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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56 (view source)
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* ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.") | * ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.") | ||
* ''Wood v. Wood'', 320 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex. 1959) ("The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast time-accepted domicile rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense nevertheless they are an important segment of the residential population. . . . What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent the granting of divorces, we think, is a ban on legislative authority to grant that relief to individuals by a special act. The power of the Legislature to grant divorces absent constitutional restriction, has been recognized generally and formerly in some of the states was not uncommonly exercised. 27 C.J.S. Divorce §5.") | |||
* ''Rodriguez v. Gonzales'', 227 S.W.2d 791, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18224133104924555465#p793 793] (Tex. 1950) ("The primary purpose back of the adoption of this section was to secure that uniformity in the application of law which is essential to an ordered society. The section is not of doubtful construction, but is a plain mandate . . . . The prohibition is against any 'local or special law.' We are not concerned with any distinctions which may be drawn between a local law and a special law, for in our opinion the Act under review is both a local and a special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision. This is so clear to our minds that we shall not discuss the question at length.") | * ''Rodriguez v. Gonzales'', 227 S.W.2d 791, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18224133104924555465#p793 793] (Tex. 1950) ("The primary purpose back of the adoption of this section was to secure that uniformity in the application of law which is essential to an ordered society. The section is not of doubtful construction, but is a plain mandate . . . . The prohibition is against any 'local or special law.' We are not concerned with any distinctions which may be drawn between a local law and a special law, for in our opinion the Act under review is both a local and a special law within the meaning of the constitutional provision. This is so clear to our minds that we shall not discuss the question at length.") | ||