Texas Constitution:Article IV, Section 22: Difference between revisions

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* ''State v. International & G. N. R. Co.'', 35 S.W. 1067, 1068 (Tex. 1896) ("We are of the opinion that the conferring upon the attorney general [in Article IV, Section 22] of the specific authority to 'take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power * * * not authorized by law' evidences an intent to make such authority exclusive in such officer, and must be held as an exception to the general authority conferred upon the county attorney [in Article V, Section 21] to 'represent the state in all cases in the district and inferior courts in their respective counties.'")
* ''State v. International & G. N. R. Co.'', 35 S.W. 1067, 1068 (Tex. 1896) ("We are of the opinion that the conferring upon the attorney general [in Article IV, Section 22] of the specific authority to 'take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power * * * not authorized by law' evidences an intent to make such authority exclusive in such officer, and must be held as an exception to the general authority conferred upon the county attorney [in Article V, Section 21] to 'represent the state in all cases in the district and inferior courts in their respective counties.'")


* ''State v. Moore'', 57 Tex. 307, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/57_Tex._307.pdf#page=8 314] (1882) ("This article is broad enough to confer all the power claimed; but it is not believed that it was the intention of the constitution to confer, by the general clause above referred to, power upon the legislature to give to the attorney general power to perform those acts which the constitution itself conferred upon county attorneys; but that it was intended thereby to give the legislature power to confer upon the attorney general such powers as might be deemed necessary in regard to matters which had not been expressly conferred by the constitution upon some other officer.")
* ''State v. Moore'', 57 Tex. 307, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/057_Tex_307.pdf#page=8 314] (1882) ("This article is broad enough to confer all the power claimed; but it is not believed that it was the intention of the constitution to confer, by the general clause above referred to, power upon the legislature to give to the attorney general power to perform those acts which the constitution itself conferred upon county attorneys; but that it was intended thereby to give the legislature power to confer upon the attorney general such powers as might be deemed necessary in regard to matters which had not been expressly conferred by the constitution upon some other officer.")


* ''State v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co.'', 24 Texas 80, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/2112131/State%20v.%20Southern%20Pacific%20Railroad,%2024%20Tex.%2080%20(1859).pdf#page=38 117-18] (1859) ("The power of the governor may be advisory or suggestive of duty in this case, as it is in many of his functions. . . . That is an inconvenience, which is consequent upon maintaining the independence of the inferior officers. Its only effect may be, to prevent suits from being brought occasionally, which might otherwise be brought. But this want of subjection, and the consequent possibility of a want of harmony in executive officers, do [sic] not affect the question of right to maintain the suit. It is the duty imposed, by law, on the officer, who must bring the suit, that constitutes the right to bring and maintain it.")
* ''State v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co.'', 24 Texas 80, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/2112131/State%20v.%20Southern%20Pacific%20Railroad,%2024%20Tex.%2080%20(1859).pdf#page=38 117-18] (1859) ("The power of the governor may be advisory or suggestive of duty in this case, as it is in many of his functions. . . . That is an inconvenience, which is consequent upon maintaining the independence of the inferior officers. Its only effect may be, to prevent suits from being brought occasionally, which might otherwise be brought. But this want of subjection, and the consequent possibility of a want of harmony in executive officers, do [sic] not affect the question of right to maintain the suit. It is the duty imposed, by law, on the officer, who must bring the suit, that constitutes the right to bring and maintain it.")