Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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Unfortunately, much of the national jurisprudence regarding this type of restriction is rather indefinite. Cf. ''Henderson v. Koenig'', 168 Mo. 356, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Mo_356.pdf#page=17 372] (1902) (emphasis in original) ("The act in question is ''local'' as to the city of St. Louis, and ''special'' as to the incumbent of the office of judge of probate."); Charles Binney, ''Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation in State Constitutions'' [https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/lXQ1AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA25 25-26] (1894) ("Hence, postponing for the present the inquiry into what constitutes a class for legislative purposes, and premising only that the class to which the general laws are applicable must be real and substantial, it may be said in brief that: (1) A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. (2) A special law is one which relates either to particular persons, places or things, or to persons, places or things which, though not particularized, are separated, by any method of selection, from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable. (3) A local law is one whose operation is confined within territorial limits other than those of the whole State or any properly constituted class of localities therein.").
Unfortunately, much of the national jurisprudence regarding this type of restriction is rather indefinite. Cf. ''Henderson v. Koenig'', 168 Mo. 356, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Mo_356.pdf#page=17 372] (1902) (emphasis in original) ("The act in question is ''local'' as to the city of St. Louis, and ''special'' as to the incumbent of the office of judge of probate."); Charles Binney, ''Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation in State Constitutions'' [https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/lXQ1AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA25 25-26] (1894) ("Hence, postponing for the present the inquiry into what constitutes a class for legislative purposes, and premising only that the class to which the general laws are applicable must be real and substantial, it may be said in brief that: (1) A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law. (2) A special law is one which relates either to particular persons, places or things, or to persons, places or things which, though not particularized, are separated, by any method of selection, from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable. (3) A local law is one whose operation is confined within territorial limits other than those of the whole State or any properly constituted class of localities therein.").


For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but most, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study, debate and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, ''Interpretive Commentary'' (Vernon 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").
For over one hundred years, more than forty state constitutions have contained provisions restricting the enactment of local and special laws. Some of the provisions are simple but a majority, referred to as laundry lists, are lengthy. Such restrictions serve a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the Legislature from usurping local control over public policy matters delegated generally to political subdivisions of the state (i.e., stopping the Legislature from meddling in local matters); and (2) reserving more time for the Legislature to study, debate and address public policy matters important to the entire state. Cf. 2 Tex. Const. Art. III, § 56, ''Interpretive Commentary'' (Vernon 2007) ("The constitutional framers believed that restrictions on the passage of local and special bills would prevent the granting of special privileges; secure uniformity of law throughout the state; decrease the passage of courtesy bills; and encourage the legislature to devote more of its time to interests of the state at large.").


The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").
The supreme courts of other states regularly issue decisions regarding their jurisprudence in this area that may inform the proper interpretation of this section. See, e.g., ''City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'n Group, LLC'', 592 S.W.3d 764, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18274283085274463577#p774 774] (Mo. 2019) ("Because recent cases have generated complex and confusing criteria for application of the provisions in article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution, this Court must revisit its analysis of local or special law challenges under article III, section 40."); ''Venice HMA, LLC v. Sarasota County'', 228 So.3d 76, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13760124335219338689#p80 80] (Fla. 2017) ("In contrast, '[a] general law operates universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is a law relating to a state function, or instrumentality.'"); ''Gallardo v. State'', 336 P.3d 717, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9895084289919725224#p721 721] (Ariz. 2014) ("To survive scrutiny, (1) the law must have 'a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,' (2) the classification the law makes must be legitimate, encompassing all members that are similarly situated, and (3) the classification must be elastic, allowing 'other individuals or entities to come within' and move out of the class."); ''Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Commonwealth'', 899 A.2d 1085, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853089952443362778#p1094 1094] (Pa. 2006) ("'The main purpose behind Article III, Section 32 was 'to put an end to the flood of privileged legislation for particular localities and for private purposes which was common in 1873.'").