Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16: Difference between revisions

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* ''Mellinger v. City of Houston'', 3 S.W. 249, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_SW_249.pdf#page=6 254-55] (Tex. 1887) ("The states to which we have referred are the only ones which have constitutional provisions in effect the same as exists in this state. The section of the constitution [prohibiting the enactment of retroactive laws] was considered in the case of ''De Cordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 480; and, while the facts in that case did not call for the decision of the question before us, it did call for a determination of the character of laws which the constitution forbids. It was said that '. . . .' We have no doubt that the law is thus correctly stated.")
* ''Mellinger v. City of Houston'', 3 S.W. 249, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_SW_249.pdf#page=6 254-55] (Tex. 1887) ("The states to which we have referred are the only ones which have constitutional provisions in effect the same as exists in this state. The section of the constitution [prohibiting the enactment of retroactive laws] was considered in the case of ''De Cordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 480; and, while the facts in that case did not call for the decision of the question before us, it did call for a determination of the character of laws which the constitution forbids. It was said that '. . . .' We have no doubt that the law is thus correctly stated.")


* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/21_Tex._713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")
* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/021_Tex_713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")


* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, <!-- comment: case not available online in pdf format --> [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28570/m1/248/ 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")
* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, <!-- comment: case not available online in pdf format --> [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28570/m1/248/ 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")

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