Difference between revisions of "Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 1"

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* ''Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.'', 852 S.W.2d 440, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2619153071208352877#p445 445-46] (Tex. 1993) (footnotes omitted) ("We therefore hold that standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived in this or any other case and may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court. We are aware that this holding conflicts with ''Texas Industrial Traffic League v. Railroad Commission'', 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam). The analysis that leads us to the conclusion we reach here, however, compels us to overrule Texas Industrial Traffic League and disapprove of all cases relying on it to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.")
 
* ''Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.'', 852 S.W.2d 440, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2619153071208352877#p445 445-46] (Tex. 1993) (footnotes omitted) ("We therefore hold that standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived in this or any other case and may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court. We are aware that this holding conflicts with ''Texas Industrial Traffic League v. Railroad Commission'', 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam). The analysis that leads us to the conclusion we reach here, however, compels us to overrule Texas Industrial Traffic League and disapprove of all cases relying on it to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.")
 
* ''Eichelberger v. Eichelberger'', 582 S.W.2d 395, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11162719321932338719#p399 399-400] (Tex. 1979) ("The language of ''Hughes'' was overbroad when it categorically denied the existence of the inherent power of a court . . . . Several other cases decided by this court have similarly stated that inherent powers of the court do not exist; however, closer examination reveals that such statements which have negated the existence of inherent power were made to deny the existence of a court's inherent 'jurisdictional' power. Our holdings have simply been that we have no inherent power to take jurisdiction of a case when that jurisdiction has been expressly or impliedly granted to another court of this state.")
 
  
 
* ''Lord v. Clayton'', 352 S.W.2d 718, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2324247470440690224#p721 721-22] (Tex. 1961) ("It is enough to say that we held invalid a provision of an act creating a Criminal District Court which undertook to give the court jurisdiction of divorce cases to the exclusion of other constitutional district courts. We specifically held that while the Legislature could create special courts under authority of an 1891 amendment to Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. and could confer on such courts concurrent jurisdiction over subjects mentioned in section 8 of Article 5 of the Constitution, it could not deprive regular district courts of the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution.")
 
* ''Lord v. Clayton'', 352 S.W.2d 718, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2324247470440690224#p721 721-22] (Tex. 1961) ("It is enough to say that we held invalid a provision of an act creating a Criminal District Court which undertook to give the court jurisdiction of divorce cases to the exclusion of other constitutional district courts. We specifically held that while the Legislature could create special courts under authority of an 1891 amendment to Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. and could confer on such courts concurrent jurisdiction over subjects mentioned in section 8 of Article 5 of the Constitution, it could not deprive regular district courts of the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution.")

Latest revision as of 19:48, October 11, 2019

As amended November 4, 1980:

The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other courts as may be provided by law.

The Legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior courts thereto.

Editor Comments

As adopted in 1876, this section read: "The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in a Court of Appeals, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioners' Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other courts as may be established by law. The Legislature may establish Criminal District Courts with such jurisdiction as it may prescribe, but no such court shall be established unless the district includes a city containing at least thirty thousand inhabitants as ascertained by the census of the United States or other official census; provided, such town or city shall support said Criminal District Courts when established. The Criminal District Court of Galveston and Harris counties shall continue with the district, jurisdiction and organization now existing by law, until otherwise provided by law."

As amended in 1891, the section read: "The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in Courts of Civil Appeals, in a Court of Criminal Appeals, in District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioners Courts, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such other courts as may be provided by law. The Criminal District Court of Galveston and Harris Counties shall continue with the district, jurisdiction, and organization now existing by law until otherwise provided by law. The Legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary, and prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior courts thereto."

The last major restructuring of the Texas judiciary occurred in 1980. See, e.g., Joe Greenhill, The Constitutional Amendment Giving Criminal Jurisdiction to the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals and Recognizing the Inherent Power of the Texas Supreme Court, 33 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 377, 378 (2002) ("The constitutional amendment of 1980 is regarded by many as the most important change in our judicial structure in more than one hundred years.").

The first paragraph of this section lists the state's constitutional courts. Although listed, county commissioners courts are not a functional part of the judiciary. The second paragraph authorizes the creation of legislative courts. Pursuant to that provision, the Legislature has established a large number of statutory courts (e.g., Dallas County Court at Law No. 1).

Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (footnotes omitted) ("Just as the Texas Constitution bars our courts from deciding a case when the plaintiff lacks standing, similarly, a court cannot not [sic] decide a case that has become moot during the pendency of the litigation. A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if the issues presented are no longer 'live,' or if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. . . . If a case is or becomes moot, the court must vacate any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.")

