6,272
edits
Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions
Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56 (edit)
Revision as of 14:21, September 8, 2023
, September 8, 2023→review
m (→23-0656) |
m (→review) |
||
| (20 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 83: | Line 83: | ||
x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926) | x Austin Bros. v. Patton, 288 S.W. 182 (Tx.Comm.App. 1926) | ||
x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450 | x Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450 (1923) (court officer) | ||
x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922) | x Limestone Co. v. Garrett, 236 S.W. 970 (Tx.Comm.App. 1922) | ||
| Line 91: | Line 91: | ||
x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd) | x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919 refd) | ||
x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123 | x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123 (1918) (same: Duclos) | ||
x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908) | x Logan v. State, 54 TCA 74, 111 SW 1028 (1908) | ||
x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tex. 150 (1907) | x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tex. 150 (1907) (local option) | ||
x Green v. State, 49 Tx.C.R. 380, 92 S. W. 847 (1906) | x Green v. State, 49 Tx.C.R. 380, 92 S. W. 847 (1906) | ||
| Line 101: | Line 101: | ||
x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools) | x State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114 (1901) (schools) | ||
x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900) | x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900) (state land) | ||
x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 463 (1901 refd) | x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 463 (1901 refd) | ||
x Central Wharf v. Corpus Christi, 57 S.W. 982 (TCA 1900 refd) | |||
x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd) | x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 S.W. 921 (TCA 1897 refd) | ||
x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893) | x McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 (1893) (state land) | ||
x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892) | x San Antonio & A.P.R. v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 910 (TCA 1892) | ||
x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317 | x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tex. 317 (1892) (local matter) | ||
x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations) | x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tex. 1 (1890) (limitations) | ||
| Line 120: | Line 120: | ||
x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881) | x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (Tx.Comm.Ap. 1881) | ||
x Cox v. State, 8 Tex.Ct.App. 254 (1880) | |||
x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879) | x Cordova v. State, 6 Tex.Ct.App. 207 (1879) | ||
| Line 141: | Line 143: | ||
x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose) | x Owen v. Baer 154 Mo. 434, 481 (1899) (purpose) | ||
x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) ( | x State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340 (1882) (!one city!) | ||
x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics) | x Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 (1901) (politics) | ||
| Line 151: | Line 153: | ||
x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs) | x Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322 (1886) (purpose/affairs) | ||
x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875) | x Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875) (!rule!) | ||
x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt) | x Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284 (1896) (Bobbitt) | ||
x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose) | x Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853) (purpose) | ||
x Gray v. Taylor, 227 U.S. 51 (1913) | |||
==23-0656== | ==23-0656== | ||
reasonable ''basis'' for classification | |||
Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void." | |||
"The Act contains two provisions relevant here. First, it provides that '[t]he Commissioners Court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less, by written order may create the position of a county elections administrator for the county.' 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 952 (S.B. 1750) § 2(a) (emphasis added to reflect the amendment). Second, it provides that 'on September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax-assessor collector and county clerk.” ''Id''. § 3." | "The Act contains two provisions relevant here. First, it provides that '[t]he Commissioners Court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less, by written order may create the position of a county elections administrator for the county.' 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 952 (S.B. 1750) § 2(a) (emphasis added to reflect the amendment). Second, it provides that 'on September 1, 2023, all powers and duties of the county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million under this subchapter are transferred to the county tax-assessor collector and county clerk.” ''Id''. § 3." | ||
| Line 183: | Line 191: | ||
The Act has at least three reasonable bases. First, Harris County's sheer size creates a statewide interest in the proper administration of its elections, which is unlikely to dissipate even if, due to statewide population growth, other large counties eventually reach populations of over 3.5 million. Second, legislators may have believed reports that Harris County's elections administrators poorly managed the County’s 2022 elections. Third, regardless of the veracity of those reports, the Legislature may have been concerned that widespread reporting about poorly managed elections in Harris County caused voters to lose confidence in the integrity of those elections. | The Act has at least three reasonable bases. First, Harris County's sheer size creates a statewide interest in the proper administration of its elections, which is unlikely to dissipate even if, due to statewide population growth, other large counties eventually reach populations of over 3.5 million. Second, legislators may have believed reports that Harris County's elections administrators poorly managed the County’s 2022 elections. Third, regardless of the veracity of those reports, the Legislature may have been concerned that widespread reporting about poorly managed elections in Harris County caused voters to lose confidence in the integrity of those elections. | ||
