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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35 (view source)
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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Subjects and Titles of Bills"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 4, 1986: | [[Category:Featured Article]]<indicator name="featured">[[File:Featured_article_star.svg|25px]]</indicator>{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Subjects and Titles of Bills"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 4, 1986: | ||
'''(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.''' | '''(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.''' | ||
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* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.") | * ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.") | ||
* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from | * ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarassment [sic], and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.") | ||
* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.") | * ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.") | ||
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* ''Cannon v. Hemphill'', 7 Tex. 184, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/007_Tex_184.pdf#page=13 208] (1851) ("The 24th section of article 7 . . . . The consequences of such a restriction on legislative discretion and power, of the application of such a test of the validity of special provisions, years, nay ages, after their passage, and after rights under them have accrued, may be very inconvenient and destructive. But such results were for the consideration of the convention; and, in their wisdom, such restriction was deemed salutary and proper. It would be irrational to suppose that this provision of the Constitution is merely a directory one, which may be obeyed or disregarded at the will and caprice of the Legislature.") | * ''Cannon v. Hemphill'', 7 Tex. 184, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/007_Tex_184.pdf#page=13 208] (1851) ("The 24th section of article 7 . . . . The consequences of such a restriction on legislative discretion and power, of the application of such a test of the validity of special provisions, years, nay ages, after their passage, and after rights under them have accrued, may be very inconvenient and destructive. But such results were for the consideration of the convention; and, in their wisdom, such restriction was deemed salutary and proper. It would be irrational to suppose that this provision of the Constitution is merely a directory one, which may be obeyed or disregarded at the will and caprice of the Legislature.") | ||
|seo_title=Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution ("Subjects and Titles of Bills") | |seo_title=Featured Article: Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution ("Subjects and Titles of Bills") | ||
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title | |seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title | ||
|seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject. | |seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject. | ||