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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35 (view source)

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Subjects and Titles of Bills"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 4, 1986:
[[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Subjects and Titles of Bills"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 4, 1986:


'''(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.'''
'''(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.'''
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* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.")
* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.")


* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarrassment, and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.")
* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarassment [sic], and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.")


* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.")
* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.")
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* ''Jones v. Anderson'', 189 S.W.2d 65, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/189_SW2_65.pdf#page=2 66] (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1945, ref'd) ("The Legislature, by the enactment of said Article 52-161, created for Bexar County the constitutional office of Criminal District Attorney, and this being so Section 21 of Article 5 of our Constitution, in effect, provides that in such a county no County Attorney shall be elected. Appellant contends that said Article 52-161 is unconstitutional because it allegedly violates the provisions of Section 35 of Article 3 . . . . All of these things were inter-related, necessary and proper to the one main object of the bill, which was to create a Criminal District Court for Bexar County.")
* ''Jones v. Anderson'', 189 S.W.2d 65, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/189_SW2_65.pdf#page=2 66] (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1945, ref'd) ("The Legislature, by the enactment of said Article 52-161, created for Bexar County the constitutional office of Criminal District Attorney, and this being so Section 21 of Article 5 of our Constitution, in effect, provides that in such a county no County Attorney shall be elected. Appellant contends that said Article 52-161 is unconstitutional because it allegedly violates the provisions of Section 35 of Article 3 . . . . All of these things were inter-related, necessary and proper to the one main object of the bill, which was to create a Criminal District Court for Bexar County.")


* ''Gulf Ins. Co. v. James'', 185 S.W.2d 966, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/185_SW2_966.pdf#page=5 970] (Tex. 1945) ("The purpose of Section 35 of Article III [] is to require that the bill shall advise both the Legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, such purpose being stated in [cited case] as follows: 'To advise the legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses which otherwise might be ingrafted on it and become the law, and to obviate legislation through the combination upon a composite bill, of the votes of the proponents of different measures included in it, some of which would not pass upon their merits if separately considered.'")
* ''Gulf Ins. Co. v. James'', 185 S.W.2d 966, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/185_SW2_966.pdf#page=5 970] (Tex. 1945) ("The purpose [of this section] is to require that the bill shall advise both the Legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, such purpose being stated in [cited case] as follows: 'To advise the legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses which otherwise might be ingrafted on it and become the law, and to obviate legislation through the combination upon a composite bill, of the votes of the proponents of different measures included in it, some of which would not pass upon their merits if separately considered.'")


* ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. State'', 113 S.W. 916, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/113_SW_916.pdf#page=2 917] (Tex. 1908) ("A title is not bad merely because of comprehensiveness; but it is bad if it is so indefinite as to express no subject, or if it does not express the particular subject of the act. The title must not only express a subject, but must express that which is dealt with in the body of the act. No authority but the plain language of the Constitution is needed for that proposition. But the authorities recognize, as they must, that a title may be so indefinite as not to express any subject of legislation sufficiently, or that it may fail to express the subject of the body of the act.")
* ''Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. State'', 113 S.W. 916, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/113_SW_916.pdf#page=2 917] (Tex. 1908) ("A title is not bad merely because of comprehensiveness; but it is bad if it is so indefinite as to express no subject, or if it does not express the particular subject of the act. The title must not only express a subject, but must express that which is dealt with in the body of the act. No authority but the plain language of the Constitution is needed for that proposition. But the authorities recognize, as they must, that a title may be so indefinite as not to express any subject of legislation sufficiently, or that it may fail to express the subject of the body of the act.")
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* ''Cannon v. Hemphill'', 7 Tex. 184, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/007_Tex_184.pdf#page=13 208] (1851) ("The 24th section of article 7 . . . . The consequences of such a restriction on legislative discretion and power, of the application of such a test of the validity of special provisions, years, nay ages, after their passage, and after rights under them have accrued, may be very inconvenient and destructive. But such results were for the consideration of the convention; and, in their wisdom, such restriction was deemed salutary and proper. It would be irrational to suppose that this provision of the Constitution is merely a directory one, which may be obeyed or disregarded at the will and caprice of the Legislature.")
* ''Cannon v. Hemphill'', 7 Tex. 184, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/007_Tex_184.pdf#page=13 208] (1851) ("The 24th section of article 7 . . . . The consequences of such a restriction on legislative discretion and power, of the application of such a test of the validity of special provisions, years, nay ages, after their passage, and after rights under them have accrued, may be very inconvenient and destructive. But such results were for the consideration of the convention; and, in their wisdom, such restriction was deemed salutary and proper. It would be irrational to suppose that this provision of the Constitution is merely a directory one, which may be obeyed or disregarded at the will and caprice of the Legislature.")


|seo_title=Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution ("Subjects and Titles of Bills")
|seo_title=Featured Article: Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution ("Subjects and Titles of Bills")
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title
|seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject.
|seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject.
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