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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 1: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 1 (view source)

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Senate and House of Representatives"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Senate and House of Representatives"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:


'''The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled "The Legislature of the State of Texas."'''
'''The Legislative [sic] power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled "The Legislature of the State of Texas."'''


|editor=
|editor=


This fundamental section creates the Texas Legislature and vests in it the "Legislative power" of the state.
This fundamental section creates the Texas Legislature and vests in it the legislative power of the state.


However, the power granted by this section is subject to more specific provisions of the state constitution.
However, the power granted by the section is subject to more specific provisions of the state constitution.


For example, the Governor is granted the veto, a significant legislative power, by Article IV, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IV, Section 14|14]].
For example, the Governor is granted the veto, a significant legislative power, by Article IV, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IV, Section 14|14]].
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* ''Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar'', 538 S.W.3d 89, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13941570117140877029#p104 104] (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) ("The power to enact our state laws together with the power to amend or repeal existing state law is vested in the Texas Legislature. The Legislature's power to amend or repeal an earlier statute is generally limited only by federal or state constitutional provisions or federal law. Moreover, as a general rule, one 'legislature cannot prevent future legislatures from amending or repealing a statute.' . . . But, because of the severe consequence that may ensue when an earlier legislature contractually binds future legislatures, contractual intent must be unmistakable.")
* ''Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar'', 538 S.W.3d 89, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13941570117140877029#p104 104] (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) ("The power to enact our state laws together with the power to amend or repeal existing state law is vested in the Texas Legislature. The Legislature's power to amend or repeal an earlier statute is generally limited only by federal or state constitutional provisions or federal law. Moreover, as a general rule, one 'legislature cannot prevent future legislatures from amending or repealing a statute.' . . . But, because of the severe consequence that may ensue when an earlier legislature contractually binds future legislatures, contractual intent must be unmistakable.")


* ''State v. Rhine'', 297 S.W.3d 301, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2378059465993094828#p327 327-28] (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (P.J. Keller, concurring) ("From this discussion, I conclude that a delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally permissible under the separation-of-powers provision of the Texas Constitution if the following four conditions are met: (1) the delegation can, at least by implication, be characterized as the delegation of authority to make a factual determination relevant to the purpose of the statute, rather than simply a policy decision . . .  and (4) post-adoption judicial review is available to ensure that the agency rule or other action does in fact comply with the legislative standards.")
* ''State v. Rhine'', 297 S.W.3d 301, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2378059465993094828#p327 327-28] (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (Keller, concurring) ("From this discussion, I conclude that a delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally permissible under the separation-of-powers provision of the Texas Constitution if the following four conditions are met: (1) the delegation can, at least by implication, be characterized as the delegation of authority to make a factual determination relevant to the purpose of the statute, rather than simply a policy decision . . .  and (4) post-adoption judicial review is available to ensure that the agency rule or other action does in fact comply with the legislative standards.")


* ''BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter'', 251 S.W.3d 500, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8808518267344329947#p504 504] (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) ("First, '[a] federal law may expressly preempt state law.' Second, 'federal law or regulations may impliedly preempt state law or regulations if the statute's scope indicates that Congress intended federal law or regulations to occupy the field exclusively.' Finally, state law is impliedly preempted if it 'actually conflicts with federal law or regulations,' because '(1) it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements; or (2) state law obstructs accomplishing and executing Congress' full purposes and objectives.'")
* ''BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter'', 251 S.W.3d 500, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8808518267344329947#p504 504] (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) ("First, '[a] federal law may expressly preempt state law.' Second, 'federal law or regulations may impliedly preempt state law or regulations if the statute's scope indicates that Congress intended federal law or regulations to occupy the field exclusively.' Finally, state law is impliedly preempted if it 'actually conflicts with federal law or regulations,' because '(1) it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements; or (2) state law obstructs accomplishing and executing Congress' full purposes and objectives.'")
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* ''Terrazas v. Ramirez'', 829 S.W.2d 712, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4056378932206213554#p733 733] n.3 (Tex. 1991) (J. Cornyn, concurring) ("There are exceptions to this rigid prohibition under which legislative authority has been delegated under certain circumstances. ''See'' ''Trimmier v. Carlton'', [] 296 S.W. 1070, 1079 (1927); Annotation, ''Permissible Limits of Delegation of Legislative Power'', 79 L.Ed. 474, 479-80 (1934). First, it is not . . . . Finally, the legislature may delegate legislative authority concerning matters of local concern. ''Ex parte Brewer'', [] 152 S.W. 1068, 1069-70 (1913). Clearly, the power to draw district lines does not fall under any of these exceptions and is not a delegable power.")
* ''Terrazas v. Ramirez'', 829 S.W.2d 712, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4056378932206213554#p733 733] n.3 (Tex. 1991) (Cornyn, concurring) ("There are exceptions to this rigid prohibition under which legislative authority has been delegated under certain circumstances. ''See'' ''Trimmier v. Carlton'', [] 296 S.W. 1070, 1079 (1927); Annotation, ''Permissible Limits of Delegation of Legislative Power'', 79 L.Ed. 474, 479-80 (1934). First, it is not . . . . Finally, the legislature may delegate legislative authority concerning matters of local concern. ''Ex parte Brewer'', [] 152 S.W. 1068, 1069-70 (1913). Clearly, the power to draw district lines does not fall under any of these exceptions and is not a delegable power.")


