Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16: Difference between revisions

'''No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.'''

Note that, in the 1934 ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'' decision referenced below, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that this section's provision regarding the impairment of contracts was stricter than its federal counterpart. Cf. ''Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell'', 290 U.S. 398, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8045354711683233471#p415 415-16] (1934) ("Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, approved April 18, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause (Art. I, § 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.").

* ''Hutchings v. Slemons'', 174 S.W.2d 487, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/174_SW2_487.pdf#page=4 490-91] (Tex. 1943) ("It requires no discussion to show that to deny the broker the right to file suit and to offer evidence of his valid parol contract through remedial legislation . . . . It follows from what we have said that in our opinion the legislature did not intend the act in question to operate retroactively and that said act has no application to the oral contract in suit. But, if such a construction is required, the act in question is void in so far as it operates upon contracts made prior to the effective date of the act because violative of Article 1, Section 16 of the Constitution of Texas.")

 

* ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'', 76 S.W.2d 1007, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/076_SW2_1007.pdf#page=18 1024] (Tex. 1934) ("So, in view of the history of the adoption of the contract clause in the Federal Constitution, its incorporation in the organic laws of the several states, and the long judicial interpretation thereof by . . . , there is no doubt whatever but that section 16 of our Bill of Rights (article 1 of the Constitution) prohibits the enactment of moratory legislation which impairs the obligation of contracts, even though enacted during an industrial depression, such as this country had previously suffered in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1861-1865, and 1873.")

* ''Mellinger v. City of Houston'', 3 S.W. 249, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_SW_249.pdf#page=6 254-55] (Tex. 1887) ("The states to which we have referred are the only ones which have constitutional provisions in effect the same as exists in this state. The section of the constitution [prohibiting the enactment of retroactive laws] was considered in the case of ''De Cordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 480; and, while the facts in that case did not call for the decision of the question before us, it did call for a determination of the character of laws which the constitution forbids. It was said that '. . . .' We have no doubt that the law is thus correctly stated.")

* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/021_Tex_713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")

* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/004_Tex_470.pdf#page=6 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")

|seo_title=Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution ("Bills of Attainder; Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws; Impairing Obligation of Contracts")

|seo_keywords=retroactive laws, Article 1 Section 16, laws impairing obligation of contracts

|seo_description=No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.