Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3: Difference between revisions

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Without any recorded debate, section twenty-one was dropped by the Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the State of Texas's fifth and current Bill of Rights. Cf. ''Reid v. Rolling Fork Pub. Util. Dist.'', 979 F.2d 1084, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14225699397135994464#p1089 1089] (5th Cir. 1992) ("Reid also urges that even if his federal constitutional claim is defeated, his claim under the Texas Constitution's equal protection clause survives. . . . There is ample support in Texas case law for the District's contention that the same requirements are applied to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution as to those under the United States Constitution.").

Finally, note that no published appellate court decision has ever detailed the origin or otherwise discussed the history of this section's unique text. Cf. ''State v. Webb'', 238 Conn. 389, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7451084436936559118#p409 409] (1996) (citation omitted) ("Thus, as the defendant acknowledges, the concepts of the social compact and of natural law as sources of unenumerated constitutional rights are intertwined. Indeed, we have treated the two as functionally the same. We now, therefore, reaffirm . . . that neither the social compact clause nor its counterpart, natural law, constitutes a source of unenumerated rights under our constitutional scheme.").

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* ''Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys.'', 458 S.W.3d 1, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5024006811308680141#p13 13] (Tex. 2015) ("The Texas Constitution provides that all people 'have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges.' . . . In conducting a rational-basis review, we consider whether the challenged action has a rational basis and whether use of the challenged classification would reasonably promote that purpose. ''Id''. These determinations are 'not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ''FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc.'', 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).")

* ''First American Title Ins. Co. v. Combs'', 258 S.W.3d 627, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8227542418100022905#p638 638-39] (Tex. 2008) (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution,' so resolution of the federal equal protection claim will also resolve the State equal protection claim. We conclude that the Comptroller's interpretation of the relevant statutes does not violate the insurers' equal protection rights. . . . This rational-basis review requires us to answer two questions: '(1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?'")

* ''Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas'', 95 S.W.3d 253, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6848930107102445989#p265 265-66] (Tex. 2002) ("They rely on two cases which they claim suggest that we have 'applied a rational basis test more exacting than mere reasonableness,' in which the statutory classification must be rationally related not only to a legitimate state interest as required under federal law, but to the very object or subject of the legislation. . . . We do not read ''Whitworth'' and ''Richards'' to establish the more exacting standard the plaintiffs suggest. To the extent they might suggest such a standard, we have recently clarified that the federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas Constitution.")

* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")

* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")

* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")

* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

* ''Francois v. State'', 9 Tex.Ct.App. 144, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/009_TexCtApp_144.pdf#page=3 146] (1880) ("Sect. 3, Art. I., of the Constitution of 1876 is a literal copy of sect. 2 of Art. I. of the Constitution of 1869, as quoted above, and sect. 29 of the same Constitution is a literal copy of the twenty-third section of the Constitution of 1869, also quoted above. These provisions, it is contended, abrogate art. 386 of the Penal Code, which was passed previously—on the twelfth day of February, 1858. It is also contended that art. 386 is in contravention of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We do not propose to discuss anew these questions.")

|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution ("Equal Rights Provision")

|seo_description=This section declares: "All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights."

|seo_image_alt=Texas equal rights provision