Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19: Difference between revisions

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:
[[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:


'''No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.'''
'''No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.'''


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The fundamental precept declared by this section has its origin in chapter twenty-nine of ''Magna Carta''. Cf. Thomas Cooley, ''A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Cooley_Constitutional_Limitations_1874_due_course.pdf#page=17 351-53] (1874) (citations omitted) ("In some form of words, it is to be found in each of the State constitutions . . . . Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly identical, except that the phrase 'due process (or course) of law' is sometimes used, sometimes 'the law of the land,' and in some cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case.").


This section is similar to the due-process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Cf. ''Zucht v. King'', 260 U.S. 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17474784919803032884#p176 176] (1922) ("Long before this suit was instituted, ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'', 197 U.S. 11, had settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory vaccination. . . . And still others had settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law.").
This section is similar to the due-process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Cf. ''Zucht v. King'', 260 U.S. 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17474784919803032884#p176 176] (1922) ("Long before this suit was instituted, ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'', 197 U.S. 11, had settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory vaccination. . . . And still others had settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law.").
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* ''Stockwell v. State'', 221 S.W. 932, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/221_SW_932.pdf#page=4 935] (Tex. 1920) ("Viewing the powers given the Commissioner by this statute and his attempted exercise of them here, the inquiry naturally arises as to what are the rights of the defendant if the Commissioner was mistaken in his judgment that citrus canker was . . . . Under the contest made by his pleading, before the property of the defendant could be summarily destroyed, he was entitled to a judicial hearing and decision as to whether it ought to be destroyed. As applied to such a case, nothing less would amount to due process of law, without which the Bill of Rights declares no citizen shall be deprived of his property.")
* ''Stockwell v. State'', 221 S.W. 932, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/221_SW_932.pdf#page=4 935] (Tex. 1920) ("Viewing the powers given the Commissioner by this statute and his attempted exercise of them here, the inquiry naturally arises as to what are the rights of the defendant if the Commissioner was mistaken in his judgment that citrus canker was . . . . Under the contest made by his pleading, before the property of the defendant could be summarily destroyed, he was entitled to a judicial hearing and decision as to whether it ought to be destroyed. As applied to such a case, nothing less would amount to due process of law, without which the Bill of Rights declares no citizen shall be deprived of his property.")


* ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=2 304-305] (Tex. 1918) ("The contention that this ordinance is inconsistent with the liberty guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions has been too completely repelled by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 22, 25 Sup.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.Cas. 765, to justify further discussion. . . . However, if defendants in error, or any of them, had a right with respect to the children's school attendance, which could properly be considered a property right, the same was held subject to a valid exercise of the police power of the state.")
* ''City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt'', 207 S.W. 303, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/207_SW_303.pdf#page=2 304-05] (Tex. 1918) ("The contention that this ordinance is inconsistent with the liberty guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions has been too completely repelled by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 22, 25 Sup.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.Cas. 765, to justify further discussion. . . . However, if defendants in error, or any of them, had a right with respect to the children's school attendance, which could properly be considered a property right, the same was held subject to a valid exercise of the police power of the state.")


* ''Griner v. Thomas'', 104 S.W. 1058, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/104_SW_1058.pdf#page=3 1060] (Tex. 1907) ("To the contention that suspension without notice is a deprivation of property without due process, the answer is that such property right in an office as the holder has is qualified by all pre-existing valid laws which provide for its suspension or termination, and hence the application of remedies so provided for does not unduly deprive him of any property. Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 669. Whether the suspension of the relator's functions took effect at once upon the making of the order, or, as contended by him, only when he received notice of it, is a question which cannot affect this proceeding to vacate the order.")
* ''Griner v. Thomas'', 104 S.W. 1058, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/104_SW_1058.pdf#page=3 1060] (Tex. 1907) ("To the contention that suspension without notice is a deprivation of property without due process, the answer is that such property right in an office as the holder has is qualified by all pre-existing valid laws which provide for its suspension or termination, and hence the application of remedies so provided for does not unduly deprive him of any property. Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 669. Whether the suspension of the relator's functions took effect at once upon the making of the order, or, as contended by him, only when he received notice of it, is a question which cannot affect this proceeding to vacate the order.")
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* ''Janes v. Reynolds' Adm'rs'', 2 Tex. 250, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/002_Tex_250.pdf#page=2 252] (1847) ("They are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public laws . . . . Whatever may be the meaning of the terms 'laws of the land,' or 'due course of the law of the land,' they have never been held to enjoin in all cases a trial by jury as a requisite indispensable to the validity of a judgment. That a party should have notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense, and the right of trying disputed facts by a jury, are cardinal principles of the common law; but there are many exceptions in which one or two of these privileges were never enjoined, or may be regarded as renounced by the defendant.")
* ''Janes v. Reynolds' Adm'rs'', 2 Tex. 250, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/002_Tex_250.pdf#page=2 252] (1847) ("They are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public laws . . . . Whatever may be the meaning of the terms 'laws of the land,' or 'due course of the law of the land,' they have never been held to enjoin in all cases a trial by jury as a requisite indispensable to the validity of a judgment. That a party should have notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense, and the right of trying disputed facts by a jury, are cardinal principles of the common law; but there are many exceptions in which one or two of these privileges were never enjoined, or may be regarded as renounced by the defendant.")


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|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution ("Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 19, procedural due process, substantive due process
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 19, procedural due process, substantive due process
|seo_description=No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property . . . except by the due course of the law of the land.
|seo_description=No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property ... except by the due course of the law of the land.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights