Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51: Difference between revisions

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* ''Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth'', 22 S.W.3d 831, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4029717219227699877#p841 841-42] (Tex. 2000) ("The City’s most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement
* ''Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth'', 22 S.W.3d 831, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4029717219227699877#p841 841-42] (Tex. 2000) ("The City’s most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '. . .', and section 52 of the same article, which similarly provides that with exceptions not here applicable, '. . .'. To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City’s 'public money'.")
is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '. . .', and section 52 of the same article, which similarly provides that with exceptions not here applicable, '. . .'. To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City’s 'public money'.")


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Revision as of 14:41, August 11, 2023

As amended November 2, 1999:

The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.

Editor Comments

This section first appeared in the Texas Constitution of 1876. Neither the Republic of Texas constitution (1836) nor any of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866, 1869) contained a provision with similar substantive language.

As adopted, it read: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant, or authorize the making of any grant, of public money to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."

The section has been amended nine times. The first eight amendments concerned grants to certain Confederate participants and their spouses. The last amendment in 1999 removed the remaining language concerning such assistance.

Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 841-42 (Tex. 2000) ("The City’s most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '. . .', and section 52 of the same article, which similarly provides that with exceptions not here applicable, '. . .'. To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City’s 'public money'.")

Historic Decisions

  • State v. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tex. 1960) ("The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds to private purposes . . . . The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.")
  • Friedman v. American Surety Co., 151 S.W.2d 570, 578 (Tex. 1941) ("Section 51 of Article III of our Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations, whatsoever. It is then provided that the Legislature may grant aid to indigent or disabled Confederate soldiers and their widows. Aid in case of public calamity is also preserved. Under the plain provisions of this constitutional provision, the Legislature is without power to grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual as a gratuity.")
  • City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling, 247 S.W. 818, 819-20 (Tex. 1923) ("The state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The destruction of ports, through which moves the commerce of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special benefit to particular communities, must be regarded as promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the state. . . . The use of the cities or counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state's duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51 of article 3.")
  • Bexar County v. Linden, 220 S.W. 761, 762 (Tex. 1920) ("The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against. The prohibition is a positive and absolute one except as to a distinctive class to whom the State is under a sacred obligation. Not only are individuals, associations of individuals and private corporations within its spirit, but all kinds of public or political corporations, as well, whether strictly municipal or not. . . . The similar restraints upon the use of public funds and the public credit applied to counties by these other provisions of the Constitution practically demonstrate this to be true.")

Library Resources

Online Resources