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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56 (view source)

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For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but a substantial majority, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, ''Interpretive Commentary'' (West 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").
For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but a substantial majority, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, ''Interpretive Commentary'' (West 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").


The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").
The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").


The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/237/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 40]) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."
The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/237/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 40]) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."
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* ''City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp.'', 571 S.W.3d 336, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11581812043885385661#p337 337] (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")
* ''City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp.'', 571 S.W.3d 336, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11581812043885385661#p337 337] (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")


* ''Southwest Travis County Water Dist. v. City of Austin'', 64 S.W.3d 25, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7516365479571908009#p?? ??] (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, pet. dism'd) (" ... .")
* ''Sw. Travis County Water Dist. v. City of Austin'', 64 S.W.3d 25, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7516365479571908009#p30 30] (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, dism'd) ("The supreme court has distinguished ''McCraw'' and ''City of Irving'' on the ground that the statutes there in question affected a substantial class . . . . It may not reasonably be concluded that H.B. 3193 affects, with respect to the water-quality factor, a substantial class of persons over a broad region of the state as opposed to the single District created by H.B. 3193. ''See'', ''e.g.'', ''Vincent v. State'', 235 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex.Comm'nApp. 1921, judgm't adopted); ''City of Austin v. City of Cedar Park'', 953 S.W.2d 424, 435 (Tex.App.–Austin 1997, no writ).")


* ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18021988528183648949#p451 451] (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")
* ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18021988528183648949#p451 451] (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")
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* ''Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins'', 263 S.W. 905, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_905.pdf#page=2 906] (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")
* ''Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins'', 263 S.W. 905, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_905.pdf#page=2 906] (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")


* ''Duclos v. Harris County'', 263 S.W. 562, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_562.pdf#page=2 563] (Tex. 1924) ("If the Legislature had, by enactment other than in the bill creating the court, attempted to increase the salary of the clerk of Harris County alone, such enactment would clearly be a special and local law, and violative of Sec. 56, Art. 3. Can the fact that it is included in the provisions of a general law creating a new court in a county in which a clerk for all district courts was already provided and his compensation fixed under a general law, the same as for all other clerks in like counties, change its nature . . . . We think not. To so hold would he to look to the form and not the spirit and purpose of the law.")
* ''Duclos v. Harris County'', 263 S.W. 562, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_562.pdf#page=2 563] (Tex. 1924) ("If the Legislature had, by enactment other than in the bill creating the court, attempted to increase the salary of the clerk of Harris County alone, such enactment would clearly be a special and local law, and violative of Sec. 56, Art. 3. Can the fact that it is included in the provisions of a general law creating a new court in a county in which a clerk for all district courts was already provided and his compensation fixed under a general law, the same as for all other clerks in like counties, change its nature . . . . We think not. To so hold would be to look to the form and not the spirit and purpose of the law.")


* ''O'Brien v. Amerman'', 247 S.W. 270, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_270.pdf#page=2 271] (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions . . . . It seems obvious that the number of pilots and the need of careful and strict supervision of pilotage would increase with the size of the port and the extension of its terminal water transportation facilities. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")
* ''O'Brien v. Amerman'', 247 S.W. 270, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_270.pdf#page=2 271] (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions . . . . It seems obvious that the number of pilots and the need of careful and strict supervision of pilotage would increase with the size of the port and the extension of its terminal water transportation facilities. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")
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