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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)
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* ''McDonald v. Denton'', 132 S.W. 823, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_132_SWR_823.pdf#page=2 824-25] (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, denied) ("Article 1, § 28, Const. 1876. If the change had any significance, it evinced a desire upon the part of the makers of our present Constitution to restrict the power to suspend laws to direct action upon the part of the Legislature. . . . Judge Cooley says this is the test for the authority and binding force of legislative enactments. Under that test, the Legislature would not have the authority to do directly what appellees contend it has attempted to do by delegating authority to the city of Houston to suspend certain laws of Texas as to certain individuals in certain localities.") | * ''McDonald v. Denton'', 132 S.W. 823, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_132_SWR_823.pdf#page=2 824-25] (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, denied) ("Article 1, § 28, Const. 1876. If the change had any significance, it evinced a desire upon the part of the makers of our present Constitution to restrict the power to suspend laws to direct action upon the part of the Legislature. . . . Judge Cooley says this is the test for the authority and binding force of legislative enactments. Under that test, the Legislature would not have the authority to do directly what appellees contend it has attempted to do by delegating authority to the city of Houston to suspend certain laws of Texas as to certain individuals in certain localities.") | ||
* ''Ex parte Smythe'', 120 S.W. 200, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Ex parte Smythe'', 120 S.W. 200, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/120_SW_200.pdf#page=2 201] (Tex.Crim.App. 1909) ("Section 28, art. 1, of the state Constitution [] : 'No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the Legislature.' The clause of the statute under consideration, last cited, clearly authorizes the county judge to suspend the law in that he suspends the punishment. A law without a punishment, especially a penal law, has no validity or force whatever, and when one suspends the penalty he suspends the law. Therefore we hold that this section of the act in question violates the section of the Constitution last quoted. . . . Relator is accordingly discharged.") | ||
* ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Shannon'', 100 S.W. 138, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/100_SW_138.pdf#page=8 145-46] (Tex. 1907) ("We are of opinion that the provision does not apply to the matter here in question. . . . The suspension of a statute is different from a provision which declares that its operation shall cease at a special time, or upon the happening of a contingency. Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365, 1 L.Ed. 638. The purpose of section 28, art. 1, of our state Constitution (quoted above), was to prohibit the Legislature from delegating to its officers the power of suspending the laws, and not to prohibit it from providing that a law may cease wholly to operate upon the happening of an event.") | * ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Shannon'', 100 S.W. 138, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/100_SW_138.pdf#page=8 145-46] (Tex. 1907) ("We are of opinion that the provision does not apply to the matter here in question. . . . The suspension of a statute is different from a provision which declares that its operation shall cease at a special time, or upon the happening of a contingency. Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365, 1 L.Ed. 638. The purpose of section 28, art. 1, of our state Constitution (quoted above), was to prohibit the Legislature from delegating to its officers the power of suspending the laws, and not to prohibit it from providing that a law may cease wholly to operate upon the happening of an event.") | ||