Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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* ''Smith v. State'', 49 S.W.2d 739, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/049_SW2_739.pdf#page=5 743-44] (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant law], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")
* ''Smith v. State'', 49 S.W.2d 739, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/049_SW2_739.pdf#page=5 743-44] (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant law], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")


* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_S.W.2d_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")
* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")


* ''Clark v. Finley'', 54 S.W. 343, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_054_SWR_343.pdf#page=3 345] (Tex. 1899) ("Indeed, it is perhaps the exception when a statute is found which applies to every person or thing alike. . . . The tendency of the recent decisions upon the subject, as it seems to us, is to drift into refinements that are rather more specious than profitable. It is said in some of the cases that the classification must be reasonable; in others, that it must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, etc. If it is meant by this that the legislature cannot evade the prohibition of the constitution as to special laws by making a law applicable to a pretended class, which is, in fact, no class, we concur in the proposition.")
* ''Clark v. Finley'', 54 S.W. 343, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_054_SWR_343.pdf#page=3 345] (Tex. 1899) ("Indeed, it is perhaps the exception when a statute is found which applies to every person or thing alike. . . . The tendency of the recent decisions upon the subject, as it seems to us, is to drift into refinements that are rather more specious than profitable. It is said in some of the cases that the classification must be reasonable; in others, that it must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, etc. If it is meant by this that the legislature cannot evade the prohibition of the constitution as to special laws by making a law applicable to a pretended class, which is, in fact, no class, we concur in the proposition.")