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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a (view source)

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* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p238 238] (Tex. 2024) (citations omitted) ("Finally, plaintiffs argue that S.B. 14 'categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic' and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny under Article I, Section 3. But this Court has previously concluded that Section 3a 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than' Section 3. Since the Equal Rights Amendment's adoption in 1972, this Court has never expanded the Equal Rights Clauses' protection to classifications that fall outside those enumerated in Section 3a. We decline plaintiffs' invitation to create a new protected class beyond those Texas voters have adopted.")
* ''State v. Loe'', 692 S.W.3d 215, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9682881558926563485#p238 238] (Tex. 2024) (citations omitted) ("[P]laintiffs argue that S.B. 14 'categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic' and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny under Article I, Section 3. But this Court has previously concluded that Section 3a 'is more extensive and provides more specific protection than' Section 3. Since the Equal Rights Amendment's adoption in 1972, this Court has never expanded the Equal Rights Clauses' protection to classifications that fall outside those enumerated in Section 3a. We decline plaintiffs' invitation to create a new protected class . . . .")


* ''State v. Zurawski'', 690 S.W.3d 644, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7571856369762417682#p670 670-71] (Tex. 2024) ("The Center argues that the State's interest in prenatal life fades when 'the health risks to the pregnant patient and the fetus are so severe that the pregnancy will never result in a child with sustained life.' But in situations where the mother has such a risk . . . current law permits an abortion to address the mother's risk of death or serious physical impairment. We conclude that the temporary-injunction record does not demonstrate that the Act lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose such that the Act violates Texas's equal protection clauses.")
* ''State v. Zurawski'', 690 S.W.3d 644, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7571856369762417682#p670 670-71] (Tex. 2024) ("The Center argues that the State's interest in prenatal life fades when 'the health risks to the pregnant patient and the fetus are so severe that the pregnancy will never result in a child with sustained life.' But in situations where the mother has such a risk . . . current law permits an abortion to address the mother's risk of death or serious physical impairment. We conclude that the temporary-injunction record does not demonstrate that the Act lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose such that the Act violates Texas's equal protection clauses.")
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