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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a (view source)
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* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.") | * ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13338516100978720617#p802 802] n.3 (Tex. 1980) (J. Steakley, dissenting) ("Adoption of the Texas [Equal Rights Amendment], considered in its contemporary social, political, and legal context, is inconsistent with a view that nothing has changed or should change. The law cannot be changed and yet remain unchanged, unless the plain language of the state constitution is ignored. Amending the state constitution is scarcely necessary to preserve the ''status quo ante'', and inclusion of a specific and unqualified guarantee of sex equality seems a peculiar means to perpetuate the sex-based discrimination of the past.") | ||
* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.") | * ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law or regulation . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.") | ||
* ''Heaton v. Bristol'', 317 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18222848089783696141#p98 98] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1958, ref'd) ("Neither counsel for appellants nor appellees have pointed out any case wherein an appellate court of any jurisdiction has at any time held, or even intimated, that a state cannot, as a part of its over-all educational system, maintain one all-male or one all-female university as the Legislature has done in Texas for our higher educational system. There is certainly not even the remotest suggestion by inference or otherwise in any of the reported cases that the system now maintained by Texas constitutes a violation of any constitutional provisions, State or Federal.") | * ''Heaton v. Bristol'', 317 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18222848089783696141#p98 98] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1958, ref'd) ("Neither counsel for appellants nor appellees have pointed out any case wherein an appellate court of any jurisdiction has at any time held, or even intimated, that a state cannot, as a part of its over-all educational system, maintain one all-male or one all-female university as the Legislature has done in Texas for our higher educational system. There is certainly not even the remotest suggestion by inference or otherwise in any of the reported cases that the system now maintained by Texas constitutes a violation of any constitutional provisions, State or Federal.") | ||