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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19 (view source)

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The fundamental precept declared by this section has its origin in chapter twenty-nine of ''Magna Carta''. Cf. Thomas Cooley, ''A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Cooley_Constitutional_Limitations_1874_due_course.pdf#page=17 351-53] (1874) (citations omitted) ("In some form of words, it is to be found in each of the State constitutions . . . . Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly identical, except that the phrase 'due process (or course) of law' is sometimes used, sometimes 'the law of the land,' and in some cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case.").


This section is similar to the due-process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Cf. ''Zucht v. King'', 260 U.S. 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17474784919803032884#p176 176] (1922) ("Long before this suit was instituted, ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'', 197 U.S. 11, had settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory vaccination. . . . And still others had settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law.").
This section is similar to the due-process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Cf. ''Zucht v. King'', 260 U.S. 174, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17474784919803032884#p176 176] (1922) ("Long before this suit was instituted, ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'', 197 U.S. 11, had settled that it is within the police power of a State to provide for compulsory vaccination. . . . And still others had settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law.").
The fundamental precept declared by this section has its origin in chapter twenty-nine of ''Magna Carta''. See Cooley, ''A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union'' [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Cooley_Constitutional_Limitations_1874_due_course.pdf#page=17 351-53] (1874) (citations omitted) ("In some form of words, it is to be found in each of the State constitutions . . . . Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly identical, except that the phrase 'due process (or course) of law' is sometimes used, sometimes 'the law of the land,' and in some cases both; but the meaning is the same in every case.").


Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2020/kp-0308.pdf#page=2 KP-308] (2020), opined that: "While the Texas and federal Constitutions differ in that Texas refers to 'due course' rather than 'due process,' Texas courts regard these terms as without substantive distinction unless and until a party demonstrates otherwise." The foregoing assertion by the Texas Attorney General is correct concerning "procedural" due process. However, as reflected by several of the decisions referenced below, the state's "substantive" due process jurisprudence has sometimes differed from its federal counterpart.
Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2020/kp-0308.pdf#page=2 KP-308] (2020), opined that: "While the Texas and federal Constitutions differ in that Texas refers to 'due course' rather than 'due process,' Texas courts regard these terms as without substantive distinction unless and until a party demonstrates otherwise." The foregoing assertion by the Texas Attorney General is correct concerning "procedural" due process. However, as reflected by several of the decisions referenced below, the state's "substantive" due process jurisprudence has sometimes differed from its federal counterpart.
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* ''Perry v. Del Rio'', 67 S.W.3d 85, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7715699698971836172#p92 92] (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted) ("The Texas Constitution . . . . We have recognized that our due course of law provision at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. And, under certain circumstances, the right to be heard assures a full hearing before a court having jurisdiction over the matter, the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and the right to judicial findings based upon that evidence. This right also includes an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to produce witnesses, and to be heard on questions of law.")
* ''Perry v. Del Rio'', 67 S.W.3d 85, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7715699698971836172#p92 92] (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted) ("The Texas Constitution . . . . We have recognized that our due course of law provision at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. And, under certain circumstances, the right to be heard assures a full hearing before a court having jurisdiction over the matter, the right to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and the right to judicial findings based upon that evidence. This right also includes an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to produce witnesses, and to be heard on questions of law.")
* ''Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz'', 940 S.W.2d 86, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12738540633429222592#p89 89-91] (Tex. 1997) ("[T]he purpose of the Texas Bill of Rights is to 'guard against transgressions of the high powers' delegated to the state government by the Texas Constitution. . . . Accordingly, based on the text of the Texas Bill of Rights, its history and purpose, our prior judicial decisions, the law in other jurisdictions, constitutional theory, and the concern for the liberty of all Texas citizens, we conclude that state action is required before a litigant can maintain a claim for deprivation of a right secured by the free speech, equal rights, and due course of law guarantees of the Texas Bill of Rights.")


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|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution ("Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law")
|seo_title=Featured Article: Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution ("Deprivation of Life, Liberty, Property, etc. by Due Course of Law")
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 19, procedural due process, substantive due process
|seo_keywords=Article 1 Section 19, procedural due process, substantive due process
|seo_description=No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property . . . except by the due course of the law of the land.
|seo_description=No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property ... except by the due course of the law of the land.
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights


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