Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TCA 2004)
x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TCA 2004)
x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (2000) (dissent)


x Scurlock P. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)
x Scurlock P. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TCA 1993 denied)
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x Inman v. Rr Comm., 478 S.W.2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)
x Inman v. Rr Comm., 478 S.W.2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre)
x Gould v. El Paso, 440 S.W.2d 696 (TCA 1969 nre)


x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)
x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)
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x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)
x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)


x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tex.Cr.Rep. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)
x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)


x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)
x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)
x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934)
x Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)


x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)
x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)


x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 S.W.2d 228 (Tx. Commn App 1931)
x Fritter v. Wesh, 65 S.W.2d 414 (TCA 1933 refd)
 
x Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. 1933)
 
x Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 41 S.W.2d 228 (Tx.Comm.App. 1931)
 
x County of Henderson v. Allred, 40 S.W.2d 17 (1931)


x Randolph v State, 36 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 1931)
x Randolph v State, 36 S.W.2d 484 (Tx.Cr.A. 1931)


x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931)
x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931) (interested)


x NT Traction Co. v. Bryan, 116 Tex. 479, 294 S.W. 527 (1927)
x NT Traction v. Bryan, 116 Tex. 479, 294 S.W. 527 (1927)


x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx Commn App 1926)
x King v. State, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 289 S.W. 69, 71 (1926) (city)
 
x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926)


x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923)
x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923)


x Limestone Co. v. Garrett 236 S. W. 970 (Tx Commn App 1922)
x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922)
 
x Vincent v. State ex rel. Wayland, 235 S.W. 1084 (Tx.Comm.App 1921)


x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919)
x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd)


x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)
x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)


x Smith v. State, 54 TCA 298, 113 S.W. 289 (1908) (!closed!)
x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908)
 
x Green v. State, 49 Tx.C.R. 380, 92 S. W. 847 (1906)


x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908)
x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools)


x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)
x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)


x Cordova v. State, 6 TCA 207 (1879)
x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd)
 
x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893)
 
x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892)
 
x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317, 18 S.W. 577 (1892) (!!brief!!)
 
x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations)
 
x Holley v. State, 14 Tex.Ct.App. 505 (1883)
 
x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881)
 
x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879)
 
x Lastro v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 363 (1878)
 
x Tx AG Opinion H-196 (1974) (one county)
 
x Tx AG Opinion C-544 (1965)


x Tx AG Opinion No. H-196 (1974)
x Tx AG Opinion V‑0386 (1947)


x Tx AG Opinion O-5326 (1943)
x Tx AG Opinion O-5326 (1943)
x Tx AG Opinion O‑5115 (1943)


x Tx AG Opinion O‑2329 (1940) (purpose)
x Tx AG Opinion O‑2329 (1940) (purpose)
x Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503 (1935)


x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose)
x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose)


x Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503 (1935)
x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) (!!one city!!)
 
x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics)


x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (affairs)
x Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554 (1893) (one city)


x Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277/281 (1889) (purpose/rule)
x Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277/281 (1889) (purpose/rule)


==? brief ?==
x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs)
 
x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875)
 
x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt)
 
x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose)
 
==brief==
 
Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification. In other words, is it void on the ground it is a designation rather than a classification.
 
GC 311.022: A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.
 
EC 31.017(a): In a county with a population of more than 4 million, the secretary of state's office may order administrative oversight of a county office administering elections ....


All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?
EC 31.031(a): The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may create the position of county elections administrator for the county.
 
EC 31.048(a): The commissioners court by written order may abolish the position of county elections administrator at any time.
 
EC 31.050: On September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. ...
 
?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ??
 
Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment.
 
Law being made theoretically, not for a day, but for all time, a statute applicable to cities of certain population is a general law when it establishes a rule for the prospective government or regulation of all such cities as may, in the course of time, reach the prescribed population; but where the statute obviously acts only on a present state of facts in such cities and cannot by possibility apply to other cities that may attain, in future, such population, it is local, special and void.
 
A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law.
 
2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779
 
This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County.
 
Matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place. All counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government. What is unique about county x that necessitates it being a class of one?


Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
Almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
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It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842
It is important to remember that originally the prohibition against special legislation was an attempt to correct two main legislative abuses: (1) special bills were jeopardizing local autonomy; and (2) they were consuming too much of the legislator's time, at the expense of general or state-wide legislation. Today-three-quarters of a century later-those same abuses are still prevalent. 28 TLR 829, 842


first population bracket in Texas Election Code
The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law.
 
Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has 449 S.W.2d 33, 38 been amended ?)
 
To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle.
 
wrong: every law is general which operates equally upon all persons and all things upon whom it acts at all; such uniformity may often characterize a local or special law, and this must indeed be the case with every law affecting only a single person or thing
 
what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded