Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

'''(a) The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing [sic]: (1) the creation, extension or impairing of liens; (2) regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts; (3) changing the names of persons or places; (4) changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; (5) authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining of roads, highways, streets or alleys; (6) relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other state; (7) vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; (8) relating to cemeteries, grave-yards or public grounds not of the State; (9) authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; (10) locating or changing county seats; (11) incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; (12) for the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; (13) granting divorces; (14) creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts; (15) changing the law of descent or succession; (16) regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate; (17) regulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, magistrates or constables; (18) regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes; (19) fixing the rate of interest; (20) affecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability; (21) remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid into the Treasury; (22) exempting property from taxation; (23) regulating labor, trade, mining and manufacturing; (24) declaring any named person of age; (25) extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or his securities from liability; (26) giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds; (27) summoning or empanelling [sic] grand or petit juries; (28) for limitation of civil or criminal actions; (29) for incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements; or (30) relieving or discharging any person or set of persons from the performance of any public duty or service imposed by general law.'''

The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").

* ''Sw. Travis County Water Dist. v. City of Austin'', 64 S.W.3d 25, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7516365479571908009#p30 30] (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, pet. dism'd) ("The supreme court has distinguished ''McCraw'' and ''City of Irving'' on the ground that the statutes there in question affected a substantial class . . . . It may not reasonably be concluded that H.B. 3193 affects, with respect to the water-quality factor, a substantial class of persons over a broad region of the state as opposed to the single District created by H.B. 3193. ''See'', ''e.g.'', ''Vincent v. State'', 235 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex.Comm'nApp. 1921, judgm't adopted); ''City of Austin v. City of Cedar Park'', 953 S.W.2d 424, 435 (Tex.App.–Austin 1997, no writ).")

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