Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35: Difference between revisions

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* ''Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State'', 4 S.W. 865, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/004_SW_865.pdf#page=8 872] (Tex. 1887) ("Former constitutions of this state used the word 'object' in the same connection in which the word 'subject' is used in section 35, art. 3, of the constitution now in force; but the latter word perhaps expresses more accurately the meaning and intent of the constitutional provision. As used in the constitution, the word 'subject' is that which is to be dominated or controlled by the particular law. . . . A title or act essentially single in subject, which does not thus conceal or disguise the real purpose, is not subject to constitutional objection, although the ends intended to be reached through the one subject may be many.")
* ''Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State'', 4 S.W. 865, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/004_SW_865.pdf#page=8 872] (Tex. 1887) ("Former constitutions of this state used the word 'object' in the same connection in which the word 'subject' is used in section 35, art. 3, of the constitution now in force; but the latter word perhaps expresses more accurately the meaning and intent of the constitutional provision. As used in the constitution, the word 'subject' is that which is to be dominated or controlled by the particular law. . . . A title or act essentially single in subject, which does not thus conceal or disguise the real purpose, is not subject to constitutional objection, although the ends intended to be reached through the one subject may be many.")


* ''Breen v. T. & P. R. R. Co.'', 44 Tex. 302, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/44_Tex._302.pdf#page=4 305-06] (1875) ("The purpose [of this section] was no doubt to prevent the 'bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, neither of which could succeed on its own merits.' It was also intended to remedy another practice 'by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation,' and thereby pass bills through the legislature while many members were unaware of their real scope and effect.")
* ''Breen v. T. & P. R. R. Co.'', 44 Tex. 302, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/044_Tex_302.pdf#page=4 305-06] (1875) ("The purpose [of this section] was no doubt to prevent the 'bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, neither of which could succeed on its own merits.' It was also intended to remedy another practice 'by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation,' and thereby pass bills through the legislature while many members were unaware of their real scope and effect.")


* ''Tadlock v. Eccles'', 20 Tex. 782, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/20_Tex._782.pdf#page=11 792] (1858) ("The terms employed in the title of the act are sufficiently significant of the subject of its provisions; and that was what the clause in the constitution intended. It could not have meant that the word 'object' should be understood in the sense of 'provision;' for that would render the title of the act as long as the act itself. Various and numerous provisions may be necessary to accomplish the one general object, which an act of the legislature proposes. Nor could it have been intended that no act of legislation should be constitutional which had reference to the accomplishment of more than one ultimate end.")
* ''Tadlock v. Eccles'', 20 Tex. 782, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/20_Tex._782.pdf#page=11 792] (1858) ("The terms employed in the title of the act are sufficiently significant of the subject of its provisions; and that was what the clause in the constitution intended. It could not have meant that the word 'object' should be understood in the sense of 'provision;' for that would render the title of the act as long as the act itself. Various and numerous provisions may be necessary to accomplish the one general object, which an act of the legislature proposes. Nor could it have been intended that no act of legislation should be constitutional which had reference to the accomplishment of more than one ultimate end.")