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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56 (view source)

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At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/48/hb167m.pdf#page=2 167] (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1973/jh0008.pdf#page=5 H-8] (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").
At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/48/hb167m.pdf#page=2 167] (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1973/jh0008.pdf#page=5 H-8] (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").


This section has been amended once. The 2001 modification was part of a "constitutional cleanup amendment." It made stylistic changes and transferred the substance of Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 22|22]] and [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 43|43]] of Article XVI to this section. The local and special laws authorized by other sections, either expressly or by implication, include laws: (1) relating to the court system (Article V, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 1|1]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 7|7]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 8|8]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 21|21]]); (2) creating or affecting a conservation and reclamation district (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 59|59]]); (3) creating or affecting a road district (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 52|52]]); (4) providing for road maintenance (Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 9|9]]); (5) creating or affecting a hospital district (Article IX, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 4|4]]-[[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 11|11]]); (6) creating or affecting an airport authority (Article IX, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 12|12]]); (7) relating to the regulation of stock or stock raisers (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 23|23]]); (8) granting aid or relief in cases of public calamity (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51|51]], Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 10|10]]); and (9) providing for consolidation of political subdivision offices or functions (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 64|64]]).
This section has been amended once. The 2001 modification was part of a "constitutional cleanup amendment." It made stylistic changes and transferred the substance of Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 22|22]] and [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 43|43]] of Article XVI to this section. The local and special laws authorized by other sections, either expressly or by implication, include laws: (1) relating to the court system (Article V, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 1|1]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 7|7]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 8|8]], [[Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 21|21]]); (2) creating or affecting a conservation and reclamation district (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 59|59]]); (3) creating or affecting a road or water district (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 52|52]]); (4) providing for road maintenance (Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 9|9]]); (5) creating or affecting a hospital district (Article IX, Sections [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 4|4]]-[[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 11|11]]); (6) creating or affecting an airport authority (Article IX, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IX, Section 12|12]]); (7) relating to the regulation of stock or stock raisers (Article XVI, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 23|23]]); (8) granting aid or tax relief in cases of public calamity (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51|51]], Article VIII, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article VIII, Section 10|10]]); and (9) consolidating political subdivision offices or functions (Article III, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 64|64]]).


As reflected by the numerous decisions referenced below, the Texas jurisprudence in this area is within the national mainstream. The governing rules can be summarized as follows: (1) A general law is a law which relates to persons, places or things as a class, both in the present and in the future, which class is based upon a real and substantial difference which bears a reasonable relation to the statute's purpose. (2) A special law is a law which relates to particular persons, places or things of a class; to a class as it is constituted at a given time without allowance for changes in the future; or to a "pretended" class which bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the relevant statute. (3) A local law is a special law in which the places to which it applies are territorial subdivisions of the state. Note that the substance of the foregoing rules are routinely stated in different terms. More importantly, recognize that the rules are sometimes ignored by courts when considered necessary to reach an equitable result.
As reflected by the numerous decisions referenced below, the Texas jurisprudence in this area is within the national mainstream. The governing rules can be summarized as follows: (1) A general law is a law which relates to persons, places or things as a class, both in the present and in the future, which class is based upon a real and substantial difference which bears a reasonable relation to the statute's purpose. (2) A special law is a law which relates to particular persons, places or things of a class; to a class as it is constituted at a given time without allowance for changes in the future; or to a "pretended" class which bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the relevant statute. (3) A local law is a special law in which the places to which it applies are territorial subdivisions of the state. Note that the substance of the foregoing rules are routinely stated in different terms. More importantly, recognize that the rules are sometimes ignored by courts when considered necessary to reach an equitable result.
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* ''Cameron County v. Wilson'', 326 S.W.2d 162, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893258599009863966#p167 167] (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.")
* ''Cameron County v. Wilson'', 326 S.W.2d 162, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2893258599009863966#p167 167] (Tex. 1959) ("Because of the breadth and territorial extent of the State, its varied climatic and economic interests, and the attendant problems of transportation, regulation and general needs incident to a growing and active population, we have been and will again be faced with the need and demand for legislation which affects all the people of the State generally, yet which, in its direct operation will apply to one locality or to a comparatively small number of counties. . . . The scope of such legislation should not be restricted by expanding the nullifying effect of Article 3, § 56 of the Constitution.")


* ''Wood v. Wood'', 320 S.W.2d 807, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9365568154058123483#p810 810] (Tex. 1959) ("The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast time-accepted domicil [sic] rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense . . . . What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent the granting of divorces, we think, is a ban on legislative authority to grant that relief to individuals by a special act. The power of the Legislature to grant divorces absent constitutional restriction, has been recognized generally and formerly in some of the states was not uncommonly exercised.")
* ''Wood v. Wood'', 320 S.W.2d 807, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9365568154058123483#p810 810] (Tex. 1959) ("The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast time accepted domicil [sic] rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense . . . . What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent the granting of divorces, we think, is a ban on legislative authority to grant that relief to individuals by a special act. The power of the Legislature to grant divorces absent constitutional restriction, has been recognized generally and formerly in some of the states was not uncommonly exercised.")


* ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.")
* ''Smith v. Decker'', 312 S.W.2d 632, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17962249283603233454#p635 635-36] (Tex. 1958) (citation omitted) ("However, it has long been held that the use of population brackets alone to direct legislation toward a particular county needing a particular type of legislation will not in itself save the law from being unconstitutional as a special law if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished. There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.")
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