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* '' | * ''Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Self'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11329341778052650525#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) (citations & footnotes omitted) ("The elements of an inverse condemnation or 'takings' claim are that (1) an entity with eminent domain power intentionally performed certain acts (2) that resulted in taking, damaging, or destroying the property for, or applying it to, (3) public use. Although the Constitution does not expressly require an intentional act, we have explained that such a requirement helps ensure that the taking is for 'public use.' . . . We explore these two ''Jennings'' standards for proving intent in more detail below.") | ||
* ''City of Baytown v. Schrock'', 645 S.W.3d 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5501203577523966836#p184 184] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("Had the Texas Constitution been presented as an alternative rather than duplicative source of law, today's case may have turned out differently. Or maybe not. We cannot know for sure until we have a case like this one that includes arguments tailored to our ''state'' constitutional law. It is clearly true that the Texas Takings Clause is broader than the federal . . . . We cannot meaningfully answer those questions unless litigants undertake substantial additional work beyond invoking federal takings doctrines.") | * ''City of Baytown v. Schrock'', 645 S.W.3d 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5501203577523966836#p184 184] (Tex. 2022) (J. Young, concurring) ("Had the Texas Constitution been presented as an alternative rather than duplicative source of law, today's case may have turned out differently. Or maybe not. We cannot know for sure until we have a case like this one that includes arguments tailored to our ''state'' constitutional law. It is clearly true that the Texas Takings Clause is broader than the federal . . . . We cannot meaningfully answer those questions unless litigants undertake substantial additional work beyond invoking federal takings doctrines.") | ||
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* ''KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett'', 593 S.W.3d 175, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3010365581179623555#p186 186-87] (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted) ("A city may take private property when it determines the property is necessary for a public use so long as it provides just compensation to the property owner. To establish a valid exercise of eminent domain, a municipality must show it intends to put the property to public use and that the condemnation is necessary to advance or achieve that public use. . . . Similarly, the mere fact that a particular individual, group, or enterprise may benefit will not deprive the use of its public character.") | * ''KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett'', 593 S.W.3d 175, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3010365581179623555#p186 186-87] (Tex. 2019) (citation omitted) ("A city may take private property when it determines the property is necessary for a public use so long as it provides just compensation to the property owner. To establish a valid exercise of eminent domain, a municipality must show it intends to put the property to public use and that the condemnation is necessary to advance or achieve that public use. . . . Similarly, the mere fact that a particular individual, group, or enterprise may benefit will not deprive the use of its public character.") | ||
* ''Porretto v. | * ''Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office'', 448 S.W.3d 393, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16625049805220548647#p401 401] (Tex. 2014) ("We are mindful that Article I, Section 17 [] requires compensation for private property 'damaged' as well as 'taken'. And we find troubling the defendants' continued assertion of claims it later abandoned, having been made aware of the Porrettos' contention that those claims were impeding the sale of the Porrettos' property. But as we have said, mere claims do not rise to the level of action requiring compensation under the Constitution. We conclude that the Porrettos are not entitled to prevail on their taking claim.") | ||
* ''Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State'', 381 S.W.3d 468, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4694948600542306391#p476 476] (Tex. 2012) ("Hearts Bluff brought an inverse condemnation claim against the State. Inverse condemnation is 'a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . . This dispute raises the question of when the State's actions affecting the regulation of property become a taking, compelling us once again to venture into the 'sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog.'") | * ''Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State'', 381 S.W.3d 468, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4694948600542306391#p476 476] (Tex. 2012) ("Hearts Bluff brought an inverse condemnation claim against the State. Inverse condemnation is 'a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . . This dispute raises the question of when the State's actions affecting the regulation of property become a taking, compelling us once again to venture into the 'sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog.'") | ||
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* ''City of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/019_SW_127.pdf#page=5 131] (Tex. 1892) ("[T]his particular clause of the constitution was intended to prohibit the legislature from granting any 'special privilege or immunity' in such way, or of such character, as that it could not be subsequently annulled or declared forfeited for such causes as might be defined by the law, or condemned in the exercise of eminent domain [] and it was further intended that 'all privileges and franchises' granted by the legislature, or under its authority, should at all times remain subject to legislative control and regulation.") | * ''City of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/019_SW_127.pdf#page=5 131] (Tex. 1892) ("[T]his particular clause of the constitution was intended to prohibit the legislature from granting any 'special privilege or immunity' in such way, or of such character, as that it could not be subsequently annulled or declared forfeited for such causes as might be defined by the law, or condemned in the exercise of eminent domain [] and it was further intended that 'all privileges and franchises' granted by the legislature, or under its authority, should at all times remain subject to legislative control and regulation.") | ||
* ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/050_Tex_614.pdf#page=14 627-28] (1879) ("This provision as to the deposit of money in advance, was evidently intended more particularly to provide speedy adequate compensation for property taken in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain, rendered more frequent by the rapidly-increasing demand for railroads and . . . . There is, however, a distinction between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that of a police regulation to meet an impending peril, by the destruction of an adjacent building to prevent the spread of fire.") | * ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/050_Tex_614.pdf#page=14 627-28] (1879) ("This provision as to the deposit of money in advance, was evidently intended more particularly to provide speedy adequate compensation for property taken in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain, rendered more frequent by the rapidly-increasing demand for railroads and other works . . . . There is, however, a distinction between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that of a police regulation to meet an impending peril, by the destruction of an adjacent building to prevent the spread of fire.") | ||
* ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C.R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_Tex_588.pdf#page=11 598] (1863) ("It cannot be questioned that a railroad for general travel, or the transportation of produce for the country at large, is a 'public use,' for the construction of which private property may be taken or applied upon adequate compensation for it being made. That the road for the construction of which the property when taken is to be applied is a corporation of private individuals to whose benefit the profits of the road, when complete, will alone accrue, furnishes no valid objection to such appropriation of private property.") | * ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C.R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_Tex_588.pdf#page=11 598] (1863) ("It cannot be questioned that a railroad for general travel, or the transportation of produce for the country at large, is a 'public use,' for the construction of which private property may be taken or applied upon adequate compensation for it being made. That the road for the construction of which the property when taken is to be applied is a corporation of private individuals to whose benefit the profits of the road, when complete, will alone accrue, furnishes no valid objection to such appropriation of private property.") | ||