Article XV, Section 4 of the Texas Constitution ("Impeachment Limited to Removal and Disqualification")

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Adopted February 15, 1876:

Judgement [sic] in cases of impeachment shall extend only to removal from office, and disqualification from holding any office of honor, trust or profit under this State. A party convicted on impeachment shall also be subject to indictment trial and punishment according to law.

Editor Comments

The broad phrase "any office of honor, trust or profit under this State" likely includes every public office in Texas. Cf. Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. 1964) ("Members of the City Council are Officers under this state").

Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

None.

Historic Decisions

  • Ferguson v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 526, 534 (Tex. 1930) ("It is unreasonable, if not unbelievable [] that the convention, after providing for the disqualification of a convicted officer in impeachment to thereafter hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the state, and after excepting from the pardon power granted to the Executive those convicted of impeachment, ever intended that the Legislature by mere implication could wholly abrogate and render nugatory the plain provisions of the Constitution providing for such disqualification. It is a matter of common knowledge that impeachment of Governors in this country, and particularly in this state, are rare. Impeachment is used only in extreme cases.")
  • Dickson v. Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012, 1024 (Tex. 1924) ("The parts most pertinent [] announce that Mrs. Ferguson is running on a platform previously promulgated by her husband, who would be the candidate but for the adjudication of his ineligibility, and pledges the best efforts of both Mrs. Ferguson and husband to give the people the best administration which their ability and gratitude can produce. After carefully considering the circular and articles, we conclude they negative the claim that Mrs. Ferguson was not the real candidate for Governor, and are wholly insufficient to establish as a matter of law any conspiracy to use her name as a subterfuge to escape the effect of the impeachment decree.")
  • Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 893 (Tex. 1924) ("If the Senate only had the power to remove from office, it might be said, with some show of reason, that it should not . . . . But under the Constitution the Senate may not only remove the offending official; it may disqualify him from holding further office, and with relation to this latter matter his resignation is wholly immaterial. For their protection the people should have the right to remove from public office an unfaithful official. It is equally necessary for their protection that the offender should be denied an opportunity to sin against them a second time. The purpose of the constitutional provision may not be thwarted by an eleventh-hour resignation.")

Library Resources

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