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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)
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* ''Ex parte Smythe'', 120 S.W. 200, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_120_SWR_200.pdf#page=2 201] (Tex.Crim.App. 1909) ("Section 28, art. 1, of the state Constitution [] : 'No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the Legislature.' The clause of the statute under consideration, last cited, clearly authorizes the county judge to suspend the law in that he suspends the punishment. A law without a punishment, especially a penal law, has no validity or force whatever, and when one suspends the penalty he suspends the law. Therefore we hold that this section of the act in question violates the section of the Constitution last quoted. . . . Relator is accordingly discharged.") | * ''Ex parte Smythe'', 120 S.W. 200, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_120_SWR_200.pdf#page=2 201] (Tex.Crim.App. 1909) ("Section 28, art. 1, of the state Constitution [] : 'No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the Legislature.' The clause of the statute under consideration, last cited, clearly authorizes the county judge to suspend the law in that he suspends the punishment. A law without a punishment, especially a penal law, has no validity or force whatever, and when one suspends the penalty he suspends the law. Therefore we hold that this section of the act in question violates the section of the Constitution last quoted. . . . Relator is accordingly discharged.") | ||
* ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Shannon'', 100 S.W. 138, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Shannon'', 100 S.W. 138, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/100_SW_138.pdf#page=8 145-46] (Tex. 1907) ("We are of opinion that the provision does not apply to the matter here in question. . . . The suspension of a statute is different from a provision which declares that its operation shall cease at a special time, or upon the happening of a contingency. Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365, 1 L.Ed. 638. The purpose of section 28, art. 1, of our state Constitution (quoted above), was to prohibit the Legislature from delegating to its officers the power of suspending the laws, and not to prohibit it from providing that a law may cease wholly to operate upon the happening of an event.") | ||
* ''Arroyo v. State'', 69 S.W. 503, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/069_SW_503.pdf#page=2 504] (Tex.Crim.App. 1902) ("Prior to 1874 this section was as follows: 'No power of . . . . It is not necessary to go into the history of the reasons for this change in the constitution, for it is too well known and too fresh to be easily forgotten. Without reviewing the history of the oppressions which grew out of the suspension of laws by reason of such delegation of legislative authority and the declaration of martial law scarcely more than a quarter of a century in the past, it is sufficient to state the fact of such occurrences, and that this change in the organic law swiftly followed, prohibiting such action by the legislature.") | * ''Arroyo v. State'', 69 S.W. 503, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/069_SW_503.pdf#page=2 504] (Tex.Crim.App. 1902) ("Prior to 1874 this section was as follows: 'No power of . . . . It is not necessary to go into the history of the reasons for this change in the constitution, for it is too well known and too fresh to be easily forgotten. Without reviewing the history of the oppressions which grew out of the suspension of laws by reason of such delegation of legislative authority and the declaration of martial law scarcely more than a quarter of a century in the past, it is sufficient to state the fact of such occurrences, and that this change in the organic law swiftly followed, prohibiting such action by the legislature.") | ||