Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56 (view source)

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 * ''Board of Managers of the Harris County Hospital District v. Pension Board of the Pension System for the City of Houston'', 449 S.W.2d 33, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=754209635729513848#p38 38] (Tex. 1969) ("The fact that Section 23a applied, when passed, only to the City of Houston does not make it a local or special law. As a matter of fact, Article 6243g applied only to the City of Houston when it was passed in 1965, but all of its provisions, including those added by Section 23a, are applicable to any city having 900,000 or more inhabitants according to any future Federal census. In this respect the Act differs from the one stricken down in ''City of Ft. Worth v. Bobbitt'', 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 470 (1931).")
-* ''Devon v. City of San Antonio'', 443 S.W.2d 598, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16168023269216229417#p600 600-01] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1969, ref'd) ("It is thus seen that the Act is not confined by its terms to the City of San Antonio. There are no restrictions that limit its operation to any city. It is general and uniform in its application to all cities which may now or hereafter fall within its reasonably broad class. Appellant does not suggest any basis for holding that the classification in the Act is unreasonable or arbitrary, or that it was put in general form by the legislature merely to evade the Constitution, and we find none. To the contrary, considering the subject matter of the Act, we perceive, without discussing, substantial grounds for the classification made by the legislature. The Act is a general law.")
+* ''Devon v. City of San Antonio'', 443 S.W.2d 598, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16168023269216229417#p600 600-01] (Tex.Civ.App.–Waco 1969, ref'd) ("There are no restrictions that limit its operation to any city. It is general and uniform in its application to all cities which may now or hereafter fall within its reasonably broad class. Appellant does not suggest any basis for holding that the classification in the Act is unreasonable or arbitrary, or that it was put in general form by the legislature merely to evade the Constitution, and we find none. To the contrary, considering the subject matter of the Act, we perceive, without discussing, substantial grounds for the classification made by the legislature. The Act is a general law.")
 * ''Smith v. Davis'', 426 S.W.2d 827, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9077696797543097267#p832 832] (Tex. 1968) ("Further, the classification limiting the applicability of Section 2b to counties with 650,000 or more inhabitants is not unreasonable, because this classification includes all counties to which the section would otherwise be applicable. . . . We do not have to consider the effect of the population bracket as if it discriminated against smaller counties with teaching hospital facilities, because it does not do so; and we may assume that the legislature would recognize the possibility of an unreasonable classification in the event a state-supported medical school were created in a smaller county at some time in the future.")