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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a (view source)
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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.") | * ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p311 311] n.3 (Tex. 1993) ("Plaintiffs point out that article I, § 3a, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), has no federal analogue, and that we have held that it 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees.' ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). However, discrimination based upon race or national origin is already subject to strict scrutiny under both federal and state equal protection analysis. Therefore, the Texas ERA would not afford any additional level of scrutiny in such a case.") | ||
* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.") | * ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the [Texas] Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.") | ||
* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.") | * ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.") | ||