5,594
edits
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19 (view source)
Revision as of 09:06, June 10, 2024
, June 10no edit summary
mNo edit summary |
mNo edit summary |
||
| Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
|recent= | |recent= | ||
* ''State v. Zurawski'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9133421901754640670#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) (footnotes omitted) ("The due-course clause of the Texas Constitution states | * ''State v. Zurawski'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9133421901754640670#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) (footnotes omitted) ("The due-course clause of the Texas Constitution states . . . . An unsettled question in this Court is whether the due-course clause protects substantive rights in addition to procedural rights. We need not decide this question today. Even if the due-course clause were to encompass substantive rights, the evidence adduced does not support the trial court's order that the Human Life Protection Act violates the Texas Constitution. If the due-course clause affords fundamental rights as a matter of substantive law and not just procedural protections before the government invades them, the right to life would be found among them.") | ||
* ''Texas Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distributing LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17653902673364512620#p664 664-65] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("The Court today 'conclude[s] that the due-course clause does not protect the interest that the plaintiffs assert,' ''ante'' at 2, 125 S.Ct. 2195, and I agree. But what ''does'' that clause protect—and how does it do so? We still do not really know, even as we approach . . . . To that end, in Part II, I explain why I believe that our precedents do not go much beyond what has permeated most of our jurisprudence: the unadorned assertion that the Texas due-course clause is essentially the twin (the junior twin, to be sure) of the federal due-process clause.") | * ''Texas Dep't of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distributing LLC'', 647 S.W.3d 648, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17653902673364512620#p664 664-65] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("The Court today 'conclude[s] that the due-course clause does not protect the interest that the plaintiffs assert,' ''ante'' at 2, 125 S.Ct. 2195, and I agree. But what ''does'' that clause protect—and how does it do so? We still do not really know, even as we approach . . . . To that end, in Part II, I explain why I believe that our precedents do not go much beyond what has permeated most of our jurisprudence: the unadorned assertion that the Texas due-course clause is essentially the twin (the junior twin, to be sure) of the federal due-process clause.") | ||