* ''Bexar County Hosp. Dist. v. Crosby'', 327 S.W.2d 445, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1673557588121091927#p447 447] (Tex. 1959) ("It is also argued that since Section 4 of Article IX [] expressly authorized the Legislature to provide for the transfer to the District of hospital land, buildings and equipment owned by the City or County, but made no mention of delinquent taxes under the maxim '''Expresio unius est exclusio alterius'',' it must be presumed that the framers of that Article and Section intended that the delinquent taxes be not transferred. There can be no dispute but that in this State the provisions of the Constitution serve only as a limitation on the power of the Legislature, and not as a grant of power.")
* ''Bexar County Hosp. Dist. v. Crosby'', 327 S.W.2d 445, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1673557588121091927#p447 447] (Tex. 1959) ("It is also argued that since Section 4 of Article IX [] expressly authorized the Legislature to provide for the transfer to the District of hospital land, buildings and equipment owned by the City or County, but made no mention of delinquent taxes under the maxim '''Expresio unius est exclusio alterius'',' it must be presumed that the framers of that Article and Section intended that the delinquent taxes be not transferred. There can be no dispute but that in this State the provisions of the Constitution serve only as a limitation on the power of the Legislature, and not as a grant of power.")
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* ''Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.'', 83 S.W.2d 935, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_SW2_935.pdf#page=7 941] (Tex. 1935) (citations omitted) ("In the absence of a well-defined standard or rule in the statutes defining the public policy of the state with respect to the mineral interest, the Railroad Commission would be without authority to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders relating to the protection of oil and gas. The power to pass laws rests with the Legislature, and that power cannot be delegated to some commission or other tribunal. In order to carry out the commands of the Legislature, the Railroad Commission adopted rule 37. The validity of this rule has been upheld repeatedly.")
* ''Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.'', 83 S.W.2d 935, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_SW2_935.pdf#page=7 941] (Tex. 1935) (citations omitted) ("In the absence of a well-defined standard or rule in the statutes defining the public policy of the state with respect to the mineral interest, the Railroad Commission would be without authority to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders relating to the protection of oil and gas. The power to pass laws rests with the Legislature, and that power cannot be delegated to some commission or other tribunal. In order to carry out the commands of the Legislature, the Railroad Commission adopted rule 37. The validity of this rule has been upheld repeatedly.")
* ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'', 76 S.W.2d 1007, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/076_SW2_1007.pdf#page=4 1010] (Tex. 1934) ("We are asked, however, to hold that, under the ''police power'', one of the powers of government (''State v. Coleman'', 96 Conn. 190, 113 A. 385) vitalized by emergency conditions, the Legislature had the authority to pass the measure before us. We are asked to do this, although the Bill of Rights, section 16, expressly prohibits the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. . . . Obviously all these questions must be answered in the negative. This is so because the pronouncements of the Constitution are 'imperious, supreme and paramount.'")


* ''Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co.'', 25 S.W.2d 259, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/025_SW2_259.pdf#page=5 263] (Tex.Civ.App.–Dallas 1930, ref'd) ("The American concept of constitutional government is that originally all legislative powers resided in the people, that certain of these powers were surrendered to the national government, and those not surrendered were reserved, and have been committed by the people of the states to their State Legislatures under certain limitations and restrictions. It follows therefore that the Legislature of a state in enacting statutes may exercise all the reserve powers of the people, except as expressly or impliedly limited in the Constitution.")
* ''Eucaline Medicine Co. v. Standard Inv. Co.'', 25 S.W.2d 259, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/025_SW2_259.pdf#page=5 263] (Tex.Civ.App.–Dallas 1930, ref'd) ("The American concept of constitutional government is that originally all legislative powers resided in the people, that certain of these powers were surrendered to the national government, and those not surrendered were reserved, and have been committed by the people of the states to their State Legislatures under certain limitations and restrictions. It follows therefore that the Legislature of a state in enacting statutes may exercise all the reserve powers of the people, except as expressly or impliedly limited in the Constitution.")
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|seo_title=Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution ("Senate and House of Representatives")
|seo_title=Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution ("Senate and House of Representatives")
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 1, Texas Legislature, delegation legislative power
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 1, bicameral legislature, legislative delegation
|seo_description=This fundamental section creates the Texas Legislature and vests in it the legislative power of the state.
|seo_description=Under this section, the legislative power of Texas is vested in a Senate and House of Representatives.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image=mod_Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


}}
}}


[[Category:State Government Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
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