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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)
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* ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_180_SWR_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.") | * ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_180_SWR_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.") | ||
* ''Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas'', 137 S.W. 342, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas'', 137 S.W. 342, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/137_SW_342.pdf#page=2 343] (Tex. 1911) ("In Burton v. Dupree, 19 Tex.Civ.App. 275, 46 S.W. 272, Judge Key . . . . Quoting the present section 28 of article 1 of the Constitution, that learned judge says: 'This section restricts the power to suspend laws to the Legislature, and expressly prohibits the exercise of such power by any other body. In view of this provision of the Constitution, it must be held (whatever may have been the power of the Legislature under former Constitutions) that that body cannot now delegate to a municipal corporation or to any one else authority to suspend a statute law of the state.'") | ||
* ''McDonald v. Denton'', 132 S.W. 823, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/132_SW_823.pdf#page=2 824-25] (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, denied) ("Article 1, § 28, Const. 1876. If the change had any significance, it evinced a desire upon the part of the makers of our present Constitution to restrict the power to suspend laws to direct action upon the part of the Legislature. . . . Judge Cooley says this is the test for the authority and binding force of legislative enactments. Under that test, the Legislature would not have the authority to do directly what appellees contend it has attempted to do by delegating authority to the city of Houston to suspend certain laws of Texas as to certain individuals in certain localities.") | * ''McDonald v. Denton'', 132 S.W. 823, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/132_SW_823.pdf#page=2 824-25] (Tex.Civ.App. 1910, denied) ("Article 1, § 28, Const. 1876. If the change had any significance, it evinced a desire upon the part of the makers of our present Constitution to restrict the power to suspend laws to direct action upon the part of the Legislature. . . . Judge Cooley says this is the test for the authority and binding force of legislative enactments. Under that test, the Legislature would not have the authority to do directly what appellees contend it has attempted to do by delegating authority to the city of Houston to suspend certain laws of Texas as to certain individuals in certain localities.") | ||