Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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* ''City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp.'', 571 S.W.3d 336, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11581812043885385661#p337 337] (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")
* ''City of Tyler v. Liberty Utilities (Tall Timbers Sewer) Corp.'', 571 S.W.3d 336, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11581812043885385661#p337 337] (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ("Not satisfied to rely entirely upon the spirit of freedom, most states, including Texas, have adopted state constitutional provisions that enact a default preference for legislation by general law, accomplished by a general prohibition of legislation by local or special law. In this appeal, we must determine whether an admittedly local law violated the Texas Constitution. . . . We conclude that the statute in controversy violates the general constitutional prohibition against local laws that regulate the affairs of a city.")


* ''Southwest Travis County Water Dist. v. City of Austin'', 64 S.W.3d 25, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7516365479571908009#p30 30] (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, pet. dism'd) ("The supreme court has distinguished ''McCraw'' and ''City of Irving'' on the ground that the statutes there in question affected a substantial class of persons . . . . It may not reasonably be concluded that H.B. 3193 affects, with respect to the water-quality factor, a substantial class of persons over a broad region of the state as opposed to the single District created by H.B. 3193. ''See'', ''e.g.'', ''Vincent v. State'', 235 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex.Comm'nApp. 1921, judgm't adopted); ''City of Austin v. City of Cedar Park'', 953 S.W.2d 424, 435 (Tex.App.–Austin 1997, no writ).")
* ''Southwest Travis County Water Dist. v. City of Austin'', 64 S.W.3d 25, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7516365479571908009#p30 30] (Tex.App.–Austin 2000, pet. dism'd) ("The supreme court has distinguished ''McCraw'' and ''City of Irving'' on the ground that the statutes there in question affected a substantial class . . . . It may not reasonably be concluded that H.B. 3193 affects, with respect to the water-quality factor, a substantial class of persons over a broad region of the state as opposed to the single District created by H.B. 3193. ''See'', ''e.g.'', ''Vincent v. State'', 235 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex.Comm'nApp. 1921, judgm't adopted); ''City of Austin v. City of Cedar Park'', 953 S.W.2d 424, 435 (Tex.App.–Austin 1997, no writ).")


* ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18021988528183648949#p451 451] (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")
* ''Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon'', 22 S.W.3d 444, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18021988528183648949#p451 451] (Tex. 2000) (citations omitted) ("We conclude that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing class actions involving motor vehicle licensees from other class actions and that Section 6.06(g) operates equally on all within the class. First, '[a] statute is not local or special . . . if it operates on a subject in which people at large are interested.' Automobiles and related issues such as automobile safety are important subjects to the public. Automobiles are the primary . . . . Thus, it is reasonable for the Legislature to ensure heightened judicial scrutiny of these class actions that affect so many individuals.")

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