4,834
edits
Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions
Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56 (edit)
Revision as of 10:58, September 25, 2023
, September 25, 2023→23-0656
m (→23-0656) |
m (→23-0656) |
||
| Line 201: | Line 201: | ||
post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 | post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 | ||
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article | https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article III, Section 56, of the State Constitution. The last mentioned section of the Constitution, is designed, in part, to insure that the system of county government shall be as uniform as is possible. It is intended to prevent the passage of laws which discriminate between the counties of this state without adequate and substantial difference in the characteristics of the individual counties indicative, rationally, of the necessity for the discrimination.") | ||
Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. 266, 281-82 (1889) ("Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for special or local legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all' the cases is that classification, with the view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, — a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws enacted in pursuance of such classification and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. . . . The purpose of the provision under consideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the doing, by local or special laws, that which can be accomplished by general láws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general, instead of local or special laws, whenever the former are at all practicable.") | Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. 266, 281-82 (1889) ("Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for special or local legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all' the cases is that classification, with the view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, — a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws enacted in pursuance of such classification and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. . . . The purpose of the provision under consideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the doing, by local or special laws, that which can be accomplished by general láws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general, instead of local or special laws, whenever the former are at all practicable.") | ||