Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28: Difference between revisions

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* ''Scoggin v. State'', 38 S.W.2d 592, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/038_S.W.2d_592.pdf#page=4 595-96] (Tex.Crim.App. 1931) ("Many examples of the application of article 1, § 28, of the Constitution are found in the reports in this state, both of the Supreme Court and this court. The restriction against the suspension of laws rendered void . . . . The subject before this court is not the authority, by proper regulation, to require peace officers to wear on their person some insignia of office. The vice in the law is referable to the fact that the terms in which the Legislature has expressed its will offend against the mandate of the Constitution which declares that no law can be suspended save by the Legislature.")
* ''Scoggin v. State'', 38 S.W.2d 592, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/038_S.W.2d_592.pdf#page=4 595-96] (Tex.Crim.App. 1931) ("Many examples of the application of article 1, § 28, of the Constitution are found in the reports in this state, both of the Supreme Court and this court. The restriction against the suspension of laws rendered void . . . . The subject before this court is not the authority, by proper regulation, to require peace officers to wear on their person some insignia of office. The vice in the law is referable to the fact that the terms in which the Legislature has expressed its will offend against the mandate of the Constitution which declares that no law can be suspended save by the Legislature.")


* ''Trimmier v. Carlton'', 296 S.W. 1070, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_296_SWR_1070.pdf#page=13 1082] (Tex. 1927) ("Again, there is strong support for our conclusion . . . that it is not a delegation of legislative power in violation of the Constitution to grant to some designated body powers which the Legislature cannot itself practically and efficiently exercise. Authorities, supra. In other words, that the exercise of that particular type of authority is read as an exception into the general language of limitation of the Constitution. It is merely tantamount to saying that the Constitution itself does not require the impracticable or the impossible. The case of Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Tex. 554, states the principle.")
* ''Trimmier v. Carlton'', 296 S.W. 1070, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/296_SW_1070.pdf#page=13 1082] (Tex. 1927) ("Again, there is strong support for our conclusion . . . that it is not a delegation of legislative power in violation of the Constitution to grant to some designated body powers which the Legislature cannot itself practically and efficiently exercise. Authorities, supra. In other words, that the exercise of that particular type of authority is read as an exception into the general language of limitation of the Constitution. It is merely tantamount to saying that the Constitution itself does not require the impracticable or the impossible. The case of Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Tex. 554, states the principle.")


* ''Dockery v. State'', 247 S.W. 508, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_508.pdf#page=2 509] (Tex.Crim.App. 1923) ("Section 28, art. 1, of our Constitution, forbids the delegation of lawmaking power by the Legislature. We discussed this at some . . . . If the act under discussion be upheld, it would seem clear that the law requiring fire escapes would be such as that the essential part of it, i. e. the kind and character of specifications necessary, might be changed, modified, added to, or taken from by a power other than the Legislature, at the will, wish, or whim of such foreign power. Indeed, if the fire marshal declined to promulgate specifications it might be that the entire law would be rendered futile.")
* ''Dockery v. State'', 247 S.W. 508, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_508.pdf#page=2 509] (Tex.Crim.App. 1923) ("Section 28, art. 1, of our Constitution, forbids the delegation of lawmaking power by the Legislature. We discussed this at some . . . . If the act under discussion be upheld, it would seem clear that the law requiring fire escapes would be such as that the essential part of it, i. e. the kind and character of specifications necessary, might be changed, modified, added to, or taken from by a power other than the Legislature, at the will, wish, or whim of such foreign power. Indeed, if the fire marshal declined to promulgate specifications it might be that the entire law would be rendered futile.")