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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56 (view source)
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* ''Cameron County v. Wilson'', 326 S.W.2d 162, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893258599009863966#p167 167] (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.") | * ''Cameron County v. Wilson'', 326 S.W.2d 162, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893258599009863966#p167 167] (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.") | ||
* ''Wood v. Wood'', 320 S.W.2d 807, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9365568154058123483#p810 810] (Tex. 1959) ("The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast time accepted domicil [sic] rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense . . . . What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent | * ''Wood v. Wood'', 320 S.W.2d 807, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9365568154058123483#p810 810] (Tex. 1959) ("The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast time accepted domicil [sic] rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense . . . . What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent the granting of divorces, we think, is a ban on legislative authority to grant that relief to individuals by a special act. The power of the Legislature to grant divorces absent constitutional restriction, has been recognized generally and formerly in some of the states was not uncommonly exercised.") | ||
* ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.") | * ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.") | ||