Historic Decisions

  • Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993) (footnotes omitted) ("We therefore hold that standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived in this or any other case and may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court. We are aware that this holding conflicts with Texas Industrial Traffic League v. Railroad Commission, 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam). The analysis that leads us to the conclusion we reach here, however, compels us to overrule Texas Industrial Traffic League and disapprove of all cases relying on it to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.")
  • Lord v. Clayton, 352 S.W.2d 718, 721-22 (Tex. 1961) ("It is enough to say that we held invalid a provision of an act creating a Criminal District Court which undertook to give the court jurisdiction of divorce cases to the exclusion of other constitutional district courts. We specifically held that while the Legislature could create special courts under authority of an 1891 amendment to Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. and could confer on such courts concurrent jurisdiction over subjects mentioned in section 8 of Article 5 of the Constitution, it could not deprive regular district courts of the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution.")
  • Key Western Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. 1961) ("In other words, the district court has held, in effect, that to afford Key Western a trial de novo, under the preponderance of the evidence rule, the court trespasses on that area of our government reserved to the legislature, thus violating Article 2, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution. We hold that a review by the courts of the action taken by the Board of Insurance under Article 3.42, supra, in this case may constitutionally be had under the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard. The district court was without authority to substitute a nonstatutory standard for that prescribed by the statute.")
  • Jordan v. Crudgington, 231 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1950) ("It expressly recognizes in the Legislature two separate and distinct powers which it may exercise in establishing 'such other courts as it may deem necessary.' . . . But the amendment was adopted for the purpose of making it certain that the Legislature had the authority to establish courts other than constitutional courts, and that its acts in establishing them should not be stricken down on the ground that they were violative of what might be conceived by vague implications to be general spirit of the Constitution, or that they did not conform to the constitutional pattern for district courts or county courts.")
  • Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 893-94 (Tex. 1924) ("It must determine whether or not the articles presented by the House set forth impeachable offenses, and it must determine whether or not these charges are sustained by the evidence produced. . . . The courts, in proper cases, may always inquire whether any department of the government has acted outside of and beyond its constitutional authority. The acts of the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, are not exempt from this judicial power; but so long as the Senate acts within its constitutional jurisdiction, its decisions are final. As to impeachment, it is a court of original, exclusive, and final jurisdiction.")
  • Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Shannon, 100 S.W. 138, 141 (Tex. 1907) ("The exception is the commissioners' courts, which are not properly a part of the judicial department. But the whole scope of the article shows clearly what is meant by the judicial department of the government. The word 'judicial' is, however, used, not with strict accuracy . . . . This question came up in the case of Arnold v. State, 71 Tex. 259, 9 S.W. 120, and it was there held that the land board, which was created under the act of 1883, and which was composed of the Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, Treasurer, and Commissioner of the General Land Office, was a lawful body.")
  • Austin & N.W.R. Co. v. Cluck, 77 S.W. 403, 405 (Tex. 1903) ("The common law was adopted by the congress of the republic by enactment embraced in the following article . . . . Whatever may be the powers of courts of other states, there can be no doubt that the courts of Texas must look to the Constitution of this state, the enactments of the Legislature, and the common law for their authority to proceed as requested in this case; and, if the authority did not exist at common law, and has not been conferred by the Constitution nor by the statutes of this state, then no court in Texas has the power to force any citizen to submit to a physical examination under such circumstances.")
  • Harris Cty. v. Stewart, 41 S.W. 650, 655 (Tex. 1897) ("The language, 'and in such other courts as may be established by law,' was nullified by the decisions of the supreme court in the cases mentioned. The courts and lawyers were in constant trouble as to the jurisdiction of courts . . . . When the legislature of the state came to formulate the amendment to be submitted to the people, one of the principal objects was to avoid the force of that class of decisions, and to render elastic the judicial system provided for in the constitution, so that the needs of the state which might develop in its future growth could be provided for by the legislature from time to time.")
  • Williams v. Taylor, 19 S.W. 156, 156 (Tex. 1892) ("The power of the courts, under the form of government common to the states of this Union, to declare void an act of the legislature on the ground that such legislation is prohibited by the constitution of the state was questioned at an early day in the history of our jurisprudence, but that the power exists is now settled beyond controversy. As to the authority of the courts in such cases there should never have been any serious question. In passing a law the legislature acts under the authority conferred by a written constitution, and whether or not it has exceeded its authority in the passage of any particular act is a judicial question.")
  • Henderson v. Beaton, 52 Tex. 29, 33 (1879) ("In our opinion, the commission is not a court, because it acts only by consent of both parties, and even then is without jurisdiction to render or power to enforce a judgment. It has no jurisdiction, for consent cannot give jurisdiction. It is but a convenient and suitable board of referees or arbitrators, provided to facilitate the adjustment of litigated cases pending in the courts of last resort, available only where both parties agree that the case be so referred. It is not a tribunal before which any litigant can be forced to come with his appeal. The constitutional Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are still open to every party.")

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