Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")
* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")


* ''Stephensen v. Wood'', 34 S.W.2d 246, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/034_SW2_246.pdf#page=3 248] (Tex. 1931) ("The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. To say that the Legislature cannot enact laws to protect the fish along a certain part of the coast line of the State because such a law would be local or special, would be to say that all such regulations must apply to every part of the State. A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons stated we hold this to be a general law.")
* ''Stephensen v. Wood'', 34 S.W.2d 246, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/034_SW2_246.pdf#page=3 248] (Tex. 1931) ("The statute operates upon a subject matter in which the people at large are interested; it applies with equal force to all persons everywhere; and the fact that it only operates in certain localities grows out of the subject matter. . . . A regulation protecting fish in the coastal waters which is made to apply to the entire State would be an idle and useless thing, as most of our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons stated we hold this to be a general law.")


* ''Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins'', 263 S.W. 905, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_905.pdf#page=2 906] (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")
* ''Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Watkins'', 263 S.W. 905, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/263_SW_905.pdf#page=2 906] (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105 [] under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers.")