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* ''Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar'', 538 S.W.3d 89, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13941570117140877029#p104 104] (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) ("The power to enact our state laws together with the power to amend or repeal existing state law is vested in the Texas Legislature. The Legislature's power to amend or repeal an earlier statute is generally limited only by federal or state constitutional provisions or federal law. Moreover, as a general rule, one 'legislature cannot prevent future legislatures from amending or repealing a statute.' . . . But, because of the severe consequence that may ensue when an earlier legislature contractually binds future legislatures, contractual intent must be unmistakable.") | * ''Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar'', 538 S.W.3d 89, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13941570117140877029#p104 104] (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) ("The power to enact our state laws together with the power to amend or repeal existing state law is vested in the Texas Legislature. The Legislature's power to amend or repeal an earlier statute is generally limited only by federal or state constitutional provisions or federal law. Moreover, as a general rule, one 'legislature cannot prevent future legislatures from amending or repealing a statute.' . . . But, because of the severe consequence that may ensue when an earlier legislature contractually binds future legislatures, contractual intent must be unmistakable.") | ||
* ''State v. Rhine'', 297 S.W.3d 301, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2378059465993094828#p327 327-28] (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) ( | * ''State v. Rhine'', 297 S.W.3d 301, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2378059465993094828#p327 327-28] (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (Keller, concurring) ("From this discussion, I conclude that a delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally permissible under the separation-of-powers provision of the Texas Constitution if the following four conditions are met: (1) the delegation can, at least by implication, be characterized as the delegation of authority to make a factual determination relevant to the purpose of the statute, rather than simply a policy decision . . . and (4) post-adoption judicial review is available to ensure that the agency rule or other action does in fact comply with the legislative standards.") | ||
* ''BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter'', 251 S.W.3d 500, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8808518267344329947#p504 504] (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) ("First, '[a] federal law may expressly preempt state law.' Second, 'federal law or regulations may impliedly preempt state law or regulations if the statute's scope indicates that Congress intended federal law or regulations to occupy the field exclusively.' Finally, state law is impliedly preempted if it 'actually conflicts with federal law or regulations,' because '(1) it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements; or (2) state law obstructs accomplishing and executing Congress' full purposes and objectives.'") | * ''BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter'', 251 S.W.3d 500, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8808518267344329947#p504 504] (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) ("First, '[a] federal law may expressly preempt state law.' Second, 'federal law or regulations may impliedly preempt state law or regulations if the statute's scope indicates that Congress intended federal law or regulations to occupy the field exclusively.' Finally, state law is impliedly preempted if it 'actually conflicts with federal law or regulations,' because '(1) it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements; or (2) state law obstructs accomplishing and executing Congress' full purposes and objectives.'") | ||
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* ''Terrazas v. Ramirez'', 829 S.W.2d 712, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4056378932206213554#p733 733] n.3 (Tex. 1991) ( | * ''Terrazas v. Ramirez'', 829 S.W.2d 712, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4056378932206213554#p733 733] n.3 (Tex. 1991) (Cornyn, concurring) ("There are exceptions to this rigid prohibition under which legislative authority has been delegated under certain circumstances. ''See'' ''Trimmier v. Carlton'', [] 296 S.W. 1070, 1079 (1927); Annotation, ''Permissible Limits of Delegation of Legislative Power'', 79 L.Ed. 474, 479-80 (1934). First, it is not . . . . Finally, the legislature may delegate legislative authority concerning matters of local concern. ''Ex parte Brewer'', [] 152 S.W. 1068, 1069-70 (1913). Clearly, the power to draw district lines does not fall under any of these exceptions and is not a delegable power.") | ||
* ''Bexar County Hosp. Dist. v. Crosby'', 327 S.W.2d 445, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1673557588121091927#p447 447] (Tex. 1959) ("It is also argued that since Section 4 of Article IX [] expressly authorized the Legislature to provide for the transfer to the District of hospital land, buildings and equipment owned by the City or County, but made no mention of delinquent taxes under the maxim '''Expresio unius est exclusio alterius'',' it must be presumed that the framers of that Article and Section intended that the delinquent taxes be not transferred. There can be no dispute but that in this State the provisions of the Constitution serve only as a limitation on the power of the Legislature, and not as a grant of power.") | * ''Bexar County Hosp. Dist. v. Crosby'', 327 S.W.2d 445, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1673557588121091927#p447 447] (Tex. 1959) ("It is also argued that since Section 4 of Article IX [] expressly authorized the Legislature to provide for the transfer to the District of hospital land, buildings and equipment owned by the City or County, but made no mention of delinquent taxes under the maxim '''Expresio unius est exclusio alterius'',' it must be presumed that the framers of that Article and Section intended that the delinquent taxes be not transferred. There can be no dispute but that in this State the provisions of the Constitution serve only as a limitation on the power of the Legislature, and not as a grant of power.") | ||
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|seo_title=Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution ("Senate and House of Representatives") | |seo_title=Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution ("Senate and House of Representatives") | ||
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 1, bicameral legislature, legislative delegation | |seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 1, bicameral legislature, legislative delegation | ||
|seo_description= | |seo_description=Under this section, the legislative power of Texas is invested in a Senate and House of Representatives. | ||
|seo_image=mod_Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg | |seo_image=mod_Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg | ||
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department | |seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department | ||
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}} | }} | ||
[[State Government Law]] | [[Category:State Government Law]] | ||
[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]] | [[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]] | ||