they do not protect him against himself or against his own agreements. When, therefore, persons enter into organizations for purposes of social intercourse or pleasure or amusement, and lay down rules for their government, these must form the measure of their rights in the premises, and it is vain to appeal to the Bill of Rights against their own agreements.") |
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| * ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.") | | * ''Janes v. Reynolds' Adm'rs'', 2 Tex. 250, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/002_Tex_250.pdf#page=2 252] (1847) ("They are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public laws . . . . Whatever may be the meaning of the terms 'laws of the land,' or 'due course of the law of the land,' they have never been held to enjoin in all cases a trial by jury as a requisite indispensable to the validity of a judgment. That a party should have notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense, and the right of trying disputed facts by a jury, are cardinal principles of the common law; but there are many exceptions in which one or two of these privileges were never enjoined, or may be regarded as renounced by the defendant.") |
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| |seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision") | | |seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution ("Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law") |
| |seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 3, Texas equal rights provision, federal equal protection clause | | |seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 19, procedural due process, substantive due process |
| |seo_description=All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services. | | |seo_description=No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property . . . except by the due course of the law of the land. |
| |seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision | | |seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights |
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| }} | | }} |
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| [[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]] | | [[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]] |
| [[Category:Civil Rights Law]] | | [[Category:Criminal Procedure]] |
| | [[Category:Civil Procedure-Texas]] |
| [[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]] | | [[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]] |