Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16: Difference between revisions

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The federal constitution expressly prohibits the states from enacting bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. However, it does not directly address retroactive laws.
The federal constitution expressly prohibits the states from enacting bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. However, it does not directly address retroactive laws.


It is noteworthy that, in the 1934 ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'' decision referenced below, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that this section's provision regarding the impairment of contracts was stricter than the federal constitution's provision regarding the impairment of contracts. Cf. ''Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell'', 290 U.S. 398, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8045354711683233471#p415 415-16] (1934) ("Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, approved April 18, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause (Art. I, § 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.").
Note that, in the 1934 ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'' decision referenced below, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that this section's provision regarding the impairment of contracts was stricter than its federal counterpart. Cf. ''Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell'', 290 U.S. 398, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8045354711683233471#p415 415-16] (1934) ("Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, approved April 18, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause (Art. I, § 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.").


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* ''Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ.'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4402055373431139742#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) ("Instead, such prohibitions should not be interpreted 'without regard to the intent' for which they were enacted. ''Id''. The framers of the 1876 Constitution knew that Texas courts would likely take ''DeCordova'''s view of constitutional bans on retroactive laws when they wrote article I, section 16. They could have reacted to ''DeCordova'' by . . . . We should therefore reject the suggestion that the 1876 Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws was understood at the time of its adoption as a categorical prohibition on ''all'' backward-looking legislation.")


* ''Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc.'', 649 S.W.3d 197, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2488607990023532344#p203 203] (Tex. 2022) ("Neither party disputes that their agreement was at-will such that, before the Act's effective date, either party could terminate the agreement at any time for any reason (or no reason) without penalty. Once the Act became effective, however, Survitec could no longer terminate the agreement without good cause. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 57.153. Survitec thus argues that the Act is unconstitutionally retroactive because it 'eliminated Survitec's right to have an at-will relationship with FPS.' We disagree.")
* ''Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc.'', 649 S.W.3d 197, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2488607990023532344#p203 203] (Tex. 2022) ("Neither party disputes that their agreement was at-will such that, before the Act's effective date, either party could terminate the agreement at any time for any reason (or no reason) without penalty. Once the Act became effective, however, Survitec could no longer terminate the agreement without good cause. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 57.153. Survitec thus argues that the Act is unconstitutionally retroactive because it 'eliminated Survitec's right to have an at-will relationship with FPS.' We disagree.")
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* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/021_Tex_713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")
* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/021_Tex_713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")


* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, <!-- comment: case not available online in pdf format --> [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28570/m1/248/ 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")
* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/004_Tex_470.pdf#page=6 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")


|seo_title=Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution ("Bills of Attainder; Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws; Impairing Obligation of Contracts")
|seo_title=Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution ("Bills of Attainder; Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws; Impairing Obligation of Contracts")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 16, retroactive laws, laws impairing obligation of contracts
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 16, retroactive laws, impairing contracts
|seo_description=No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.
|seo_description=No bill of attainder, ''ex post facto'' law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights