Difference between revisions of "Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 11"

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* ''Nalle v. City of Austin'', 22 S.W. 668, 671 (Tex. 1893) ("They maintain that amended section 11, art. 5, of the constitution, imperatively requires that when one of the judges of any one of the higher courts is disqualified the fact shall be certified, and the governor shall appoint a special judge in his stead; and they further contend that the intent becomes more manifest when that section is construed in connection with the section for which it was substituted. The following is a copy of so much of the original section . . . . The amended section obviates this difficulty by providing for an appointment when one only is disqualified. It does not follow that an appointment is to be made in every such case.")
 
* ''Nalle v. City of Austin'', 22 S.W. 668, 671 (Tex. 1893) ("They maintain that amended section 11, art. 5, of the constitution, imperatively requires that when one of the judges of any one of the higher courts is disqualified the fact shall be certified, and the governor shall appoint a special judge in his stead; and they further contend that the intent becomes more manifest when that section is construed in connection with the section for which it was substituted. The following is a copy of so much of the original section . . . . The amended section obviates this difficulty by providing for an appointment when one only is disqualified. It does not follow that an appointment is to be made in every such case.")
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* ''Munzesheimer v. Fairbanks'', 18 S.W. 697, 698 (Tex. 1891) ("When a special term is called in the manner provided for by the statutes on the subject, and a judge qualified to hold it can be procured by observing such statutes as are applicable, when the judge of the court is absent, we think it may and should be done without regard to the cause of the absence of the judge, and the court so called and organized should be held, notwithstanding another court may be lawfully in session in the same district. . . . The constitution provides that 'the district judges may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other, when they may deem it expedient.' Section 11, art. 5. The judgment is affirmed.")
  
 
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[[Category:TxCon ArtV Sec]]
 
[[Category:TxCon ArtV Sec]]

Latest revision as of 13:31, December 4, 2019

As amended November 6, 2001:

No judge shall sit in any case wherein the judge may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with the judge, either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when the judge shall have been counsel in the case. When the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of Appeals, or any member of any of those courts shall be thus disqualified to hear and determine any case or cases in said court, the same shall be certified to the Governor of the State, who shall immediately commission the requisite number of persons learned in the law for the trial and determination of such cause or causes. When a judge of the District Court is disqualified by any of the causes above stated, the parties may, by consent, appoint a proper person to try said case; or upon their failing to do so, a competent person may be appointed to try the same in the county where it is pending, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.

And the District Judges may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it expedient, and shall do so when required by law. This disqualification of judges of inferior tribunals shall be remedied and vacancies in their offices filled as may be prescribed by law.

Editor Comments

The first sentence of the second paragraph has been construed to authorize a district judge to preside in any district court in the state.

Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted) ("A judge is 'interested' in a case—and thus disqualified under Article V, Section 11—if an order or judgment in the case will directly 'affect him to his personal or pecuniary loss or gain.' . . . Thus, the disqualification of a judge is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived. Limas's order denying Freedom's summary-judgment motion is the sole basis for appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. If Limas's order is void, then the court of appeals did not have authority to consider the merits of Freedom's appeal from the order denying summary judgment, and neither do we.")
  • Tesco American, Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2006) ("Repeatedly, the people of Texas have insisted on constitutional protection against 'counsel in the case' becoming a judge in the guarantee that makes no distinction between trial and appellate judges. When we adopted Rule 18b(1)(a) and applied it in O'Connor, we construed 'counsel' to include the former firms of trial judges; we think construing the Constitution otherwise for appellate judges would be construing it too narrowly. We recognize the risk cited by the First Court that vicarious disqualification may allow litigants to 'lie behind the log' and move to disqualify only if an appeal is unsuccessful.")

Historic Decisions

  • Isaac v. State, 257 S.W.2d 436, 437-38 (Tex.Crim.App. 1953) ("The cited cases deal with special . . . . Under the provisions of Sec. 11 of Art. 5 of the Constitution of Texas, District Judges may exchange districts or hold court for each other when they deem it expedient. Art. 1916, R.C.S., provides: 'A judge of the district court may hold court for or with any other district judge; and the judges of such courts may exchange districts whenever they deem it expedient.' Judge McDonald being at the time the regularly elected judge of the 66th Judicial District of this State, and not a 'special judge', was authorized to preside for Judge Rogers without the necessity of the entry of a formal order.")
  • Love v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1930) (citations omitted) ("[S]uch grounds have always been held by the Supreme Court to be exclusive. Under the Texas Constitution, it is the duty of the judge to sit save 'in any case wherein he may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him, either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when he shall have been counsel in the case.' Every Constitution of Texas since that of 1845 has forbidden a judge to sit in any case wherein he is interested. So often has this phrase, 'case wherein he is interested,' been interpreted that its meaning no longer admits of reasonable doubt.")
  • Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co., 25 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1930, ref'd) ("After making provision for holding special terms of district courts, also for holding court in instances where the regular judge is absent, or from any cause is disabled or disqualified to preside, or has exchanged districts with another judge, the Constitution makes the further provision in section 11, art. 5, as follows: '* * * And the district judges may * * * hold courts for each other when . . . . The quoted provision has a distinct meaning all its own, and obviously contemplates the holding of court by one judge with another, under circumstances not elsewhere provided for in the Constitution.")
  • City of Oak Cliff v. State, 79 S.W. 1068, 1069 (Tex. 1904) (citation omitted) ("From these authorities, and others . . . , we think the rule may be stated negatively in this form: 'That where a judicial officer has not so direct an interest in the cause or matter as that the result must necessarily affect him to his personal or pecuniary loss or gain, * * * then he may sit.' We are of opinion that Chief Justice Gaines has not such direct and immediate interest in the result of this suit as would disqualify him under these authorities. The judgment, in our opinion, will not directly produce the issuing of the bonds nor the levy of any tax, and therefore it cannot be said that he is directly or immediately interested.")
  • Nalle v. City of Austin, 22 S.W. 668, 671 (Tex. 1893) ("They maintain that amended section 11, art. 5, of the constitution, imperatively requires that when one of the judges of any one of the higher courts is disqualified the fact shall be certified, and the governor shall appoint a special judge in his stead; and they further contend that the intent becomes more manifest when that section is construed in connection with the section for which it was substituted. The following is a copy of so much of the original section . . . . The amended section obviates this difficulty by providing for an appointment when one only is disqualified. It does not follow that an appointment is to be made in every such case.")
  • Munzesheimer v. Fairbanks, 18 S.W. 697, 698 (Tex. 1891) ("When a special term is called in the manner provided for by the statutes on the subject, and a judge qualified to hold it can be procured by observing such statutes as are applicable, when the judge of the court is absent, we think it may and should be done without regard to the cause of the absence of the judge, and the court so called and organized should be held, notwithstanding another court may be lawfully in session in the same district. . . . The constitution provides that 'the district judges may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other, when they may deem it expedient.' Section 11, art. 5. The judgment is affirmed.")

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