Editing Texas Constitution talk:Article XVI, Section 50 (section)

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The constitutional provisions Zepeda relies on were enacted before LaSalle. None "contains . . . language that would indicate displacement of equitable common law remedies was intended," and as in LaSalle, "we decline to engraft such a prohibition onto the constitutional language."[25] Furthermore, since LaSalle was decided, § 50 has been amended twice, in 2013[26] and 2017,[27] but neither set of amendments added language addressing subrogation.

Zepeda argues that the availability of subrogation as a safety net erodes lenders' incentives to make loans that comply with all constitutional requirements and to promptly cure any defects. Freddie Mac counters that abolishing subrogation would result in a windfall to borrowers, that subrogation does not even make a lender whole because the amount of the subrogated first lien is usually less than the loan on which the borrower defaulted, and that abolishing subrogation would destabilize the Texas real-estate industry and increase the cost of borrowing money. Home-equity loans have been legal in Texas for about 24 years, but subrogation has been part of the common law for more than a century. On this historical and procedural record, we believe that revisiting the wisdom of subrogation in this case is unwarranted.

19-0712 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Zepeda