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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35 (view source)
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* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.") | * ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.") | ||
* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarrassment, and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue | * ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarrassment, and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.") | ||
* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.") | * ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.") | ||