Harris County’s size makes it different from all other counties. Okay but how with regard to whether its elections should be administered by elections administrator or county clerk? | |||
Because elections in Harris County have a statewide impact, particularly when statewide officials and measures are on the ballot, the Act is not local within the meaning of the Constitution. License to change all election related laws. | |||
Given the disparate outcome between different-sized counties and Harris County's own disparate outcome between methods of administration, it was reasonable for the Legislature to change who administered the County's elections. If Bell County faltered, bracket out their elections administrator? | |||
If outside impact then classify as largest | If outside impact then classify as largest | ||
| Line 203: | Line 217: | ||
?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ?? | ?? All powers and duties of a [x:the] county elections administrator of a county with a population of more than 3.5 million are transferred to the county tax assessor-collector and county clerk. This happens on official release of federal census showing county has population of more than 3.5 million. ?? | ||
Here, where the subjective motivation is not an element of the Plaintiffs' claims—and only the reasonableness of the Legislature's classification matters—legislative history plays no role in the analysis. | |||
Because the Legislature’s classification was reasonable, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. | |||
Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment. | Construe entire EC: change to administrator is not one way. in other words, cc can move duties back to county clerk and tax assessor-collector. EC 31.060 only prospective? Then determine effect of disputed 2023 amendment. | ||
| Line 212: | Line 230: | ||
A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. | A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all the members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. | ||
2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779 | 2020: 1 Harris 4,731,145 [in legislation, 3.3 million]; 2 Dallas 2,613,539; 3 Tarrant 2,110,640; 4 Bexar 2,009,324; 5 Travis 1,290,188; 6 Collin 1,064,465; 7 Denton 906,422; 8 Hidalgo 870,781; 9 El Paso 865,657; 10 Fort Bend 822,779 | ||
This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County. | This act permanently limits the rights of voters in Harris County. | ||
| Line 232: | Line 250: | ||
The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law. | The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory, but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their size, have peculiar needs, and that all cities wherever situated are entitled to the benefits of the law. | ||
Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has | Two new sections are only EC that apply only to Harris County. Cf. H.B. 4559 relating to statutes that classify according to population; note other "population" classifications in EC (? has Art. 6243g been amended ?) | ||
EC 85.066: (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), any voter who is entitled to vote an early voting ballot by personal appearance may do so at any branch polling place in the territory served by the early voting clerk. (b) For a countywide election in a county with a population of more than 3.3 million and a primary election in a county with a population of more than 1 million in which temporary branch polling places are established under Section 85.062(d)(1), the commissioners court may limit voting at a temporary branch polling place to the voters of particular state representative districts. To the extent practicable, the state representative districts shall be grouped so that the temporary branch polling places in each group serve substantially equal numbers of voters. A maximum of four groups of state representative districts may be established under this subsection. | |||
To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle. | To entrust a legislature with power over matters which concern exclusively districts which the majority of the members do not even profess in any way to represent, and to the people of which they cannot be held responsible, is, therefore, strictly speaking, not representative government at all. That the officers of a city should be appointed by the State executive would not be more at variance with the representative principle. | ||
| Line 239: | Line 259: | ||
what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded | what makes Harris County unique with regard to the purposes of the disputed section? legislation limited in its relation to particular subdivisions of the State, to be valid, must rest on some characteristic or peculiarity plainly distinguishing the places included from those excluded | ||
LCRA is a Texas governmental agency that has many duties coextensive with the limits of the state. Harris County is not. The governance of LCRA is a state public policy matter. The governance of Harris County is not. | |||
Stephenson: "Under the above authorities we hold that the act in question is a general, and not a local or special law within the meaning of Sections 56 and 57 of Art. 3 of our State Constitution. The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. To say that the Legislature cannot enact laws to protect the fish along a certain part of the coast line of the State because such a law would be local or special, would be to say that | |||
all such regulations must apply to every part of the State. A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of | |||
our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons | |||
stated we hold this to be a general law." | |||